

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THE FOX

EDITED BY

SARAH CHARLESWORTH
MICHAEL CORRIS
PRESTON HELLER
JOSEPH KOSUTH
ANDREW MENARD
MEL RAMSDEN

REVIEW CONSULTANT ..... IAN BURN
COPY EDITOR ..... PAULA RAMSDEN
ASSISTANCE ..... NICK HOLMES, JOHN SHORT,
OSCAR YACILA, STEVEN MARTIN

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IT IS THE PURPOSE OF OUR JOURNAL TO TRY TO ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF COMMUNITY PRACTICE. THOSE WHO ARE INTERESTED, CURIOUS, OR HAVE SOMETHING TO ADD (BE IT PRO OR CON) TO THE EDITORIAL THRUST...THE REVALUATION OF IDEOLOGY...OF THIS FIRST ISSUE ARE ENCOURAGED, EVEN URGED, TO CONTRIBUTE TO FOLLOWING ISSUES. ALL OTHER CORRESPONDENCES ARE WELCOME. CONTRIBUTIONS AND CORRESPONDENCES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: THE EDITORS, POST OFFICE BOX 728, CANAL STREET STATION, NEW YORK CITY, 10013.

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A DECLARATION OF DEPENDENCE

SARAH CHARLESWORTH

"We are living in a period of unprecedented destruction of languages and cultures, of nations, under the assault of highly bureaucratic states. These exert, both internally and externally, a steady pressure, reducing culture to a series of technical functions. Put another way, culture, the creation of shared meanings, symbolic interaction, is dissolving into a mere mechanism guided by signals".—Stanley Diamond[1]

I.

When we discuss a work of art or an art tradition, we are discussing a phenomenon which exists in an integral relationship with the entire complex of human social and historical forces defining the development of that work or tradition. This same complex of social and historical forces in turn inevitably defines the context in which that work or tradition claims significance, and ultimately functions as a force or agent in the ongoing evolution of that culture. Thus we are at once the products and the producers of the culture in which we participate. *This seems so obvious,* yet we often fail to recognize that while options may be limited, the value and function of our work may be defined by the social and economic context in which we operate; we are ourselves, individually and collectively, the constitutive agents of the social complex that defines the value and significance of our work. In the same way that we as artists are *responsible* for the notion of art, by the formulation of art works or concepts, we are in turn responsible to the culture itself in the formulation of the notion and function of art.

In speaking of a social and historical context in which any art work or tradition evolves and is transmitted, it is difficult to differentiate between the political and economic order which prevails at any particular time and place, and the ideological or intellectual traditions which have developed concommitantly; these latter more often than not serve to reinforce and sustain the political and economic order. Institutions tend to claim authority over the individuals and their activity in society *regardless of whatever subjective meaning* they may attach to their situation and endeavor. The ideological structure of society integrates and legitimizes the institutional order by explaining and legitimizing its objectivated meanings.

If we speak specifically about art in modern European and American culture, we see that its meaning, function, and value within society are clearly institutionally mediated; and that not only artistic values, but the intellectual and ideological forces which explain, interpret and legitimize art practice have their origins in the very same traditions that presuppose that institutional order. Thus the structural system of the art-world, which provides a context for the social signification of art, is itself contextually situated in a social system, the structure of which it in turn reflects. At this point, attempts to question or transform the nature of art beyond formalistic considerations must inevitably begin to involve a consideration not only of the presuppositions inherent in the internal structure of art models, but also a critical awareness of the social system which preconditions and drastically confines the possibility of transformation.

If we recognize the institutional structure of a complex society to be (culturally) all-embrasive, then we may begin to see that in attempting to redefine, alter or redirect the social definition or function of art—the manner and channels through which we can effectively work—we are encountering a firmly entrenched and highly developed institutional order: not just when confronting the obvious bureaucratic structure of the New York art world, but encountering the force of that order on every level, from such specific factors as the persistance of socially convenient (marketable) formal models of art (i.e. painting and sculpture) to more abstract socially convenient (noncontroversial) theoretical models (formalism, art for art's sake), to the most blatant sociological fact that cultural power is clearly allied with economic power, and that to a large extent the internalizations of the dictates of the produetive

system regarding patterns of legitimation and consumption are the very means by which individuals surrender their critical faculties to that system.

A certain ideological inversion or mystification which Marx calls false consciousness is apparent in the very fact that in discussing art, we commonly describe the sphere of influence in the following manner: as one moving *outward* from the individual artist, who, acting out of personal feelings or convictions, expresses himself/herself by way of a statement, traditionally in the form of a discrete work or art product, the social recognition and validation of which is dependent on some internal properties, termed "quality", which bear upon its visual or historical characteristics, *outward* through a system of institutions responsive to its self-evident merit; which in turn circulate and promote the work accordingly, to the benefit of all those culturally refined and sensitive enough to partake of its virtues. Hence the artist, as well as his product and the abstract sphere of his influence, are assumed "transcendent", that is, somehow responsive to and effective of abstract psychic and social conditions somewhat removed from the mundane conditions of "everyday life". The historical, social, and psychological factors which bear upon the artist are viewed from the perspective of predominantly after-the-fact analysis, the domain of various somewhat less "transcendent" (presumably more "objective") specialists who interpret and speculate on the myriad social and historical influences and implications manifest in the personal history, life style and oeuvre of the particular subject under study—those factors which bear upon and are implicit in the process of validation or interpretation seldom being taken into account. The art work as a symbolic token of the struggle of the individual artist and the spiritual and social dilemmas which that individual struggle in turn reflects, becomes in a sense a sanctified cultural relic, presumably embodying in itself some elusive, imaginative spirit.

One wonders, of course, why it is the *tokens* of struggle toward meaning and not *the struggle itself* to which we respond (or how much spirit we can touch upon when these tokens become the stock in trade of a sophisticated cultural elite). That this conception is naive and idyllic and totally out of keeping with the rather more complex situation in which cultural phenomena emerge, develop, and function ought to be readily apparent; however, attempts to construct a more accurate basis for understanding are not without problems. One obvious alternative model to this ideological Disneyland is of course a (very broadly speaking) materialist schema, in which material processes, specifically the mode of production and distribution of goods, services and capital within and amongst societies is the primary and overriding factor of which all mental and spiritual attitudes and formulations are (consciously or unconsciously) in large part the product. "All parts of the ideological superstructure, art being one of these, are crucially determined both in content and style by the behavior of a more basic structure which is economic in nature."[2] But it would be deterministic, in this case, to suppose that the mere economic dependence of the artist, a certain *external* tie which links producer to consumer (and vice versa), is the full extent of that relationship, that the economic and social conditions of production are explicit and can be dealt with as such; but rather they are *implicit and internalized* to such a degree that they inform *every aspect of our self and social consciousness* upon which all praxis is founded. The artist may then be unwittingly supportive of ideals or conditions in relation to which he sees himself neutral or even opposed.

While a materialist critique and the dialectical method it implies is eminently useful as a tool by which to reorient our inquiries, to attempt to situate our self-presumptions, to gauge the implications and ramifications of our critical or practical stance, we should at the same time recognize the historical (and ideological) nature of this tradition/model, as well as the one from and to which we bring it to bear. A dialectical or immanent critique, however, takes seriously the principle that it is not ideology itself which is untrue but rather its pretention to correspond to reality. There can be no method of escape, no science, no dialectic, no objective criteria which are not in turn subjectively assumed. The issue then becomes not so much a question of how we can achieve a "value-free" or "objective" model or theory of art practice as it is a question of what values and conditions of learning we in fact promote and provide through our practice of art.

I can no more reduce the "spirit of art", to which I am still responsive, to an entirely material-

istic function than I can conversely, assume it to be neutral or independent of material conditions. I am wary of the individualism and subjectivism which pervades our self and social consciousness, which I believe (when assumed uncritically) is actually a factor which perpetuates the oppression of individuals in our society. Concurrently I would argue that it is only when individuals begin to accept a responsibility for the social implications of their actions that a collective spirit or consciousness conducive to social change can occur. While being critical of the idealistic and presumptive notion of freedom and transcendence which informs the modernist paradigm, I myself work within the context of that art, that tradition; in part because I am responsive to certain ideals which that endeavor represents and recognize therein a certain emancipatory and self-reflexive capacity lacking to varying degrees in other disciplines. My own work is tempered with realism only to the extent to which I feel continually compelled to re-examine or redirect my course in relation to such ideals.

Throughout this essay I use the pronoun "we", and thereby incorporate myself and others into some abstract community, and assume a certain sympathy amongst the members so included. This is in part a function of the fact that I see myself as a participant in a real community which in my case might be centered around my involvement with The Fox and my working relationship with other participants; but I also address and appeal to a larger community which is made up of other individuals with whom I share a common tradition, a similar historical and cultural locus, who see themselves and/or have come to be recognized variously as artists, critics, dealers, curators, professors, students and so on. All are at least potentially in a position to make critical choices which will effect not only the internal character but also the social dynamic of contemporary and future art activity. To a large extent, we learn what our purposes are through the systems which we use, just as we learn what is required for survival through the interaction of those systems and our experience in trying to do things. For each of us there is a certain element of contradiction involved in the majority of personal and professional choices that we make, a certain tension between self survival/self interest and social interest/species survival. Some of us feel this conflict more intensely than others and we have varying interests and values at stake. It is important, however, that we begin to recognize and elucidate the criteria and implications of choice rather than continue to apologize, rationalize, and obfuscate. None of us, neither artist, critic, dealer, curator, nor "patron of the arts," can be said to be free of conflict of interest when it comes to the making of the cultural phenomena "art".

If art is viewed as one aspect of culture or one form of "symbolic action", then the logic embodied in this particular system and the meanings which we attribute to our actions must be considered in relation to, or more precisely as evolving within and contributing to, a larger context of social meaning. But characteristic of our liberal tradition, both on an intellectual or ideological level (political liberalism, empiricism, logical positivism) as well as on an intuitive or common sense level, is a tendency toward an emphasis on the individual fact or item at the expense of an awareness of the relational or contextual aspects in which such a seemingly discrete fact or item occurs. This tendency has been manifest in contemporary art both in our conceptualization of art as an autonomous and self regulatory discipline, an assembly of static objects of contemplation, as well as in our inclination to interpret the symbolic or gestural content of our actions in a dissociated and superficial manner.

Viewed from one perspective, the history of modern art has been a long revolution against the complacency, sentimentality and tedium of bourgeois culture, a rebellion against the self-assuming and rhetorical aspects of traditional forms, against the threat of subsumption or diversion of political or social non-art concerns—a veritable march of progress in the name of freedom, of individuality, of *art*. On a symbolic level, this is apparently so; on a theoretical level as well. *But* is not the very logic through which we hail the theoretical and symbolic tokens of "revolutionary spirit" while embracing those very tokens in an attitude of blind acceptance and self-complacency, a tribute to the *failure* of that art—and the logic it embodies—to adequately comprehend and respond to the exigencies of a very real social and ideological predicament that, none the less, transcends and subsumes that art? Freedom and independence is not something you can posit and proceed to as-

sume, but a condition fought for and seldom won.

II.

Implicit in our understanding of modernist art is the assumption that art values and objeetives might somehow be viewed as dissociatcd or neutral in relation to the social sphere in which they operate. Andre Malraux pointed out that "the middle ages had no more idea of what we mean by fine art than Greece or Egypt. In order that this idea could be born it was necessary for works to be separated from their function . . . the most profound metamorphosis began when art has no other end than itself."[3] In keeping with this tradition, when we speak of function or meaning when discussing art work we refer to the function or meaning of that work not so much in relation to a larger sphere of social praxis, but rather within the isolated and abstracted province "art". *The struggle of modernism in the West has been, above all else, a struggle to establish an independent and autonomous context of meaning at once in opposition to and in disregard of the existent social order.* Thus when Ad Reinhardt was to proclaim the one permanent revolution in art is always a negation of the use of art for some purpose other than its own, and that all progress and change in art is toward the one end of art as art-as-art, he was, as he claims, echoing an ideal which has characterized the writings of a majority of artists and theorists of the modern era. In 1834, Theophile Gautier in his preface to *Mademoiselle De Maupin*, (frequently considered the first real manifesto of the art for art's sake movement), likewise argued for the elimination of all utilitarian and moral purpose for art, in favor of anarchistic individualism, which he regarded as the reflection of unique romantic genius; he was in turn responding to an idealistic conception of disinterested and pure beauty, formulated earlier still by Kant.

It is a curious and romantic notion that somehow by ignoring that which is repugnant within the existing order, we might quite logically be immune to its effect. But more curious still is the fact that this profoundly romantic and idealistic attitude, in which the problems of the apprehension of beauty, pure and independent of moral or utilitarian concerns, a primarily aesthetic and metaphysical preoccupation descended from the enlightenment, should survive in an age when the creation of beauty and aesthetic enjoyment are no longer the self-proclaimed ends of art. Although the notion of *l'art pour l'art* now appears an outdated and naive preoccupation, a romantic struggle against bourgeois ideals of social utility, we must begin to question the degree to which this idealistic 19th century construct has been internalized—in not only early modern, but even the most current art-model. As Arnold Hauser points out, "What was onee a revolt against classical rules has become a revolt against all external ties . . . from the standpoint of the direct aesthetic experience, autonomy and self-sufficiency appear to be the essence of the work of art, for only by putting itself completely in the plaee of reality, only by forming a total self-contained cosmos, is it able to produce a perfect illusion. But this illusion is in no way the whole content of art and often has no share in the effect it produces. The greatest works of art forego the deceptive illusion of a self-contained aesthetic world and point heyond themselves."[4]



Leaving aside the question of "great works", is it not true that in forwarding an ideal self-image of autonomy (both in our concept of discrete self-contained art works and art values in general—in the face of all manner of evidence to the contrary), we are in effect now perpetuating those same bourgeois values such self confinement was originally deemed to escape? Even the question of bourgeois values is growing increasingly moot. *There is a great deal more to be frightened of at this point than the taint of an impure art.* When the power of validation and legitimization of human enterprise occurs more and more within an institutionalized system, where corporate power and investment potential are becoming increasingly the social concensus by which we signify meaning, it is clear that no private vision, no personal iconoclastic gesture can withstand.

Much "theoretical" or "analytical" work in the past few years has served to focus our attention on the conventional or conceptual underpinnings of our contemporary art practice. So-called conceptual art represents, amongst other things, an attempt to redefine art value or significance in terms of its ideational rather than physical ("experiential") attributes, but, as has been apparent for some time, to the extent that conceptual art is dependent upon the very same mechanisms for presentation, dissemination, and interpretation of art works, it *functions in society* in a manner not unlike previously more morphologically oriented work. Thus the *extent* to which its significance as art (or as idea) is dependent upon or inferred by its existence within the traditional context, its value or function within the culture is conditioned primarily by patterns of response *traditionally associated* with that context. This is a world in which honor is ritually bestowed, values assumed and rarely created. "Art as idea" was once a good idea, but art as idea as art product, alas, moves in the world of commodity-products and hardly the realm of "idea". The significance that early conceptual work bore in relation to previously held assumptions regarding formal requisites of traditional art practice is not to be denied, but formalistic innovation in and of itself is of questionable value. Since it is assumed that the intentional aspects of an artist's endeavor extend only to the making of a work or a proposition, and its placement or "documentation" within the prescribed context, the use or function of that work (aside from its existence as art history) is no longer an aspect of art. The artist is thus severed, except on a symbolic level, from his culture. *He responds to and assumes responsibility for an art in isolation.*

If art "lives" primarily by affecting other art (as is often claimed), then there is no mechanism by which such an art can reorient or redefine itself except out of a logic internal to the closure "art". Thus we are confined to a large extent to the progressive reduction and expansion of inherent formal relations; such "conceptual innovations" as may occur are subsumed within the system to which they refer. A tradition keyed to the demands of the competitive market, responding to the stylistic or formal elements of innovation, sees no use or value in the implications of change beyond the historical progressivity which it denotes. This is the ultimate consumership: *Ideas become the property of the inventor, and as such are no further use to the community once claimed.*

We move away from the tyranny of the picture frame only to discover that of the gallery, the market, and so on, and as it begins to become apparent that the privileging of the art object cannot be dissociated from the privileging of the context and tradition in which the object appears; we begin to wonder whether the very sense of that history or sociality, which is the shape and dynamic of our discipline, is not so much the momentum of a free and critical consciousness as the order of a definitive social and economic reality, the pervasiveness of which we have scarcely begun to grasp.

Inversely, we might begin to inquire whether the retreat from the objectification, commodification and institutionalization of traditional art models, which has characterized the tactics of certain more (theoretically) radical segments of the art community, is not so much a function of the realization of inherently noxious qualities which those models possess, as the instinctive recoil against *that which they represent*: the commodification and institutionalization of human history and endeavor.

While such activities now appear naive and unsuccessful on the one hand, in mistaking for ethic or style that which is in fact part of a more profound social and economic reality, they *do* signify a positive and potentially liberating capa-

city; that is, the will to change, to re-examine, and, more importantly, to "call to arms" the tools that make radical and contextual critique conceivable. Suppose we imagine this capacity as a medium, a methodology, and not an end in itself. We can *learn* as much, in a sense, through the "failure" of concept art as we do through its partial success; while being critical of the (self) presumptive and reductionist aspects of formalist tradition, we exist as its inevitable heir.

III.

Our dilemma at this point is profound and problematic in its circularity. If we assume any theoretical stance or critical viewpoint (by which we mean to assess a previous or other presumably "more naive" position), we must do so by use of a logic which justifies or lends authority to our current more "sophisticated" outlook. This new position claims precedence over antecedent or rival theories, and yet does so at the expense of obscuring its own presumptions. Thus we are always in a position of revealing the "false" foundations of one logic while claiming another similarly founded. This is, of course, where traditional Marxist social "science" as well as many sociological or anthropological models, particularly the structuralist models, break down. You cannot, on the one hand, claim that all knowledge is culturally determined, socially derived, and then in turn claim the objective validity of your own theory. In this sense the dialectic becomes immanently useful as an ideal working model but in practice something of an impossibility. So we proceed amidst contradiction.

Dialectical critique implies that one cannot view any object or subject at rest, for in the very act of viewing or depicting our object, we grasp self and subject as situated in the same historical moment from whence we depart. "Faced with the operative procedures of the nonreflective thinking mind (whether grappling with the philosophical or artistic, political or scientific problems and objects), dialectical thought tries not so much to complete and perfect the application of such procedures as to widen its own attention to include them in its awareness as well; it aims, in other words, not so much at solving the particular dilemmas in question, as converting those problems into their own solutions on a higher level, and making the fact and the existence of the problem itself the starting point of new research."[5]

That this model does represent at any given moment a logical closure which is immensely problematic in application is readily apparent; but its emancipatory as well as normative potential in the ideal is compelling. What is called for is not the replacement of one authoritative model with another; but rather the gradual creation of a community, a discourse, an art, which is not so much the reflection of our competitive and antagonistic pursuits as it is a common vehicle through which we might continually examine not only our own values and assumptions, but those of the culture of and to which we ideally speak. We might seek therefore not so much to regulate our cultural praxis in relation to the existent norms, as to understand, elucidate, and evaluate the normative import of those activities in which we are historically, presently, as well as potentially engaged. Thus the philosophy, the theory, the strategy and the ethics of practice become one with praxis itself. And yet this joinder of theory and practice in the ideal is always subject to and modified by conditions in relation to which we must continually re-evaluate our position. It is a dynamic and self-regulatory critical theory by which we attempt to understand and evaluate our own (art) practice in relation to social practice in general, and to evaluate social and historical conditions as they are effective of and become apparent in our practice of art.

If it is true that "the creation of a thing for the sake of a thing is itself an objective human relationship to itself and to man,"[6] then it is on the level of this relationship which we must question our function, for it no longer has much meaning to speak of the thing (art) in itself.

At the dawn of the 19th century, Hegel predicted that art would no longer, as in the past, be connected with the central concerns of man. Hegel saw the role of art becoming increasingly marginal as science moved into a stronger and more central position within society. Art, according to Hegel, would cease to be serious, as it became increasingly pure and disengaged. By moving into a marginal position, art would not lose its quality as art, but it would nonetheless cease to have direct relevance to the existence of man.

We have lost touch– not only with ourselves and with each other but with the culture of which

we are a part. It is only by confronting the problem of our alienation, making *this* the subject of our work, that our ideals take on new meaning. We move to become one again with culture in our sense of shared concern.

New York, New York

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FOR THOMAS HOBBES

MICHAEL BALDWIN AND PHILIP PILKINGTON

I.

The editors wanted something written about New York. What a bizarre idea.

One prevailing emotion (is that what it is?) is our inordinate snobbery in relation to the community allegedly under scrutiny. 'Why are so many of them so thick?' is perhaps not the sort of question we should be asking.

Another question: 'Why are there so few 'real' conflicts?' There seems to be support for Parsonian Open-Society-recommendations in the critical to-ing and fro-ing of New York's art community.

It's easy to say that the prevailing critical condition is that of hustling rules for the correct consumption of 'res'/objects which fall into various genetic/semantic/ontological classes ... This, in contradistinction to considering the conditions of practice. The last remark may sound like prejudice . . . but it seems to suggest something deeper, more 'historical' than might at first seem obvious.

A facile observation is that there might be a better situation in New York vis a vis 'change' if the artistic community were full-blooded reactionary, rather than thin-blooded reactionary/revolutionary.

There are a lot of neo-teacher's pets on the one side, and a lot of drones and slack mouths and excess saliva on the other. Some of the conceptual illuminati are still making the mistake of assuming it's their job to sort-out the epistemological casualties left behind by the drones (etc.). Some of the illuminati want to join the drones on their own terms.

A day in the life of N.N. in New York . . . Why does it bring the worst out in N.N.? Perhaps it's because it's tedious to watch people spend a great deal of their time living in the store—'self-managing' the organization of experience from the outside. That's bad grammar and paradoxical, but it also describes something observable.

(A lot of the N.Y. community doesn't get into our picture: we don't know much about many painters, pardoners, millers, manciples and wives of Brooklyn.) Many of the rest—about whom something is known (felt)—adhere more rigidly to the ideology of the status quo than the self images of the reformist might supply. Are there any reformers anyway? What would they say about ideology?

Do the inhabitants of the artistic Big House (in both available metaphoric senses) ever see anyone 'outside'? Even the plumbers and carpenters are offduty artists. The only non-artists (or art-pundits, etc.) known to artists (or art-pundits) are more economically (etc.) powerful than the artists. Before anyone reaches mistakenly for a handkerchief, it should be noted that many artists are rich. Historically non-vacuous sociality is a vain hope.

New York's artistic community approaches the condition of a lumpen-bourgeoisie. We want to show some of its characteristics.

This is being written out of the gutter—stifled of critical purchase. The Copernicanism of much of the intellectual output compounds the proliferation of privatized quasi-dialectic. It may be argued that the basis of the art-market hierarchy (which is in some places non-classical) may be found in the assumption of privacy of output.

'The dominant ideas of each epoch are the ideas of its ruling class' . . . Don't think of this in relation to successful people . . . artists . . . That particular sort of resonance

situation is well-known. It might be more instructive to think of it in relation to mystificatory popularism-as-anti-elitism.

Some people have earnestly taken up Marxism in one form or another. A parenthetical motto might be introduced: "Set up revolutionary holy writ and make the observation (pace Marx) that 'Revolutionaries have only interpreted Marx (or Bakunin) . . . what's necessary (from the ideological perspective) is to change them'."

It's a commonplace to say that the increase in consumption has rules, some of which are generalized into the context of quasi-esoteric merit-objects. It's less usual to say that many artists are more-or-less integrated in the system of exploitation. Wherewith most critics and enthusiasts?

Another normal thing to say (for us) is that bureaucratization corresponds to the rationalization of experience from the outside. Its corollary is the observation that, as a consequence, individuals seek private solutions to social problems.

'The comprehensiveness of what are called needs and the methods of their satisfaction are likewise historical products, depending in large measure upon the stage of civilization a country has reached . . . and depending, moreover, to a very considerable extent upon . . . under what conditions . . . the class of free workers has come into existence.' (Marx, *Capital*, p. 22).

Marx's system of political economy, his whole theory of crises and (by implication) his assumptions as to how socialist consciousness arose (arises) were based on his theory of wages. Many expensive Marxists, as well as inexpensive ones, still look at the dialectic on the same basis. It corresponds to a conception which is equivalent to treating work-potential (necessary conditions of ideology (remember, we don't mean reactionary, or simply bourgeois ideology)) in theory in the same way as reactionaries would like to treat it/them in practice . . . but can't . . . as objects: work-potential, it is still claimed, is *integrally* a commodity.

Ideology is not, in our sense, an instrument of moral reform. Many of the more well-meaning artists of whom we are aware seem to make this mistake. Feasible comment will have to be concerned with pointing to the opacity and inertia of institutions willingly connived-at by the avant garde, reformists, people who discovered political economy last week and sundry others. 'Constantly growing conditions of change' is (at best) Trotskyist incantation. We leave out modernists, etc.—obviously.

Writing about New York could easily slip . . . into some spurious base-superstructure archivism because it was more than writing about art. Furthermore, the authentic problem is not to be served in genuflecting to the Olympian height of expensive Marxian culture analysis.

We are forced to consider the demand from the inside (historically) and provide the picturesque only occasionally in a story of bureaucratic degeneration. Any social/cultural observations will be transformed by apparent congruence rules generated by the pervading *Kulturlogik*. Selective modal filtration takes place via hegemonies . . . And anyway, we are bound to generate disjoint referent-complexes in relation to a specious ('public') 'true structure'. This sort of complexity was never envisaged in the genre-fixated structurist tradition.

Perhaps what we ought to do is examine some conditions of going-on in New York. This in a non-esoteric way . . . remember a favourite Lukács quote. We've written so long and so complexly about/within ideology that we might think that we'd demonstrated some complexity: anyone who can't understand at this point (neither laughing nor weeping) might look at some other things we've written.

It might be argued that one has to leave the West in order to find instances of ideology. Again, this is ideology in a non-neutral sense: think of a complex mesomeric hybrid—anti bureaucratic ideology; the ideology of the problematic (dialectic); the ideology that's a revision of the resources of expression; ideology that's in confrontation with de facto conditions of rationality . . . contra bourgeois rationality as a socializing function. There is an important sense in which the possibility of ideology is the possibility of the modali-

ties of social action . . . given that the deontic /alethic indices of ideology do not (obviously) have concrete correlates. It seems they can't . . .

Back to the West. Wouldn't we rapidly uncover another place (aside from New York) to talk about if we had in any way kept up with the idea of art as ideology/practice? The judgement that they do bad art in Cuba and Algeria is merely a reflection of the consumption-determinants of the international museum.

Back to the question. Why do we have friends in New York and why don't we have any/many(?) friends in Algeria? There's a sense in which one would want to demonstrate a pro-attitude to the statement that ideological interest is a negatively accelerated function with respect to economic→'cultural' sophistication (progress) approaching an inverse-ratio situation. The statement is hopeless since it presupposes a hard and fast answer to the problem of cultural (learning) resonance. It might further be argued that, in accepting the statement, one would not be asking oneself to consider highly transformational entities . . . intraspatial transformations are not identical with interspatial ones. Depolitization in the West doesn't inter alia recommend third world politics.

All right; we're discussing New York . . . it's a figure against a ground . . . New York is the general phenomenon: it is simply the case that the wider aspect of the problem of social organization is not that of transformation from an early or (prehistoric) form to a modern one (e.g., pre-industrial to industrial). And let's not dig up Jackson Pollock, or asses like W. Rubin, or any other mandarin of the modern tradition.

The problem of an ideological expression vectored on, or a function of the mass (or social(ist)) activity of the working class is essentially bound to a functional network of historical conditions. If we are going to say this, however, we may have to look at the suprastructural conditions and dynamics of history. So much for one caveat. But we still have something like an excuse . . . but we are bound to express cultural/historical dysfunction-congruity with respect to what the conditions of learning (N.Y.) might be. *Inter alia*, someone might discern what looks like a teleologically asymmetrical cultural temerity. The latter won't be discernable as an abstract or metaphysical exercise in sociological analysis. It's a real problem to sort out reflexive definitions with respect to the indices that constitute 'environment' in theory and in *practice*.

A subtitle was suggested: 'New York, its only hope:—return to Europe'. It was pointless. It's much easier to say that (e.g., modernist, neo-modernist and most post-modernist . . . conceptual art activity) represents an almost complete ossification of any conditions of a feasible or non-bureaucratic ideology. And many new-born 'Marxists' might be added to the list. Traditional revolutionaries mark time while 'progress' in one form or another continues apace. New York society artists have instantiated the most superstructural and inconsiderable form of this appropriation in their manipulation of after-order (quasi-dialectical) naive critical reformism.

Modernism, even in its most attenuated sense (and this covers nearly all of the dynamics of New York art-practice) is commensurate with the modernization of capitalism in the development of interventionism, etc. There seem to be very few instances of classical economic crises (cf. earlier and later remarks about conditions of change). Most artists in the West are fully integrated into the system of exploitation. The implicit *telos* of New York art is more than paradigmatic—negotiating an uncritical docility in exchange for the possibility of practice within the narco-social-security of acquisition.

'We have to revalue 'superstructure' toward a related range of cultural practices' . . . →learning . . . 'away from' . . . a specifically dependent content. And crucially, we have to revalue the 'base' away from the notion of a fixed economic or technological abstraction . . . That's not a species of militancy of a novel kind. It would be appalling to sustain a crude base-superstructure relation just so as to have a stalking horse. Some restriction, however, should be put on 'totality' as the description of

structure. Hegemony has been (re) introduced by some writers as heuristic in this connection. It emerges as a structuring concept. Hegemony is postulated as having some inordinate depth. It corresponds to a generative saturation of dialogical and material life. It won't hurt Gramsci if it's said that it may be thought to constitute a primary bound of rationality . . . this, insofar as the conditions of rationality might be thought to be socially determined.

The question may be asked whether a *daseinsformen* has been reached, such that the feasibility of a transformation of praetice is feasible in the New York lattice. Much traditional Marxism-revolutionism has not been adequate to the task. The question raised in general must be regarded here as a neighbour of the question what New York's *Kunstwelt* has done to historical ideology and what is now feasible given an answer. We are looking at the non-praxis of an academy's epistemia at best—even Chomsky.

Answering some of the questions will involve self-consciously coping with 'eine verschwindende Notwendigheit'; this doesn't mean that we're advocating a relativistic interpretation of ideology. There is a reciprocal interpenetration of the theoretical and ideological faetors in a particular system locality. That's an almost incredibly porous generalization, but it might be sufficiently plausible to stop people staring fixedly at a socio-economic standpoint and hoping for a critical purview of the situation. One does not hope for Keynesian 'horrid conversion' in New York or anywhere else.

Mannheim's attempts to get over his own mechanistic determinism-relativism with the 'freischwebende Intelligenz' involve a fictitious structural postulate. Overt 'life-transformations' are indigestible to his theories, and the fictitious postulate is introduced to cope with that fact. Intellectuals are 'mobile' (intellectually and sociohistorically) because—you guessed it—they are intellectuals. The ideological function of these angels is supposed to be the transformation of interest conflicts into idea conflicts. The Lukácsian 'totality' is no more than a methodological principle, but Manheim's is supposed to he 'empirical'.

Contra-Mannheim, art practice is dialectically ideological—not 'ideological': the latter means 'purblind to the modifications and transformations of its sphere of operation'. You might remember 'Ideology and Utopia' as a boring reactionary book: (e.g.) 'voluntary attachments' are made (chosen) from a middle-way ideology. Pace Lenin, 'There is no middle way'. It is perhaps necessary to posit a fairly wholistic picture of historical materialism. This would not be a 'structural whole'—and, particularly, it would not be Mannheim's logically simple progress (objectivity) of history.

When does Anthony Quinton-political-philosophy/theory become self-conscious of its ideas as distinct from and instead of its interests? Para-Socratic self-knowledge is arcane. For Mannheim, the *intelligenz* provide a self-consciousness for a political movement via ideas. Oh really? Somebody is trying to sell us a highly restricted and 'noise-free' notion of attachment to a group—attachment *sans* historical embedding into the group set. We are supposed to accept a supervening function. And it's not even the Lukácsian 'ought' that points to the whole. The whole is supposed to be a fact. The idea of mass interpenetration/integration is chimerical and not any sort of condition. (Try to sort-out a logic of 'joining' pre-conditions.) Anyway, we're talking about a dumb view of the 'political' world . . . The 'political' world is idealistically categorized—i.e., it's supposed not to be materialist-cum-socio-economic and its also supposed to be non-dynamic. 'Group interests' simpliciter must be idealistic. Hence 'POLITICAL SCIENCE'.

Self-serving and smug ideas about 'the whole' and the possibility of choice of class interests within it: our friend from the London School of Economics tells us that you/we have to know your/our specific position in 'the whole'. This corresponds to a simple-minded view of collective forces and class interests (cf. Michels, Lenin, Trotsky . . .). What is postulated is a *de facto (daseinen)* structure/structural whole: what about economic growth? It is absurd to postulate a *de facto* 'whole' and then explain the possibili-

ties of transcending that 'whole' as a monad within it. Structure just becomes Leibnizian—mechanistic because of the postulated structure of judgement in relation to 'dynamic' point(s) of reference. Young-left thespian ravings are ravings and are not explanation-cum-categorization: 'Radical Philosophy'.

'Defence not defiance' was a Trade Union Congress slogan in the 1940's and 1950's. Many wage-labour disputes began and ended (according to Roger Hyman in 'Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism'. 1972) at the point of production. Lenin would no doubt have said that 'The End of Ideology' was premature for bourgeois sectional consciousness, but no answer to that book lies in ideological casuistry.

Open society criticism abounds—as production—or, at least, as indispensable to it. Two thirds of total global production consists of objects of consumption. Accumulation takes place on familiar lines via 'the proliferation of needs' and collateral systems.

Slavish or not, it seems that one of the ways to avoid expensive Marxism is to try and support some form of base-superstructure distinction. It seems quite feasible to regard 'the superstructure' as 'the determined' *de dicto* . . . and 'the material conditions'. etc. as not universally determining. This involves an interpenetration of complex sets. This is as much a bar to epistemological snobbery as to simplistic correlations.

It may be asserted that the 'critical action' within the established framework of putative practice (and within aspiring frameworks) is commensurate with, if not indispensable to, the maintenance of stable conditions of production within that framework. This remark applies strongly to 'reformers', and to many (all?) dissatisfied-because-of-a-lack-of-acclaim-reformers . . . as well as obvious idiots (Bueys . . .) and modernists, or neo-modernists. Where large 'groups', democratization projects, etc. are involved, collective action invariably amounts to an unholy collocation (sic) of suspended or suppressed private interests. 'A gathering for swapping private profundities' is another characterization. (Cf. most prospectuses for alleged collectivity—the Mannheimian underpinnings of which tend to be unavoidable even in circumstances of non-vacuous motivation.)

The privatization of practice . . . ideological pre-functions are a function of a positive increment of bureaucracy. Whatever the fans of Max Weber might say, you don't have to see this crystallization as inevitable. The corollary of the bureaucratization of practice (i.e. its transformation into consumables-plus-interpretive-tools-in-a-plenum) is typical of 'open society' pseudo-dialectic/conflict.

Politico-practical 'description' is perhaps best pursued in the tone of the 'red gutter press' that Keynes hated so much. Unfortunately, we aren't all that skillful at it. What we are trying to do is stress the reciprocal interpenetration of theoretical and ideological factors in a possible universe of discourse. Objections to 'close-on value free' are here theoretic-conceptual and not just social. New York must now be the metropolis for those who make the ideological claim of freedom from ideology(?)

How do we sort-out a non-Trotsky-like pedagogy?

We thought of this as a possible headline: 'How can I adopt a creed which preferring the mud to the fish exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia who . . . carry the seeds of human advancement.' Even if we need a religion, how can we find it in the turbid rubbish of the red bookshops? (J.M. Keynes, *A Short View of Russia*, 1925) Pray for turbid rubbish. The function of the *dasein* of living in New York seems to have been transformed from an 'accidit' base to disappearing necessity (cf. above). The participants (better, *dramatis personae)* must look on their lived set neighbourhood as a corporative organism, functioning, in come cases, as the determinant of the universe of discourse. Referring 'outside' is generally a further mystification. The community, as a consequence, moves according to the modalities of the bourgeois annexation of production.

A functional interpenetration of base and superstructure is (very nearly?) indispensable to the socialization of any possible ideology possibility . . . indispensable to the enculturation of art as practice. Remember the 'special' restrictions above on the use of ideology.

The phenomenon of privatization is discernable as a function of the bureaucratization of practice. 'Privatization' may be thought to extend as far as the preservation of 'low profile modalities' in practice. It is also a function of the disappearance of the dialectic of penetration *vis a vis* the pair base: totality to reach a class for itself (ideologically). The hegemonial assumption that the mass of workers is more-or-less unlikely to take an explicit historical stance in relation to capital society as a totality (postulated true whole) may very well be justified inductively, but there is no justification for the quasi superstructural substitution of ideology by the asymptotes of taste.

A partially systematic dispute over the uses of methodological fictions is no doubt dialectical. It's also of *palpable* historical *vacuity*. In saying that a given lump of modernist historicism is demonstrably reactionary, no one is suggesting that an amelioration is feasible via an enlargement of scale or scope. Differences of type do not all inhere in scalar considerations.

Now, traditional Marxism can't cope . . . traditional revolutionary ideology can't cope because they fail to identify the occurrences of privatization (and its siblings). It is pointless to point to those "'objective' social or methodological modifications" if no dynamic dialectical character is to be found in them. In the transformation of Marx into Marxism (which embodies all kinds of revision, etc.) the dialectical vector of art as ideology/learning incitation, etc. would have to be dismissed as utopian. And certainly it would be argued that what we've discerned as structural transformations imply that any such ideological perspective is merely utopian. Others might suggest we look at all the utopian rubbish that's been churned-out in the past.

It has to be remembered that what's being advocated is not a new non-problematic non-intensional-but-incitational tableau, but a particular problematic practice, socialized and regarded as practice. For this there have to be new institutions capable of operating in the social-structural interfaces (etc.) there really are and not a backyard leisure activity—like drumming up revolutionary content.

The historical character of Christian ideology is discovered in literary contexts with an undoubtedly *recherche* relation to the Gospels or St. Augustine. Similarly, it could be said that the historical reality of 'practical Marxism' is to be found more in Kautsky's vulgarizations, Bukharin's 'ABC' or Lenin's 'Karl Marx' than in Marx's writings as such. Many activists have followed these schematic accounts (and they've also written new ones). Concentration in these accounts is focussed on 'objective contradictions', and ideology (of the relevant kind) was seen as arising from the economic conditions of the wage earner—from his expropriation from part of the social product. Theoretically, attention remains on the 'objective contradictions' and there are many different 'dialectical-organization-principles' as propulsion accountancy. Economic questions provide the incitational groundwork. Traditionally, however, there has been no univocity of response (reply) to, or explicit formulation of, an answer to apparently impor-

"You know what I think about Chapple's right wing policies. But you can say one thing about him, he's not a paper tiger. He doesn't pretend to be something he isn't like Jones and Scanlon."

Q. But you can't simply blame the officials—they only reflect the rank and file to a large extent.

A. In this case that was clearly not so. If it was, then there would never have been any need for letters of 'advice and instruction.' But if national, district and branch officials claim to be left-wing then their job is not simply to pander to any reactionary need, but to *lead.*

Look at what happened at *Stoke.* The Convenors have a long history of retreating on issues of principle. Under Measured Day Work they have been more and more the messengers boys of management. Nevertheless, they were too weak on their own to sell out. They needed the official stamp on things. Once this had happened they were well away.

At the JSSC on Monday 27th August, a determined effort by militant stewards defeated the unanimous efforts of Simpson, Wild Morris and McClusky to avoid a mass meeting to reverse the decision to scab. What happened?

Firstly, the man responsible for moving the resolution calling for blacking of machines was none other than Morris, who was opposed to the idea! When he did move the resolution, he attacked scab labour once, and the International Socialists twice! Secondly Eddie McClusky, EC member of the communist Party 'couldn't find' any loudspeaker equipment. Amazing! But the convenors and company used the day's delay to great effect. The company announced a gigantic financial crisis all of a sudden. The delay of a day, at a time when sections were spontaneously walking out, defused the whole situation. Thirdly at the mass meeting, *despite all this* the vote was at worst 50-50. *Simpson* without hesitation, announced a 2-1 majority for returning to work.

Even despite this disgraceful behaviour, several sections refused to return to work and meetings broke out all over the place, with stewards tearing up their cards.

It is not true that the convenors and national officials 'reflect' the rank and file. To a large extent, the rank and file reflect the lead they get. This clearly shows by the Linwood situation.

Q. How do you see us rebuilding Trade Union organisation in the plants, and preparing for the struggle ahead?

A. As we pointed out earlier, Measured Day Work has transformed the situation in which the shop floor operates:

1. It has undermined the democratic relationship between the steward and his section under piecework.
2. It cuts down the extent to which any section can go-it-alone.
3. It puts much more power into the hands of the JSSC and top table and outside officials.

More and more, the trend is towards factory-wide struggles, not just over wages and bi-annual negotiations, but victimisations, shoddy work, and the like. M.D.W. forces the stewards more and more into being the defenders of the 'agreement'—not the representatives of the shop floor.

This means, militant stewards can no longer operate as individuals simply on behalf of their section. Since most key issues are factory wide, so the militants must organise on a factory-wide basis—and eventually combine and industry wide. This is where a group like the International Socialists comes in. In every factory (as we have started to do in Chrysler) we aim to group the militants together to thrash out a common policy towards the problems facing the factory. Acting together in putting our ideas to the shop floor, we militants have much more influence and can become an alternative to the top table, especially in critical situations. We need to spread our ideas to every section. We have found that regular bulletins and rank and file papers, written from the shop-floor, have helped considerably.

For example, the Chrysler Branch, despite being relatively small in relation to the workforce as a whole, has been able to affect recent struggles.

1. In the 'shoddy work' dispute, it was the Chrysler I.S. Branch members and others forming the *Ryton Action Group,* which led to the highly effective flying pickets which strangled Chrysler. At each stage in that dispute, the strike committee was ahead of the works convenor Gibson and many of the stewards (only 40% picketed at all) and the Ryton Action Group—supported by the best stewards—was way ahead of the strike committee. Had it been left to the strike committee the dispute would have petered out in no time at all, in pointless picketing of Ryton.
2. Also in the 'shoddy work' dispute, it was the Chrysler I.S. Branch which took the lead within the Stoke Plant in organising support for the Ryton pickets, and which consistently argued against the line of waiting to be laid off. Whilst the convenors were paralysed, the best sections were organising support and—for example, after the millwright was coshed—taking industrial action.
3. During the electricians dispute it was I.S. members and other good trade unionists, in the Stoke Stewards room, who defended trade union principles. When, after the mass meeting of Friday 24th August, all seemed lost, it was our exposure of the introduction of non-union sub-contract labour to do ETU work, which helped swing things back in favour of another mass meeting to reverse the Friday's decision.

Where the convenors took a lead, we backed them to the hilt. But usually, they retreated. Not only do we react to attacks on the shop floor by the management, because we look outside the factory as will as inside it, and because we see the whole society in class terms, we can, unlike the existing convenors, *see the attack coming before its too late.*

Thus in 1970, in Stoke Bulletin 9, at a time when only a tiny minority of stewards at Stoke were clear about Measured Day Work, we wrote:

"When Ford started the scheme 30 years ago, Ford workers were the highest paid in the motor industry. During those 30 years they sunk to the lowest paid."

Increasingly it is only socialists who can *plan* the resistance to the attacks of companies like Chrysler.

On top of this we have to build a really powerful and democratic combine organisation. Virtually nothing was done by the combine committee during the shoddy work dispute, and the main meeting of the combine convenors during the electricians dispute was *convened by management* TO LAY DOWN THE LAW. International links are also vital. This will be a hard job but must not be left to the trade union jet-set of outside officials. We in I.S. will do all we can to help this process through our members in, for instance, the Detroit plants of Jefferson, Mack and Dodge Main.

Horley, Oxfordshire

GLOSSARY

A.S.T.M.S.	*Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff. A coterie of arrivists—mostly devoid of political character. They invest heavily in recruiting (e.g.) University staff. cf. Radical Philosophy, Winter 1974 for a boring report on one of their member's (admirable) activities and demise at the hands of an incredibly boring professor of something-or-other.*
Jock Gibson	*Transport & General Workers Union chief convenor at Chrysler's Ryton (U.K.) plant.*
Jack Jones	*General Secretary of the T.G.W.U. Journalistically, he's regarded as the architect of the recent 'Social Contract' (between the unions and the Government (?)). He's also a fairly respectable figure (for a Socialist) in the eyes of the press.*
Hugh Scanlon	*President and General Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers. He's a former C.P. member regarded by the press as a dangerous Marxist.*
Stoke	*Another Chrysler (motor) plant in Coventry.*
Triumph Meriden	*Triumph Motorcycles. A co-operative since September 1973.*

It's a pity this glossary looks a little like a Hans Haacke Politikkunst *item. The purveyors of the fat and the sledges of* Bundeslkonografic *aren't interested in much in the way of solidarity. It looks as if Beuys' and Haacke's academy is for aesthetic democracy as the methodology of a secure (and opaque) institution. The extracts above demonstrate a radical alternative to their 'democracy'.*

THE ARTIST AS ANTHROPOLOGIST

JOSEPH KOSUTH

"The reflective assimilation of a tradition is something else than the unreflected continuity of tradition"
—Rolf Ablers

PART I

A FRAGMENTED AND DIDACTIC ETHNOLOGY OF SCIENCE AS RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY

Consider the following mosaic:

1. Albert Einstein:

. . . whoever has undergone the intense experience of successful advances made in this domain is moved by profound reverence for the rationality made manifest in existence. By way of this understanding he achieves a far-reaching emancipation from the shackles of personal hopes and desires, and thereby attains that humble attitude of mind towards the grandeur of reason incarnate in existence, and which, in its profoundest depths, is inaccessible to man. This attitude . . . appears to me to be religious, in the highest sense of the word.

2. Karl Polanyi:

. . . if we decided to examine the universe objectively in the sense of paying equal attention to portions of equal mass, this would result in a lifelong preoccupation with interstellar dust, relieved only at brief intervals by a survey of incandescent masses of hydrogen—not in a thousand million lifetimes would the turn come to give man even a second's notice . . . Our vision of reality . . . must suggest to us the kind of questions that it should be reasonable and interesting to explore.

3. Martin Jay:

Hobbes and later Enlightenment thinkers had assimilated man to nature in a manner that made man into an object, just as nature had been objectified in the new science. In their eyes, both man and nature were no more than machines. As a result, the assumption that nature repeated itself eternally was projected onto man, whose historical capacity for development, so closely bound to his subjectivity, was denied. For all its progressive intentions, this "scientific" view of man implied the eternal return of the present.

4. Max Weber:

All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is "important" in the sense of being "worthy of being known."

Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to their connection with our values . . . We cannot discover . . . what is meaningful to us by means of a "presuppositionless" investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation.

5. William Leiss:

So long as Christianity remained a vital social force in Western civilization, the notion of man as lord of the earth was interpreted in the context of a wider ethical framework. Religion's declining fortunes, however, led to the gradual secularization of this notion in imperceptible stages, and in contemporary usage it reveals few traces of its Judaeo-Christian background. The identification of mastery over nature with the results of scientific and technological progress, in connection with the cultural antagonism of science and religion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, dissolved the traditional framework. For Francis Bacon there was no apparent contradiction between his religion and his hopes for science—in fact the image of man as the lord of nature clearly helped him to unite the two; but the Baconian synthesis, so characteristic of the seventeenth century, has not endured. The purely secular version of this image retains the various associations derived from the political analogy discussed above while shedding the ethical covering that both sustained and inhibited it. In its latter-day guise, mastery over nature loses the element of tension resulting from the opposing poles of domination and subordination in the religiously based version and adopts a unidimensional character—the extension of human "power" in the world.

6. Stanley Diamond:

Just as, in the nineteenth century, the social organization and techniques of modern industrial capitalism emerge as a world force, so the idea of inevitable progress in the name of science becomes a fixed ideology. The revolutions having succeeded and then, quite obviously, having failed in their social promise, it appears as if all the frustrated passion was mobilized behind the idea of a regnant science.

7. Bob Scholte:

If the emancipatory and normative interests of "scientism," especially as practiced in applied domains, are contradictory and illusory, if no position can ever hope to be entirely value-free and transcultural, and if its naive, uncriticial application may either simply hide ideological presuppositions or unwittingly generate reactionary political consequences, does not the self-corrective, self-critical, and progressive nature of scientific activity eventually ensure consistency, transparency, and viability? I would argue—following Radnitzky and others—that this would be possible only if "scientism" were to embark on a self-reflexive and self-critical course, that is, one which would emancipate it from its own paradigmatic stance. This, of course, is highly unlikely, since the paradigm's own assumptions, procedures, and aims mitigate against a radical and contextual critique. The basic reason for this lack of self-reference lies in the widely held assumption that there is, and should be, a discontinuity between experience and reality, between the investigator and the object investigated. If we accept this assumption (which, ironically, is no longer tenable or practical, even from a strict scientific point of view) the scientist can afford to remain largely indifferent to his own existential, sociological, historical, and philosophical environment. . .

While "scientism" may express a peripheral interest in the intentional consciousness of scientific investigation, it does so only to use or to purge existential circumstances for the sake of scientific objectivity and replicability. Though it may utilize and contribute to the "ethnomethodologies" available at any given time and may study, manipulate, or implement a culture's norms and values, its professed and ultimate aim lies in transcending the sociocultural settings and particular time periods in which scientific activities are located and developed. Similarly, if progress demands at least some awareness of history, "scientism" nevertheless remains largely indifferent to the historicity of scientific praxis as a whole.

If "scientism" also considers itself empirical and problem-oriented, it usually assumes that facts are facts, that objective methods simply select relevant data without further affecting them, and that these "units of analysis" can be processed to yield lawful predictions and functional norms. Its overriding interest in logical clarity and technical precision, realizable within the "manageable" boundaries of "piecemeal" research, further assures only a marginal concern with the ontological grounds and epistemological preconditions which science's own activities nevertheless presuppose or simply take for granted. Finally, when "scientism" is raised to the encompassing status of a philosophical system, its ultimate purpose becomes the rational explanation of a determinable reality in accord with universal principles and objective techniques. Its transcendental aim is to establish and to verify formal laws and eternal verities. Any relativizing or perspectivistic alternatives to scientific dogma are simply considered irrational, impractical, or—worst of all—metaphysical.

8. Alvin Gouldner:

. . . objectivity is not neutrality, but alienation from self and society; it is an alienation from a society experienced as a hurtful and unlovable thing. Objectivity is the way one comes to terms and makes peace with a world one does not

like but will not oppose; it arises when one is detached from the status quo but reluctant to be identified with its critics, detached from the dominant map of social reality as well as from meaningful alternative maps. "Objectivity" transforms the nowhere of exile into a positive and valued social location; it transforms the weakness of the internal "refuge" into the superiority of principled aloofness. Objectivity is the ideology of those who are alienated and politically homeless.

In suggesting that objectivity is the ideology of those who reject both the conventional and the alternative mappings of the social order, I do not, however, mean to suggest that they are equally distant from both; commonly, these "objective" men, even if politically homeless, are middle class and operate within the boundaries of the social status quo. In some part they tolerate it because they fear conflict and want peace and security, and know they would be allowed considerably less of both if they did not tolerate it."

9. William Leiss:

The "mastery of inner nature" is a logical correlate of the mastery of external nature; in other words, the domination of the world that is to be carried out by subjective reason presupposes a condition under which man's reason is already master in its own house, that is, in the domain of human nature. The prototype of this connection can be found in Cartesian philosophy, where the ego appears as dominating internal nature (the passions) in order to prevent the emotions from interfering with the judgments that form the basis of scientific knowledge. The culmination of the development of the transcendental subjectivity inaugurated by Descartes is to be found in Fichte, in whose early works "the relationship between the ego and nature is one of tyranny," and for whom the "entire universe becomes a tool of the ego, although the ego has no substance or meaning except in its own boundless activity.

In the social context of competition and cooperation the abstract possibilities for an increase in the domination of nature are transformed into actual technological progress. But in the ongoing struggle for existence the desired goal (security) continues to elude the individual's grasp, and the technical mastery of nature expands as if by virtue of its own independent necessity, with the result that what was once clearly seen as a means gradually becomes an end in itself . . .

On the empirical level the mastery of inner nature appears as the modern form of individual self-denial and instinctual renunciation required by the social process of production. For the minority this is the voluntary, calculating self-denial of the entrepreneur; for the majority, it is the involuntary renunciation enforced by the struggle for the necessities of life.

The crucial question is: what is the historical dynamic that spurs on the mastery of internal and external nature in the modern period? Two factors shape the answer. One is that the domination of nature is conceived in terms of an intensive exploitation of nature's resources, and the other is that a level of control over the natural environment which would be sufficient (given a peaceful social order) to assure the material well-being of men has already been attained. But external nature continues to be viewed primarily as an object of potentially increased mastery, despite the fact that the level of mastery has risen dramatically. The instinctual renunciation—the persistent mastery and denial of internal nature—which is required to support the project for the mastery of external nature (through the continuation of the traditional work-process for the sake of the seemingly endless productive applications of technological innovations) appears as more and more irrational in view of the already attained possibilities for the satisfaction of needs . . .

The persistent struggle for existence, which manifests itself as social conflict both within particular societies and also among societies on a global scale, is the motor which drives the mastery of nature (internal and external) to even greater heights and which precludes the setting of any a priori limit on this objective in its present form. Under these pressures the power of the whole society over the individual steadily mounts and is exercised through techniques uncovered in the course of the increasing mastery of nature. Externally, this means the ability to control, alter, and destroy larger and larger segments of the natural environment. Internally, terroristic and nonterroristic measures for manipulating consciousness and for internalizing heteronomous needs (where the individual exercises little or no independent reflective judgment) extend the sway of society over the inner life of the person. In both respects the

possibilities and the actuality of domination over men have been magnified enormously . . .

The more actively is the pursuit of the domination of nature undertaken, the more passive is the individual rendered; the greater the attained power over nature, the weaker the individual vis-a-vis the overwhelming presence of society. . . .

So long as the material basis of human life remains fixed at a relatively low level and bound to premechanized agricultural production, the intensity of the struggle for existence fluctuates between fairly determinate limits. The material interdependence of men and women in different areas under such conditions is minimal, and the lack of any appreciable control over the natural environment also constricts efforts to extend the hegemony of particular groups permanently beyond their local borders. Political domination within and among societies is everywhere at work, to be sure, but it is also severely limited in scope. Slowness of communications and transportation hampers the exercise of centralized authority, which outside the area of its immediate presence is restricted to intermittent displays of its might; the daily struggle for the requirements of life normally occurs on a local basis. As mentioned earlier, in all forms of society characterized by class divisions the natural environment surrounding the individual in everyday life appears as actually or potentially in another's domain. The fear of being denied access to the means of survival is a determining aspect of the relationship between man and external nature in the evolution of society. But in the premechanized agricultural economy both ruler and ruled are subject to the parsimonious regime of nature: the comparatively low productivity of labor, the paucity of the economic surplus, and the small accumulated reserves of commodities generally check the designs of empire or at least render both domestic and imperial authority highly unstable.

The link between the struggle for existence and control of the natural environment is illustrated best by the fact that the intensity of the possible exploitation of human labor is directly dependent upon the attained degree of mastery over external nature. Here the decisive step has been the coming of industrial society: the machine and the factory system have expanded enormously the productivity of labor and consequently the possible margin of its exploitation. Thus the heightened mastery of external nature reveals its social utility in the mounting productivity of labor resulting from the technological applications of scientific knowledge in the industrial system. But why does there also occur a qualitative leap in the intensity of social conflict? In the first place, the economic surplus, which in class-divided societies is appropriated as private property, becomes so much larger and opens new opportunities for the development and satisfaction of needs, both material and cultural; consequently disposition over this surplus becomes the focus of greater contention. Second, certain types of natural resources (for example, coal and oil), available only in specific areas, become essential ingredients for the productive process. An adequate supply of these resources must be assured, and so the commercial tentacles of the productive unit must expand, until in some instances it draws upon supplies extracted from every corner of the planet. Inasmuch as every productive unit becomes dependent upon its source of raw materials, every actual or potential denial of access to them represents a threat to the maintenance of that unit and to the well-being of its beneficiaries. Since obviously no equitable distribution of the world's natural resources has been agreed upon, the effect of that widened dependency is to magnify the scope of conflict.

The imbalance among existing societies in the attained level of mastery over the external environment acts as a further abrasive influence. The staggering growth in the destructiveness of weapons and in the capabilities of the "delivery systems" for them aggravates the fears and tensions in the day-to-day encounters among nations, whether or not those weapons are ever actually employed. The most favored nations in this regard may wreak havoc anywhere on the globe, and those less fortunate must either hope for parity or expect to suffer repeated ignominy. The fact that every social order must fear the depredations not only of its immediate neighbors but potentially of every remote country—a condition arising out of increased mastery of nature accomplished in the context of persistent social conflict—alters the stakes in the dangerous game of human rivalry.

A fourth contributory factor may also be mentioned, namely, the extension of the struggle

to the realm of the spirit through intensive propaganda (both domestic and foreign) and the manipulation of consicousness . . . "

Finally, the rising material expectations of populations grown accustomed to an endless proliferation of technological marvels have a decisive impact. In this respect, mastery of nature without apparent limit becomes the servant of insatiable demands made upon the resources of the natural environment, that is, demands for the transformation of those resources into a vast realm of commodities. Perhaps they can be met—even on a universal scale, for all men. Yet if every level of gratification for material wants merely serves to elicit a more elaborate set of desires, the competitiveness and isolation among individuals that underlies the psychology of consumer behavior will continue to feed the sources of conflict.

Through the attempted conquest of nature, therefore, the focus of the ongoing struggle of men with the natural environment and with each other for the satisfaction of their needs tends to shift from local areas to a global setting. For the first time in history the human race as a whole begins to experience particular clashes as instances of a general world-wide confrontation; apparently minor events in places far removed from the centers of power are interpreted in the light of their probable effect on the planetary balance of interests. The earth appears as the stage-setting for a titanic self-encounter of the human species which throws into the fray its impressive command over the forces of nature, seemingly determined to confirm the truth of Hegel's dictum that history is a slaughterbench. The idea of man as a universal being, one of the great achievements of philosophical and religious thought, is refracted through the prism of universal conflict and realized in a thoroughly distorted form.

The cunning of unreason takes its revenge: in the process of globalized competition men become the servants of the very instruments fashioned for their own mastery over nature, for the tempo of technological innovation can no longer be controlled even by the most advanced societies, but rather responds to the shifting interplay of worldwide forces. Entire peoples and their fragile social institutions, designed for far different days, are precipitously sucked into the maelstrom.

10. Stanley Diamond:

Investment in the notion of progress in the nineteenth century was the beneficent aspect of a morbid process, which can be epitomized as the conquest of nature—including human nature. Imperialism was a political manifestation of the struggle against nature and man, associated with the notion of the inevitable superiority of Western civilization; the means at hand for conquering primitive and archaic peoples helped rationalize the scientific perspective in which they were viewed as inferior. Coincidentally, the spirit of reason, the scientific utopianism of the eighteenth century, was transformed into functional, or, better, reductive rationality, evident, ideally, in the mechanisms of the market, and embedded in the apparatus of industrial capitalism. The arena for rationalization becomes the whole of human existence; as reason is reduced to rationality, the aesthetic and sensuous aspects of the person are repressed, that is, they are brutalized or sentimentalized. The "performance principle" develops in antagonism to human nature or, rather, constricts the definition of human possibilities.

11. Max Horkheimer:

As the principle of the self endeavoring to win in the fight against nature in general, against other people in particular, and against its own impulses, the ego is felt to be related to the functions of domination, command, and organization . . . Its dominance is patent in the patriarchal epoch . . . The history of Western civilization could be written in terms of the growth of the ego as the underling subliminates, that is, internalizes, the commands of his master who has preceded him in self-discipline . . . At no time has the notion of the ego shed the blemishes of its origin, in the system of social domination.

12. William Leiss:

The objective of transforming all of nature (including consciousness) into the material of production becomes compulsive, blindly repetitive, and finally self-destructive. The apparatus of production expands infinitely—steady growth is its Nicene Creed—while all rational criteria for judging the human value of its fruits are subverted. The final stage is reached when the only rationale for production that can be offered is that many persons can be induced to believe that they really want and need the newest offering of commodities in the marketplace. At this stage domination over nature and men, directed by

the ruling social class, becomes internalized in the psychic processes of individuals; and it is self-destructive because the compulsive character of consumption and behavior destroys personal autonomy and negates the long and difficult effort to win liberation from that experience of external compulsion which marked the original relationship between humanity and nature.

13. Martin Jay:

Critical theory refused to fetishize knowledge as something apart from and superior to action. In addition, it recognized that disinterested scientific research was impossible in a society in which men were themselves not yet autonomous; the researcher, Horkheimer argued, was always part of the social object he was attempting to study. And because the society he investigated was still not the creation of free, rational human choice, the scientist could not avoid partaking of that heteronomy. His perception was necessarily mediated through social categories above which he could not rise.

14. Stanley Diamond:

The fear of excommunication from the kinship unit, from the personal nexus that joins man, society, and nature in an endless round of growth, in short, the sense of being isolated and depersonalized and, therefore, at the mercy of demonic forces—a punishment and a fear widespread among primitive peoples—may be taken as an indication of how they would react to the technically alienating processes of civilization if they were to understand them. That is, by comprehending the attitude of primitive people about excommunication from the web of social and natural kinship we can, by analogy, understand their repugnance and fear of civilization.

Primitive society may be regarded as a system in equilibrium, spinning kaleidoscopically on its axis, but at a relatively fixed point. Civilization may be regarded as a system in internal disequilibrium; technology or ideology or social organization are always out of joint with each other—that is what propels the system along a given track. Our sense of movement, of incompleteness, contributes to the idea of progress. Hence, the idea of progress is generic to civilization. And our idea of primitive society as existing in a state of dynamic equilibrium and as expressive of human and natural rhythms is a logical projection of civilized societies, in opposition to the latter's actual state. But it also coincides with the real historical condition of primitive societies. The longing for a primitive mode of existence is no mere fantasy or sentimental whim; it is consonant with fundamental human needs, the fulfillment of which (although in different form) is, as we have discovered in the milieus of civilization, a precondition for our more elaborate lives. Even the skeptical and civilized Samuel Johnson, who derided Boswell for his intellectual affair with Rousseau, had written:

when man began to desire private property then entered violence, and fraud, and theft, and rapine. Soon after, pride and envy broke out in the world and brought with them a new standard of wealth, for man, who till then, thought themselves rich, when they wanted nothing, now rated their demands, not by the calls of nature, but by the plenty of others; and began to consider themselves poor, when they beheld their own possessions exceeded by those of their neighbors.

15. Edward Sapir:

. . . a genuine culture refuses to consider the individual as a mere cog, as an entity whose sole raison d'etre lies in his subservience to a collective purpose that he is not conscious of or that has only a remote relevancy to his interests and strivings. The major activities of the individual must directly satisfy his own creative and emotional impulses, must always be something more than means to an end. The great cultural fallacy of industrialism, as developed up to the present time, is that in harnessing machines to our uses it has not known how to avoid the harnessing of the majority of mankind to its machines. The telephone girl who lends her capacities, during the greater part of the living day, to the manipulation of a technical routine that has an eventually high efficiency value but that answers to no spiritual needs of her own is an appalling sacrifice to civilization. As a solution of the problem of culture she is a failure—the more dismal the greater her natural endowment. As with the telephone girl, so, it is to be feared, with the great majority of us, slave-stokers to fires that burn for demons we would destroy, were it not that they appear in the guise of our benefactors. The American Indian who solves the economic problem with salmon-spear and rabbit-snare operates on a relatively low level of

civilization, but he represents an incomparably higher solution than our telephone girl of the questions that culture has to ask of economics. There is here no question of the immediate utility, of the effective directness, of economic effort, nor of any sentimentalizing regrets as to the passing of the "natural man." The Indian's salmon-spearing is a culturally higher type of activity than that of the telephone girl or mill hand simply because there is normally no sense of spiritual frustration during its prosecution, no feeling of subservience to tyrannous yet largely inchoate demands, because it works in naturally with all the rest of the Indian's activities instead of standing out as a desert patch of merely economic effort in the whole of life.

16. Meredith Tax:

In most cultures prior to that of industrial capitalism, artists have had a well-defined and clearly understood relation to some part of their society, some group of consumers. In a primitive tribe or collective, art is the expression of the whole tribe—later, some people may be specially good at it, or hereditarily trained to it, and take on the production of artifacts as their work, but they work surrounded by the community, and work for the community's immediate and obvious benefit. In other periods of history, the artist has produced for a court, for a personal patron, for a religious sect, or for a political party. It is only with the dominance of the capitalist system that the artist has been put in the position of producing for a market, for strangers far away, whose life styles and beliefs and needs are completely unknown to him, and who will either buy his works or ignore them for reasons that are equally inscrutable and out of his control.

PART II

THEORY AS PRAXIS: A ROLE FOR AN 'ANTHROPOLOGIZED ART'

"The highest wisdom would be to understand that every fact is already a theory."—Goethe

1. The artist perpetuates his culture by maintaining certain features of it by "using" them. The artist is a model of the anthropologist *engaged*. It is the implosion Mel Ramsden speaks of, an implosion of a reconstituted socio-culturally mediated overview.[1] Such a reconstituted overview is, as well, the praxis one speaks of. In the sense that it is a theory, it is an overview; yet because it is not a detached overview but rather a socially mediating activity, it is engaged, and it is praxis. It is in this sense that one speaks of the artist-as-anthropologist's *theory* as praxis. There obviously are structural similarities between an "anthropologized art" and philosophy in their relationship with society (they both depict it—making the social reality conceivable) yet art is manifested in praxis; it "depicts" *while* it alters society.[2] And its growth as a cultural reality is necessitated by a dialectical relationship with the activity's historicity (cultural memory) and the social fabric of present-day reality.

2. Art in our time is an extension by implication into another world which consists of a social reality, in the sense that it is a believable system. It is this holding up what is often said to be a "mirror" to the social reality which attempts to be believable and real. Yet the mirror is a *reference* which we take as being real. To the extent that we take it as being real, it is real. It is the manifestations of internalizations which connect an "anthropologized art" to earlier "naive" forms of art activity. Our "non-naiveness" means we are aware of our activity as constituting a basis for self-enlightenment, self-reflexivity—rather than a scientistic attempt at presenting objectivity, which is what a pictorial way of working implies. Pictorial art is an attempt to depict objectivity. It implies objectivity by its "other world" quality. The implication of an "anthropologized art", on the other hand, is that art must internalize and *use* its social awareness. The fallacy of Modernism is that it has come to stand for the culture of Scientism. It is art outside of man, art with a life of its own. It stands

and fails as an attempt to be objective. Modernism seems to offer two roads—one might be called the "high" road and the other the "low" road. The high road allowing for an impersonalized other-worldly "objectivity", or with the lower road, an idiosyncratic subjectivity reified "objective" in stylistic terms on the art-historical marketplace. The choice Modernism seems to offer is one between the personal "other world" or the objective "other world", with both being "alienated and politically homeless".

3. Thus the crisis Modernist abstract painting finds itself in is that it can neither provide an experientially rich fictive reality, the kind of quasi-religious "other world" believability which the traditional form of painting was still capable of maintaining earlier on in the Modernist period *nor*, by virtue of its morphological constriction and traditional semantic form has it been able to contribute *in any way* to the emerging post-Modern debates of the late sixties and early seventies. Modernist abstract painting now finds itself as a collapsed and empty category, perpetuated out of nostalgia that parades as a self-parody, due to the necessities of bankrupt mythic historical continuums, but ultimately settling for its meaning in the marketplace.

4. There is perhaps no better example of how crazed and alienated our culture has become than the popularity of photo-realism. Photo-realism has totally internalized pop irony. Its cold sober acceptance of American society iconizes consumer trivia. Perhaps what the camera sees is the desired scientific/technological view of the "objective" world. More likely though, a camera is a mechanical approximation of how a committee sees the world: it is the perfect bureaucratic vision of "objectivity". The hand-painted mechanized "objectivity" of photo-realism ends in an unproblematical fraud, of course, when one realizes that the selected pastiches of glimpsed reality are *glorifications*. Two of photo-realism's major practioners have steadfastly maintained that they were "abstractionists". One of them even paints the paintings upside down just to prove it. They probably *are* "abstract" in terms of their meaninglessness and alienation. To be engaged in an activity which consists of mimicking a machine in order to perfectly depict depictions of stoned silent vignettes of industrial or commercial artifacts, to sell on an impersonal art market, and to think of it as anything other than "abstract" would be to invite terror.

5. Our earlier conceptual art, while still being a "naive" Modernist art based on the scientific paradigm, externalized features of the art activity which had always been internalized—making them explicit and capable of being examined. It is this work which initiated our break with the Modernist art continuum and it is this work which constitutes perhaps the *legitimate* history of "conceptual art". This schism in "conceptualism" which occured between conceptual *theorists* and conceptual *stylists* (artists of the "naive" Modernist variety who consider "conceptualism" a stylistic alternative, within Modernism, to painting and sculpture) was a logical result of the dominant popular art-media learning situation. The work of the *original* conceptualists (which in fact consists almost exclusively of the theorists)[3] as regurgitated and reified in the art press and presented within the art institutions, only accentuated and preserved those features of the activity which complemented and reinforced the Modernist view of art and culture. All but the style was edited out.

6. Bob Scholte:

What seems to me to be urgently required is a genuinely dialectical position, one in which "analytical procedures (and descriptive devices are chosen and) determined by reflection on the nature of the encountered phenomena and on the nature of that encounter" (Fabian, 1971, p. 25). This would mean that every procedural step in the constitution of anthropological knowledge is accompanied by radical reflection and epistemological exposition. In other words, if we assume a continuity between experience and reality, that is, if we assume that an anthropological understanding of others is conditioned by our capacity to open ourselves to those others (cf. Huch, 1970, p. 30), we cannot and should not avoid the "hermeneutic circle" (cf. Ricoeur, 1971), but must explicate, as part of our activities, the intentional processes of constitutive reasoning which make both encounter and understanding possible. Indeed, "the question is not . . . how to avoid it, but . . . how to get properly into it .[4]

7. Because the anthropologist is outside of the culture which he studies he is not a part of the community. This means whatever effect he has on the people he is studying is similar to the effect of an act of nature. He is not part of the social matrix. Whereas the artist, as anthropologist, is operating within the same socio-cultural context from which he evolved. He is totally emmersed, and has a social impact. His activities embody the culture. Now one might ask, why not have the anthropologist, as a professional, "anthropologize" his own society? Precisely because he *is* an anthropologist. Anthropology, as it is popularly conceived, is a science. The scientist, as a professional, is *dis*-engaged.[5] Thus it is the nature of anthropology that makes anthropologizing ones own society difficult and probably impossible in terms of the task I am suggesting here. The role I am suggesting for art in this context is based on the difference between the very basis of the two activities—what they mean as human activities. It is the pervasiveness of "artistic-like" activity in human society—past or present, primitive or modern, which forces us to consider closely the nature of art.

8. Stanley Diamond:

The authentic historian may thus be said to have attained, by training and talent, a very high pitch of speciational consciousness. He approaches other societies in other times with the confidence that his humanity is equal to the task of registering differences. And that, though not the only element, is the critical one in all human communication.

The anthropologist must be such a historian. In conceptualizing a primitive society, he interprets signs and symbols by exchanging places with the actors in the system under study. The mere cataloguing or even systematic linking of institutions and artifacts is meaningless unless the effort to reproduce the social consciousness, the cultural being of the people who live and produce in their modality, is made. Every technique available must, of course, be used in these efforts, but the techniques may not become ends in themselves. If we detach the social forms and tools from persons and arrange and rearrange them typologically in the service of this or that method or as abstract, deductive models, we lose touch with concrete social reality, with the imprecisions of human behavior, and with its actual meaning at a particular time."[6]

9. Artistic activity consists of cultural fluency. When one talks of the artist as an anthropologist one is talking of acquiring the kinds of tools that the anthropologist has acquired—insofar as the anthropologist is concerned with trying to obtain fluency in another culture. But the artist attempts to obtain fluency in his *own* culture. For the artist, obtaining cultural fluency is a dialectical process which, simply put, consists of attempting to affect the culture while he is simultaneously learning from (and seeking the acceptance of) that same culture which is affecting him. The artist's success is understood in terms of his praxis. Art *means* praxis, so any art activity, including "theoretical art" activity is praxiological. The reason why one has traditionally not considered the art historian or critic as artist is that because of Modernism (Scientism) the critic and art historian have always maintained a position outside of praxis (the attempt to find objectivity has necessitated that) but in so doing they made culture *nature*. This is one reason why artists have always felt alienated from art historians and critics. Anthropologists have always attempted to discuss other cultures (that is, become fluent in other cultures) and translate that understanding into sensical forms which are understandable to the culture in which he is located (the "etic" problem). As we said, the anthropologist has always had the problem of being outside of the culture which he is studying. Now what may be interesting about the artist-as-anthropologist is that the artist's activity is not *outside*, but a mapping of an internalizing cultural activity in his *own* society. The artist-as-anthropologist may be able to accomplish what the anthropologist has always failed at. A non-static "depiction" of art's (and thereby culture's) operational infrastructure is the aim of an anthropologized art. The hope for this understanding of the human condition is not in the search for a religio-scientific "truth", but rather to utilize the state of our constituted interaction.

10. There is a highly complex operational structure to art which one could describe as a kind of cultural "black hole" which semantically implodes (internalizes) functioning elements which are reconstituted simultaneously as both the most specific feature and the most general consciousness.

11. Stanley Diamond:

The study of cultural apparatus finds its basic meaning in the attempt to understand the social consciousness that it both reflects and creates. Otherwise the study of man is not the study of man but the study of social, ideological, economic, or technical forms, a sort of cultural physics.[7]

12. Johannes Fabian:

In anthropological investigation, objectivity lies neither in the logical consistency of a theory, nor in the givenness of the data, but in the foundation . . . of human inter-subjectivity.[8]

PART III

EPILOGUE

"The savage has his life within himself; civilized man, in the opinions of others."—Jean-Jacques Rousseau

1. The Marxist critique *as well as* the evolving theory and praxis of art of which I speak in this paper are features of a modern world. The model of art has evolved into a viable and workable model based on certain tenets of the same Western civilization from which Marx began his work. In the face of the conspicuous absence of any sophisticated (that is, real in terms of its complexity) alternative Marxist model, we must use as a given the model of art as it has come to us in this Post-Modern period. We cannot do so uncritically, but in terms of an "anthropologized art" such a critique is (along with the study of primitive culture) basic to the activity.

2. It is almost truistic to point out that the "non-naive" artist-as-anthropologist is forced to become politically aware. This should not be confused with art which uses political subject-matter or which estheticizes the necessity of political action. "Protest art" is not artistically radical (it is oblivious to the philosophical self-reflective historical relationship between the artist and the concept of art in this society) but is more likely an *ad hoc* expressionistic ad media appeal to liberalism.

3. The life-world of abstracted experience of which I speak would be total and all embracing if not for the fact that we are all involved within the context of a culture, which means that insofar as the culture consists of a generalization of experience which we have grown up in (and have been mediated by) then that generalization of experience becomes an aspect of us. It orders and forces our experiencial world to correlate to and exemplify the generalized experience.

4. The cultural change and growth, rather than being dependant upon natural events and qualitative decisions within the context of a life which is textually integrated with nature is, in our civilization, dependant upon cultural events alone. Science, obviously through an empiricist illusion, presents our analysis of nature as a meaningful relationship with it. Science is a religious-like motor which is perhaps primarily responsible for the abstraction of our natural world. Culture is dependant upon the language of abstraction. Culture means

consensus. Direct experien[illegible] are always compared with the generalized expe[illegible]ce. By "compared with" we mean "try to gi[illegible]eaning to".

5. Perhaps art consists [illegible]f experiencing abstractions of experience. Abstr[illegible]ction means a generalization of our experiential [illegible]orld. This superstructural connective is what c[illegible]onstitutes culture. Culture consists of an abstraction [illegible]of experience. That's what brings in the signifi[illegible]ance of language—and the direct relationship betwe[illegible]n language and culture. Why art is culture culture[illegible] is that it is an abstraction of culture in the sense th[illegible]t it is a depiction—a linguistic-like depiction of c[illegible]ulture. A considerable part of our world consist[illegible] of experiencing abstractions of experience. [illegible]This is what civilization has come to be. It is in th[illegible]is sense that one can speak of our civilization as bein[illegible]g out of control, having a will of its own, being an [illegible]automated system. Our culture has been self-perp[illegible]petuating, and the more abstract it gets, the more [illegible]its capacity for self-perpetuation increases—[illegible]primarily due to the life-world of this civilization [illegible]which flows on independant, if not oblivious to, [illegible]the arbitrary forces of the natural world. A self[illegible]-replicating culture indifferent to nature is qui[illegible]te unlike the world of the so-called primitive whose [illegible]se every experiential moment is mediated by his [illegible]s relationship with this natural environment. It [illegible]is this relationship with nature which maintains [illegible]s the pace of his life and gives meaning to it. We, [illegible], on the other hand, live in a totally enculturated w[illegible]world which is running out of control precisely beca[illegible]cause it does operate independant of nature.

6. Maurice Stein:

The combin[illegible]nation of artist and philosopher in the role of the p[illegible] primitive thinker as distinct from the man of action [illegible]n is not as removed from civilized actuality as ma[illegible]any would contend . . . . . But the conception [illegible]n that these activities must be interrelated is alien t[illegible] to our specialized civilization. And even more ali[illegible]alien is the relation between primitive thinkers and n[illegible]d men of action which rests upon the thinker's abili[illegible]ility to sense crises of the community and cope w[illegible] with resulting strains by symbolic and ceremoni[illegible]nial acts. While men of action live in a "blaze of r[illegible]of reality", there are strains in their relation to their[illegible]eir impulses, to the community and to the external[illegible]nal world. Thinkers who perform properly feel these[illegible]ese strains first and express them symbolically. Reli[illegible]Religious men, shamans and priests, cooperate in this endeavor and indeed are occasionally themselves the artist-philosophers of the tribe. Radin's complex interpretation of primitive religion denies the theories of "mystical participation" without denying that the bulk of primitives who are non-religious still have their experience illuminated by their relation to the authentic religious men of the tribe. Actually there is always a possibility that the tribal intellectuals will become exploitative, but prior to state development the larger context of tribal status should keep this tendency within limits.

In terms of a perspective on the modern community, the distinctions between men of action and thinkers or between religious and non-religious men must be seen as entailing important points of contact and even fusion between the distinctive groups. Primitive artist-philosophers articulate the symbolic-ceremonial web of the tribe, while religious men authenticate this web by inspiration and the evidence of their "seizures". Both are more sensitive to strains and tensions than ordinary members of the community and in their different ways both react to these strains in order to cushion their impacts on the less introspective members. But all remain tied to each other in the larger network of kin statuses and the experiences are shared insofar as they can be symbolically communicated. The revelations of the shaman are the property of the tribe . . . . . But the modern artist, mystic, or philosopher rarely breaks through to community experience, nor does he help to authenticate communal symbols. Modern men of thought are segregated from the everyday world and the people who live in it by barriers of sensibility and language. Our artists are therefore forced to record their private responses to the strains of civilization without any assurance that the meaning of their expression will carry much beyond a small circle of similarly inclined creators and critics."[1]

7. Perhaps the locale of "praxis" is just here at the vectors of where the historically located and philosophically aware anthropologist joins the agents of lived cultural reflexivity (artist) . . . Art is an activity which, to (scientific) "objectivity" is more a complex paradox than a profound one—but in lieu of such an objectivity they are simply two over-lapping yet perpendicular "myths".

8. The artist-as-anthropologist, as a student of culture, has as his job to articulate a model of art, the purpose of which is to understand culture by making its implicit nature explicit—internalize its "explicitness" (making it, again, "implicit") and so on. Yet this is not simply circular because the agents are continually interacting and socio-historically located. It is a non-static, in-the-world model. The implication of this, as a cultural heuristic, is its epistemological non-specificity, but more importantly–it is *non-teleological.* One could describe primitive art as culture made implicit. The Modernist paradigm of art is culture made explicit and timeless—*objective.* In this Post-Modern, para-Marxist situation that the artist-as-anthropologist finds him or herself in, is a world where one realizes that *objective* explicit art means (in Sapir's sense) a spurious culture. Implicit art is an art of lived subjectivity, but at this point unreal and culturally lost in our technological era.[2]

9. Meyer Fortes:

"Primitive people express the elementary emotions we describe by terms like fear and anger, love and hate, joy and grief in words and acts that are easily recognizable by us. Some anthropologists say that many non-European peoples are sensitive to the feeling of shame but not to guilt feelings. I doubt this. One of the most important functions of ritual in all societies is to provide a legitimate means of attributing guilt for one's sins and crimes to other persons or outside powers. In many primitive societies this function of ritual customs is prominent and it leads to the impression that individuals have a feeble sense of guilt, by comparison with Europeans. The truth is that our social system throws a hard and perhaps excessive burden of moral decision on the individual who has no such outlets for guilt feelings as are found in simpler societies. This is correlated with the fragmentation of social relations, and the division of allegiances and affectations in our society. I am sure it has a great deal to do with the terrifying toll of mental disease and psychoneurosis in modern industrial countries. We know very little about mental diseases in primitive communities. What evidence there is suggests that those regarded by many authorities as of constitutional origin occur in the same forms as with us. But disturbances of personality and character similar to those that cause mental conflict and social maladjustment in our society seem to be rare. I do not mean to imply that everybody is always happy, contented, and free of care in a primitive society. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence that among them, as with us, affability may conceal hatred and jealousy, friendliness and devotion enjoined by law and morals may mask enmity, exemplary citizenship may be a way of compensating for frustration and fears. The important thing is that in primitive societies there are customary methods of dealing with these common human problems of emotional adjustment by which they are externalized, publicly accepted, and given treatment in terms of ritual beliefs; society takes over the burden which, with us, falls entirely on the individual. Restored to the esteem of his fellows he is able to take up with ease the routine of existence which was thrown temporarily off its course by an emotional upheaval. Behavior that would be the maddest of fantasies in the individual, or even the worst of vices, becomes tolerable and sane, in his society, if it is transformed into custom and woven into the outward and visible fabric of a community's social life. This is easy in primitive societies where the boundary between the inner world of the self and the outer world of the community marks their line of fusion rather than of separation. Lest this may sound like a metaphysical lapse I want to remind you that it springs from a very tangible and characteristic feature of primitive social structure, the widely extended network of kinship. The individual's identification with his immediate family is thus extended outward into the greater society, not broken off at the threshold of his home.[3]

10. Stanley Diamond:

Linton proposes that the decay of the local group in contemporary society, that is, of the sense and reality of community, is the fundamental problem of modern man—since it is through the local group that people learn to realize their humanity. This is a critical anthropological concept, and it is drawn from experience in the primitive locality, composed of reciprocating persons, growing from within, as opposed to the imposed, technically estranging, modern collective.[4]

New York, New York

REFERENCES & NOTES

PART I

I would like to dedicate this section to Terry Atkinson, whose ability to internalize borrowed material and write papers untainted by appeals to

any authority other than his own has necessitated the use of this literary device.

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2. (Friedricks, 1970)

3. Jay, Martin. *The Dialectical Imagination*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973.

4. (Friedricks, 1970)

5. Leiss, William. *The Domination of Nature*. Boston: Beacon, 1974.

6. Diamond, Stanley, "Anthropology in Question" in *Reinventing Anthropology*, ed. Dell Hymes. New York: Random House, 1969.

7. Scholte, Bob. "Towards a Reflexive and Critical Anthropology" in *Reinventing Anthropology*. ed. Dell Hymes. New York: Random House, 1969.

8. Gouldner, Alvin. *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology*. New York: Avon, 1971.

9. (Leiss, 1974)

10. (Diamond, 1969)

11. (from Jay, 1973)

12. (Leiss, 1974)

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14. Diamond, Stanley, 1963. "The Search for the Primitive" in *Man's Image in Medicine and Anthropology*. ed. Iago Galdston. New York: International Universities Press.

15. Sapir, Edward *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir*, ed. David G. Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949.

16. Tax, Meredith. "Introductory: Culture is Not Neutral, Whom Does it Serve?" in *Radical Perspectives in the Arts*, ed. Lee Baxandall. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972.

PART II

1. The term "implosion" was originally introduced into our conversation by Michael Baldwin. I refer here to its use by Mel Ramsden in "On Practice", this issue.

2. This notion of an "anthropologized art" is one that I began working on over three years ago—a point at which I had been studying anthropology for only a year, and my model of an anthropologist was a fairly academic one. That model has continually changed, but not as much as it has in the past year through my studies with Bob Scholte and Stanley Diamond (at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research). While their influence is strongly felt, I obviously take full responsibility for the use (or misuse) of their material within my discussion here [see note 5].

3. Granted, this is self-serving though I don't feel it is inaccurate. I refer here to the work of Atkinson, Baldwin, and myself. By now it is quite clear that most of the work which followed (outside of the Art & Language community) consisted of stylistic morphological experimentation, the meaning of which rested (and still rests) on the epistemological underpinnings of the early work. Sadly, "conceptualism" became synonymous with "avant-garde" to the extent that the launching of art careers for traditional modernist painters (such as Bochner) first had to go through a "legitimization" period of "conceptualism" first. The idea seems to be: first get everyone's attention, then please the market with goods they are familiar with.

4. (Scholte, 1969)

5. To be fair, I must point out here that the marxist anthropology of Diamond and Scholte is not included in this generalization. Indeed, due to the alternative anthropological tradition in which they see themselves, their role as anthropologists *necessitates* that they be "engaged". It is a consideration of their work, and what it has to say about the *limits* of anthropology (and the study of culture) which has allowed me a further elucidation of my notion of the "artist-as-anthropologist".

6. Diamond, Stanley. *Primitive Views of the World*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.

7. (Diamond, 1960)

8. Fabian, Johannes. 1971 "Language, History, and Anthropology". *Journal for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 1, No. 1.

PART III

1. Stein, Maurice. "Perspectives on the Modern Community" in *Primitive Views of the World*, ed. Stanley Diamond. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.

2. The following is a public statement posted during my last exhibition (January, 1975) at Leo Castelli Gallery, New York:

"This, The Tenth Investigation, is my last. The point of my saying this is not that I intend to stop working, but that it has become extremely difficult for me to support the epistemological implications and cultural ramifications of the uncritical analytic scientific paradigm which the structure of this work (regardless of my own attempts to subvert it) inescapably implies. My study of Anthropology in the past few years was initiated out of a desire to acquire tools which might make possible the overview of art and culture that my earlier work finally necessitated. This at least in part, has led me to the following conclusions: 1. That history is, indeed, man-made and therefore more understandable than nature; and that an understanding of this is more a part of my work than the isolation of this exhibition would imply; 2. That our historigraphy is our mythology and the art we experience is, at best, an extension of it; 3. That ideology, be it expressed, aeted or observed is always subjective; that meaning is dependent upon a community's intersubjectivity and this society fails to provide one? 4. That Art, Anthropology, and History share at least two things in common: they are both creative and constitutive.

The work in this exhibition is (as well as the other things I claim it to be) flawed by my attempts to overcome my own historical baggage—while at the same time, of course, the attempt adds to it. The Wittgensteinian and scientific aspect of Investigations, Propositions, and the necessarily complex display installations constitute a structural outgrowth from an earlier period of faithful ethnocentricity which can no longer accommodate my view of my aetivity. The ideological package has become inappropriate. That the work was viable eight or nine years ago within that structure is no justification for cultural self-perpetuation *ad infititum*. Our war at that time against Formalism's mindless estheticism was "won" at the expense of our being responsible (after proliferation has begot proliferation) for a replacement which is functionally decorative and potentially even more "mindless' because of its inability to be self-reflexive in spite of its claims. The Revolution didn't even simply end, it continues as a style. I don't like the work I see being done around me, and to the extent that I am co-participant (even if as an antithesis) I must somehow alter my course."

3. (Diamond, 1960)

ARE YOU NOT DOING WHAT YOU'RE DOING WHILE YOU'RE DOING WHAT YOU ARE

ANDREW MENARD

As we stare into the abyss of recession we shouldn't forget that while this may be a day of belt-tightening and bullet-biting, it is an age of growth, expansion. The American Dream is coming true for more and more people, and recessions are only temporary set-backs. Practically speaking, since the American Dream can only be realized through growth, growth itself can only be realized through obsolescence. Certainly General Motors and Ford Motors know this: if their cars lasted longer than a few years there would be little incentive for increased employment or more research and development, not to mention increased advertizing. And the government contributes its share by getting involved in wars such as Korea and Vietnam, wars that "blow up" money in the form of arms and ammunition, thereby stimulating the production of more arms and ammunition, more research and development, more employment. I'm afraid, however, that the art world has been sadly remiss in its contribution to the American Dream: by presenting art as an investment many new products increase *in value as they get older, rather than decreasing. People are encouraged to hoard art. This is clearly detrimental to an expanding economy. As such, I'm afraid the arts have been rather reactionary through the years. I would thus like to suggest a new game plan for the arts, an "aesthetic of obsolescence", so to speak:*

1. Every consideration should be given to eliminating objects all together. Conceptual art is a step in the right direction, though hardly a large one. For while conceptual artists have begun to concentrate on the "event" rather than the object, that is, on built-in obsolescence, they should also concentrate on getting support for larger *events, employing* greater *numbers of people. The sky's the limit here, there's no telling how many people an artist with ambitious ideas could employ. And insofar as the Age of Obsolescence has rendered social status more than a mere function of physical property, the supporters of such art would thus derive considerable status from their support. Moreover, it seems reasonable that they should also be granted substantial tax deductions for this support. A movement in this direction would nicely complement an economy moving from goods towards services.*

2. If objects are to be used they should be restricted: Painting should be confined to acrylics on unprimed cotton duck, since this makes restoration extremely difficult, and very few people are going to go to the trouble of building hermetically sealed rooms to protect this work from environmental deterioration. Photographs are alright if they are fixed improperly. Sculpture should be confined to materials that will rust or decay in a relatively short period of time. And so on.

3. In any case, all establishments devoted to the restoration of art should be abolished immediately.

4. The media should be encouraged to decrease the present 5-year plan of recognition to a 1- or 2- year plan. We've got to keep artists and their ideas moving off the shelves. We don't want repetition, everybody doing similar things, or else the status contingent upon supporting new products would be weakened. As such, the media would function primarily as "talent scouts". Critical overviews would be strictly gratuitous, even counter-productive.

5. Though nothing can rectify all the reactionary art to date, perhaps the various national governments could stem the tide of economic conserva-

tism by endorsing an "immanent domain" policy in order to buy up all these works. (Recently anyway, many of them were made under government support to begin with.) Initially this would be quite an outlay of money; but the ultimate benefits for the economy are innumerable.

6. Certain ideas still common to much of art would have to be eliminated in favor of those indigenous to a here-today-gone-tomorrow kind of art. The idea of "masterpieces" is clearly outdated. So is the idea of artists as "heroes"—we don't want artists to sell themselves as objects, even if they have stopped selling objects per se. There are many others.

No doubt I have left things out. The plan needs to be developed in detail. But it does need to be implemented if the art world is to carry its weight in our pursuit of the American Dream for everyone. In this time of tight money it is only a matter of time until the art world begins to exert a substantial drag on the economy's long term upward trend.

Mrs. Ballinger is one of the ladies who pursue Culture in bands, as though it were dangerous to meet it alone.—Edith Wharton.

We all know the problems of high art and money; most of us feel that we and our work are raped by the market system; many of us feel that we'd just like to work in peace; some of us feel as if we have to overtly demonstrate against the market system, as well as do our work; each of us feels entitled to handle the problem in his/her own way. But why, for example, do we all find art such a respectable means of making money these days? It seems to me that we rarely give the issue of art and money more than an oblique glance, that even when someone is supposedly confronting it head-on, they've always got, in a theoretical sense, one eye closed.

No doubt it's unfair to single out one person for responsibility, but Douglas Davis' article ("Toward the Billion-Dollar Painting", *Esquire,* Nov., 1974) happens to be the last one I read. Davis has been one of our better Emissaries, yet this particular article is no more than a rehash of conventional art world Wisdom. While he gives a passing nod to the milder forms of Marxist criticism, he generally invokes (and evokes) the usual battle cries: "The need for art is a need for an arbitrary value. You must pay for it, dearly, but you do not expect it to function or to mean *anything*. It is the last preserve of madness."

Now I would really like to believe this. It would be easier and I suppose, in a certain existential sense, safer to shoulder the weight of historical Convention. But I don't believe it, because criticism of the market system from this point of view never goes far enough. It just doesn't accord with my life in the art world. Does it with yours? Most of you are as familiar as I am, some of you much more so, with the focus of Conventional Criticism: the hearty handshake of the Entrepreneurs, the Parke Bernet meat markets, the demise of artists' estates, unfair tax laws. But this focus takes the *art* for granted. What about the ways our actual working procedures, our lives, are influenced? I've found that such criticism, by limiting its diagnosis to a kind of non-specific "moneyitis", ignores the highly specific structure that money engenders in our society and the extent to which I, as a Technician, have perpetuated that structure.

It is no surprise, after all, to hear that we all work, become producers, in order to make money. Nor is it surprizing to hear, once again, that we are a "consumer society". But *making money* doesn't completely saturate the notion of production in our society. And consumption is not merely a matter of *buying things*, a gross reduction to the issue of believing or disbelieving advertising when we go into a store or the issue of buying art we like rather than art that seems a good investment. In other words, it should come as no surprise that the process of production/consumption isn't merely asymptotic to our lives, something we can forget about (like a job) when we want

to. When Conventional Criticism concentrates on the monetary "superstructure" of the art world, virtually ignoring the relation of art to this "superstructure" as well as the relation of both art and "superstructure" to society in general, it poses no more of a threat to our art, or our lives, than a horsefly does to a horse. For not only our work, but the structure of our social relationships in general, is based on specific economic relationships of production and consumption. And for the most part these social relationships, reflecting the economic ones, are thus based on exploitation, however benign it may appear.

I am sure the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.—John Maynard Keynes

The following is a diachronic scenario, mostly confined to the last twenty or twenty-five years, highly subjective and annotated with several synchronic (homeostatic) fragments. For Davis, like the majority of Emissaries, like most Technicians (Davis is both in fact), in fact the whole art Establishment confidently asserts that "Nearly all of American art since Eakins has reacted against the bourgeois notion of beauty" while the contradiction of nearly all recent American art is that the decisions which seemed most viable "aesthetically", as well as socially, were precisely those which best reflected the *structure* of bourgeois society if not its notion of beauty: In his article "Ameriean Painting During the Cold War" (*Artforum,* May, 1973) Max Kozloff begins to expose this structure, he begins by constructing an excellent history of political and social assumptions of Abstract Expressionism and what emerges is a group of technicians defining themselves as an elite, devoid of overt political content but, for "political" reasons of sorts, devoted to the unfortunate but necessary task of making art for each other, not atypical of art's recent social history merely constituting it in an extreme form. After all before I received a grant from National Endowment for the Arts I did carpentry to make money which, presumably, I will do again after it runs out (unless I receive another), and since it was difficult doing carpentry and art at the same time, both suffering in the process, I was relieved to say the least when I, unexpectedly, received the grant. But lately I've had mixed feelings about this gift horse, a certain guilt perhaps and some mistrust for all our institutions particularly our schools which encourage us to think of ourselves as *only* Technicians, so that even when we can't make money from our art we rarely invest any psycho-social energy in our roles as "carpenters" or "plumbers" or "window dressers" and professionalism comes to mean specialization, of social identity as well as labor. Now this says a lot about the issue of output of productivity, an issue I'm approaching rather obliquely at the moment, because "art time" demands more or less total economic commitment to making art making sure that one becomes dependent on the vagaries of the market. Most technicians affiliated with a gallery, and most of us are or would like to be though, I must admit, for reasons that I suppose will become clear I am not now and perhaps do not ever wish to be affiliated with a gallery, have at least one major show a year. Although there's nothing particularly wrong with this on the face of it, it's one way of getting work out, as is commonly known a more or less unwritten, and in some cases no doubt written "contract" *requires* Technicians to have shows once a year or so and while I, personally, would probably have a significant amount of new work in a year and I don't, as a general rule, object to "external" strictures on my time, I can certainly imagine times when I might *not* have a great deal of new work and certainly wouldn't want to show old work or manufacture new work just for the show. But reputable Technicians need to be visible, the gallery schedule needs to be filled work needs to be sold reviews of works need to be sold, the mainspring of "art time" winds too fast for those who work slowly or those who may be involved in large projects which aren't, unlike Heubler's proposal to photograph everyone in the world, conducive to yearly "progress reports". Whatever *we* may think we're doing in our work, and that's always open to question and I don't have the answer, not that there's only one answer anyway, the galleries and their friendly sidekicks the media are by and large interested in *productivity*, output. So while I can't always answer the question of what I myself am doing in my work much less the question of what you yourself are doing it is an important question nevertheless, wouldn't you say? Since if produc-

tivity if output become such important requirements we have to question whether our art is much more than a mere commodity something to be exchanged for the security of a gallery contract a steady income. This is a difficult question though at the moment I'm really only interested in how galleries force us to think about our work in certain ways and as far as the galleries are concerned the content of shows is important, at least initially, though after a certain point after a Technician's reputation has been established it isn't so much a question of *what* s/he did at this or that show but *that* s/he did it. A reputation then is nothing more than a measure of the value of one's labor and "creativity on demand" is nothing more than the ability to perform correctly that is frequently thereby inflating one's value on the open market and what are we left with but the general practice of pricing paintings for example not by way of their personal meaning to the Technician, if s/he has any and once again I can't answer this question, or any similar criteria but according to *size* as a function of *what the market can bear*. And you know as well as I that however good or innovative a particular work by an obscure Technician is it will never sell for as much as *any* work by a more reputable one (which reminds me that NEA is not necessarily granting money on the basis of a particular project this year, it is an optional part of the application. Now what does this mean? that they've eliminated or made optional the project because if they've done this if they've eliminated or made optional what, besides the money itself of course, might be personally interesting to the Technicians and/or themselves, this raises the question of what they *are* granting money for. That is I know we're really interested in the money itself of course but presumably we're going to do something with the money or anyway it will provide money to live on so we can do something and no doubt some of us have more interesting ideas than others. Not that NEA or any other organization necessarily chooses what you or I might consider the more interesting or innovative proposals, but what else have they got to base their decision on now except one's *reputation* as a kind of abstract assessment of one's labor value because what have they got to look at besides career summary sheets prizes honors etc., even if it's relative to age, I mean how much can five (5) slides tell you? And if this is the case and unfortunately it seems to be the case then NEA is edging more towards mediocrity or at best "bureaucratic genius" or maybe continued support of those it has already granted money to for we're all dependent on galleries the media etc. in order to establish a reputation, and public recognition is always a matter of control generally a matter of control by those with vested interests in the status quo. It is strange but in some sense galleries for example are more conservative than even NEA since even if I for example wanted to join a gallery it is highly unlikely I would be an attractive prospect if only because I don't have a large backlog of relatively consistent work demonstrating my productivity. Though as I admit proposals were doubtless chosen on grounds of bureaucratic stability for the most part it was possible, as in my case, for an individual proposal to outweigh one's reputation and even possible, as in my case, for that proposal to at least question the status quo, at least I think so since this article is part of that proposal, indicating perhaps that the "performance principle" (Marcuse) was less in effect or, and this is certainly possible since NEA as a self-determining institution is likely to have somewhat different requirements from galleries as self-determining institutions, just different): This is an important point I think, the strictures on performance in art, it means not only are we asked to concentrate on output on productivity we are coerced by this very requirement to *limit* our output our productivity to art, whether we want to or not though most of us do anyway, while by the same token other people are coerced into limiting their output their productivity to what *they* have been trained for whether they want to or not. So if at least high art isn't something one does in one's spare time on the weekend if "dabblers" rarely surface in the New York art world because training is much more specialized and serious than *that,* isn't it? then art becomes the domain of a relatively small group of producers. Whereas art may occupy a privileged position on the alter of many peoples' lives in this country they generally have to confine their involvement to viewing art in a museum or gallery going to an occasional lecture reading about it in an art journal, they have to enjoy it in other words as a *consumer* not a producer. Being a consumer means being dependent on *access* so that even this minimal involvement is largely at the mercy of the *limitations of ownership* that is at the mercy of museums galleries etc., those institutions which purvey art many of which are corporations. Being a corporation means preserving the corporation more or less intact and while museums in particular can rely on donations grants endowments etc. they nevertheless have to sell their art sometimes in order to offset operating costs and of course museums without much money aren't likely to have many works. This is one way of limiting consumers though only one way and perhaps not the most important for whatever the financial situation of a museum or gallery consumers are just as dependent on the "aesthetic" policies which determine what art the museum *does* buy and/or show. Consumers are forced to see what's in the museum gallery, they may or may not see what they are personally interested in, yet neither stricture financial or "aesthetic" is malicious or cynical and that is the problem they are the result of financial necessity or "enlightened" aesthetic policy or whatever, all a matter of good faith towards the consumer never questioning consumerism itself. I think as Technicians we are all aware of this problem in one form or another, wouldn't you say? some of us even going so far as to remove our work from the confines both visual and social of museums galleries. Still with the rise of "mass culture" we Technicians, many of us as paradoxically self-proclaimed Culture Heroes, have felt little or no need to justify our activity to anyone but ourselves the implications of this position being that the myriad connections between Culture and upward mobility social climbing begin to assert themselves. Consider the "rube" from Ohio who is perhaps hostile to modernism who walks into the Museum of Modern Art in New York and says Who needs this anyway and walks around somewhat dazed or outraged or bored but *continues* to walk around somehow *blaming* him/herself for not understanding and remember that we as Culture Purveyors probably *agree* with this assignation of blame, get an *education* "rube"! But what if there are valid reasons for this person to dislike modernism? what are the implications of it having little or no resonance with his/her social experience except as one more example of cultural hegemony? In his article the article we've been talking about all along, not as I indicated to blame Davis but because it is a convenient prism for certain concerns because it's something we can all share, in his article Davis relates Robert Scull's discovery that people were much quieter in art museums than they were in church even or at least quieter than his Lower East Side neighbors were in church even. Now I suspect this doesn't indicate a greater reverence for art than church say or one's minister Priest rabbi or the Virgin Mary or God, far from it I think it more appropriately indicates *lack of familiarity* most of the people probably just fucking uncomfortable in a museum, rubes from Ohio or even Long Island. And cagey ambitious old Scull was 100% correct in thinking he could engender a similar cultural Aura by acquiring and surrounding himself with high art, an Aura that being a taxicab mogul would never instill, since as a high art Technician I can't ignore how much the acquisition of Culture in our society is as I said before associated with social climbing and thus how much Cultural aspirations are inherently *class as well as gender and racial aspirations.* Purely from the point of view of financial support and I say purely with a certain sense of irony since even leaving aside other considerations for the moment we are still left with a highly important consideration, that is money which means that high art has always existed in the domain of the ruling class, a class financially able to support this art a class which has been and by and large still is controlled by white, men. The ruling class is a consumer yes it is a consumer but as we all know there are consumers and there are consumers and the ruling class wields a substantial power over artistic production through financial control whereas other people wield very little so that the ruling class is able to *strengthen its social cultural power* through the production of cultural objects such as art. Almost everyone is forced to be a Culture consumer in the first place and most people are forced to be consumers of specific notions of culture, like whiteness maleness formalism abstraction, which may or may not be resonant with their social existence or which may or may not at least reduce the alienation of their social existence and in fact the "repressive tolerance" of high art in a class cocicty is that such art is generally escapist (socially alienating) for most people. The ruling class rein-

forces its Cultural cultural hegemony by reducing Cultural models such as regionalism or primitivism in fact all other Cultural models to the level of second class citizens, which means that if people accept this and many do then they begin to direct their antagonisms not towards the class that renders them inferior but towards the people in their own class or those just below them who challenge belittle their Cultural aspirations. But this is familiar ground very familiar ground, don't you think? harldy occupied by the ruling class alone, since it seems to me that as we Technicians became the sole producers of art we eliminated in the process the need to justify *changing* the reified aspects of "Culture" *except on our own terms*. We are the arrogants of power the merchants of power the technicians of power and presumably it makes us feel better having provided people with the chance, if only they would take it, to "raise themselves up" hallelujah to Culture and under the circumstances this hardly seems an appropriate way of proceeding, does it? Like other things in peoples' lives art should be "special" not because it is *separate* from their day to day existence as museum hours force it to be, something consumed on the weekend a commodity over which they have little or no control but precisely because they *do* have a choice and *are* able to integrate it into their lives in a meaningful way. And that goes for our lives as well, as I can't think of any recent art from Abstract Expressionism through Art and Language and New Realism which hasn't instantiated this producer-consumer relationship at some point if not all the time, nationally as well as internationally, though these more explicitly social issues are no more but no less controversial than the corresponding phenomenological ("aesthetic") issues neither being separable from the other. So it will come as no surprise then, not that it should since I've already tole you and in fact not that anything here should at least dramatically and perhaps not in any other way, no surprise to hear that aesthetic decisions have been similarly oppressive. To begin at the middle and certainly the beginning and possibly the end we have raised fetishism to heroic proportions which is to say formalism has been one long love affair not only with the representation of objects but recently with the objects *themselves*. Perhaps there's nothing wrong with this certainly nothing inherently wrong, though in a society which has already glorified the object it seems suspect and this in spite of the fact that it's also possible formaism could be seen as a dialectical *negation* of objecthood clarifying that when a *form of being* (consumerism in the context of object worship) is subsituated for *being itself* that is when social cultural relationships themselves become reified into say producer-consumer roles people also become objects. But presenting the problem in this way, concentrating on and extending objecthood, requires a simultaneous *alienation* from the object of presentation something akin to Brecht's strategy for drawing attention to the ideology of his plays and I just haven't found this to be the case have you? Nearly all of recent American art all of the hullabaloo over enlarged stetchers happenings environments gestalts etc., demands an *involvement* of sorts from the viewer demands that one be in actual physical *contact contiguity* for the work to make sense really. Yet this involvement is strangely anti-dialectical and insofar as art is to be judged on the basis of relationships internal to the work edge surface color etc. or on the basis of some notion of "presence" or whatever the viewer is largely rendered *passive* by this art this art is *done to* the viewer and certainly constitutes an alienation from the object but only in that one is once again a consumer and hardly leads one to reject objecthood much less consumerism or exploitation in general: I'm sure all of you have thought of some examples which at least potentially contravene this combined social and "aesthetic" assessment and of course I have a few favorites myself, people and works I've been interested in for one reason or another, though as you might expect none of them pan out as real contradictions but then I'm not trying to prove anything either. To begin with there is Jasper Johns or as Kozloff said "In the beginning there was Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg" but I want to forget about Rauschenberg for the moment and say that Johns was interested in questioning how we refer to objects for example or how we name colors, thereby introducing a kind of alienation from objects though hardly I think as a strategy for questioning the socio-political implications of objecthood. But Johns also initiated what has come to be called "process art" and this is quite interesting because the notion of *labor* enters the picture and paintings can no longer be thought of as immaculate conceptions, not that this was so easy to do anyway with the advent of Abstract Expressionism, but as the product of work. In Johns' case the actual labor involved in constructing the piece is only represented, pictorially obliquely, but as process art developed through Robert Morris for example or Gilbert and George what became important was the labor itself the idea that the time and effort spent "constructing" something even something as ontologically vague as a "living sculpture" was more significant than the finished construction, if indeed a separate finished construction existed at all. There was and no doubt still is a lot of potential here for drawing attention to and perhaps dialectically transforming certain aspects of the labor relationships in our society, drawing attention to the way labor separates people alienates them from each other to the way their labor is usually measured by the amount of objects they can produce or the amount of paper they can shuffle from the in-tray to the out- and so on trying to provide meaningful alternatives. Unfortunately process art didn't provide anything new choosing instead the bourgeois alternative if you can call it that of dehumanizing labor which is to say Gilbert and George became as much like machines as possible and don't forget Warhol who said he wanted to be like a machine and very few process pieces allowed the audience to become involved except as consumers alienated from each other and the producer(s) even though the producer(s) were usually present, so that "the audience completing the work" was little more frequently than the audience completing the institutional links between art and society, and isn't if funny that a process which exists through time can be called "a piece" in other words an object to begin with, isn't it? no different really from a 7-piece dinner set a piece of ass a piece of shit, piece brother piece sister, right on! a compartmentalized "revolution" against bourgeois values indeed. Process art merely objectified labor made *it* a commodity to be consumed an experience like most others thus alienating and didn't care that making our labor relationships explicit did not in itself constitute a challenge to those relationships, though that's OK since it wasn't so much a "socio-economic" decision as an "aesthetic" one in the first place and I wouldn't want to be accused of historicism, of misrepresenting past intentions on the basis of current ideologies, but of irony: Now Don Judd also made a few tentative jabs in the right direction by drawing attention to the interdependence of art and its ambience, though that ambience was generally defined as the gallery rarely extended to a coherent socio-political awareness and thus became a somewhat limited praxis containing the seeds of a fruitful notion, and I need hardly add that Judd has certainly helped me at least. But Judd was also one of many Technicians who began to have their work fabricated in factories, a development which has several implications one of which is the creation of workers who produce not only cars radios airplanes etc. that they're alienated from but *art* as well, the old brain/body split along class lines with a new twist and not even half the problem since Technicians thus become (somewhat indirect) employers of those workers exploiting the workers' labor to create profit for themselves, while many Technicians also directly employ assistants who are glad to work but certainly exploited in return on investment and not surprizingly the employment of factory workers and assistants increases productivity. Of course we're all implicated in this kind of exploitation to one degree or another and we Technicians are hardly the only ones to blame and if the argument were carried to an extreme it would doubtless become absurd, yet this exploitation has become more explicit in the art world recently more large-scale and certainly more direct: Now some conceptual artists particularly the ones interested in information theory (cf. Lucy Lippard's . . . *dematerialization* . . .) were conscious of certain art world failures and perhaps we are faced with an exception to exploitation after all it certainly eliminated objects to a large degree and a common concern was that art should be like everything else in the world not something special, indeed it might even be seen as a Marcusean dialectic using technology to negate the oppressive hierarchic effects of technology. It's no coincidence however that much of this art is embedded in imperialistic assumptions about a world culture about the symmetrical nature of communication in this world culture which is to say international art, which reminds me that international art is a problem in itself though most of us in New York accept it without much question. And why this blithe acceptance, do you think? except that

international art is a process of expanding consumption wherein new markets are created for New York ideologies and works, financial security through enlargement of a glutted market and we also have the satisfaction of stimulating artistic *production* via international shows, you know German Judds French Olitskis etc., though Technicians in underdeveloped areas (less so in more developed areas) really remain Culture consumers in that their production of such work doesn't affect their position in the system so much as strengthen the system itself lend it international validity and where does that leave us in New York, do you think? With the rise of international art markets competition works *for* Technicians, and while this contradicts the way competition works usually for sellers (in situations other than that of short supply) it is certainly the case now isn't it since Pollock's *Blue Poles* sold for $2,000,000 to Australia Impressionist prices soared during the recent Japanese gorge the debate rages over selling American art to foreign investors. It's clearly to our financial advantage to maintain the interdependence of a world market which in addition looks to New York as the world capital of that market, so that the socio-political ramifications of world culture international art are thus manifold as are the ramifications of technology in world culture international art and in the end this is a major problem with conceptual art. Since information technology TV video computers newspapers is not inherently capitalist socialist or whatever it seems to me that many information Technicians have assumed that the content as well as the structure of technology is thus politically *arbitrary*, some squeezing this assumption a little drier even and concluding that the mere *use* of technology itself, merely "plugging into it", constitutes a revolutionary praxis if (properly) understood in McLuhanesque terms. As Les Levine says, A computer terminal in every household, and perhaps a robot in every closet a video in every family a ten minute spot on TV for everybody and I still find it hard to believe that technology can be so aggrandized and at the same time so easily dismissed, can it? Sure technology is amenable to all existing socio-economic systems we can't deny that and I'm not trying to, though we're nevertheless faced with the situation of it being used *differently* in each case and in the case of capitalism it is used to reinforce and extend producer-consumer relationships, bourgeois ideology in general, a computer terminal in every home more likely an extension of this control than a challenge to it. Whatever its benefits the myriad manifestations of McLuhanism are *formalistic*, subjegating the content of presentation to the form of presentation form is content considering neither aspect from the point of view of social context, such that multiple TV sets in a gallery tuned to daytime programs and a show that exists simultaneously in several cities throughout the world and art in newspapers and various media events have all tended to *homogenize* culture social context through the intrusion of Culture, and technology worshiped rather than used dialectically ironically to undermine homogenization. Under the circumstances the desire for art to be like everything else in the world was little more than another art world exclusively art world response to the art world problems of artists art objects art in galleries etc., the creation of an illusion an obfuscation of the extent to which art already *is*, in the context of our society, like everything else and perhaps more correctly stated was really a desire for everything else in the world to be like art: Unfortunately there are many things in our repetoire of recent decisions which don't deserve the credit of a "mixed review" even for instance the common practice of more or less reifying the notion of consistency, and consistency is reified enough as it is, by constructing a series of closely related works (not to be confused with "serial art" where a single work is conceived as a systemic progression). Now consistency is so suspect, and I really can't say this too often because I'll never forget the long succession of art instructors admonishing me with the need to develop a consistent personal style no doubt believing it to be the best way of manifesting my individually and probably expressing at the same time a cultural preference for simplicity over complexity, now consistency is so suspect because it reinforces market expectations of greater productivity greater volume of sales by reducing the variation from work to work thus reducing the energy creativity needed for a substantial body of work. Of course people want to buy "a Morris" "a Judd" almost any "Morris" any "Judd" will do for many of them as long as it *looks like* "a Morris" "a Judd" and that's one way of defining individuality I guess

but it smacks of objectification reification to me, I mean is it any different from "a Ford" and whoever called the Communist Manifesto say "a Marx"? The specter of Frank Lloyd visiting Rothko's studio to scoop up large quantities of a protracted series is never far behind us as we are encouraged by the market to more or less repeat our history, and remember the notion of a series was an "aesthetic" decision though not ours alone (e.g., Kandinsky Picasso Mondrian), and unavoidably we begin to reify both ourselves as people and our work while reinforcing even accelerating the tendency for our labor itself to become an object to impart *equal value* to almost anything of equal size and scale we touch. I admit I've overstated the issue all issues a bit and presented them somewhat obliquely perhaps in that any model is at best an imperfect fit and the gaps are probably more important than the fits anyway and as I said I'm not trying to prove anything, though I wouldn't want to merely list my points either, an attenuated narrative, for it can't be denied that some works are recognized as seminal sell for more that's that and I don't deny it. However it's extremely rare for the Technicians who did those works to actually sell them for tremendous amounts of money, more like Johns' $960 for the ale cans since recognition seminality is largely a function of the market system and you have to be able to sell work in the first place to qualify as a superstar in the second, which means that as far as Johns is concerned the sale of his ale cans for $90,000 means that the value of his labor his name essentially has risen accordingly for *all* his new work and *all* the old work he does still have whether it's artistically significant or not. Since it's the name that counts and that's what's in a name it is not a long jump to those of us who find a "gimmick" exploit it as much as we can and rely on our reputations to financially carry us through, or those of us who manufacture back work in our most lucrative style and coyly bring it out of "hiding". And then and almost finally there is the connection between our old friend formalism which is to say that if the work has to be seen in the raw to make sense really reproductions are more or less gratuitous and what are we left with after all but museums schools not to mention corporations which is to say that the ideology phenomenology of formalism has by and large been dispersed by those institutions able to afford the actual works, and what does this say about the purveyance of Culture? For example what about schools for example according to College Art Association statistics art schools and departments in this country have multiplied with almost profligate zeal my words not theirs since the late fifties there were a number of new jobs created for Technicians and administrators, an increase in art students a strengthening of graduate degree programs necessary for many teaching positions an increase in expensive kinds of art film video computer art and technology in general and in fact I think the current popularity of film and video at least has a lot to do with schools. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of all this proliferation is the extent to which New York Ideology is taught *nationwide*, of course worldwide too but we've kind of talked about that already and anyway that's them and this is us which is probably more interesting and it's not only the students Technicians in Los Angeles Houston Boston, the large metropolitan areas, but those in Missoula Santa Fe Dayton yes even in Peoria it will play in Peoria! who are indoctrinated in the ways of New York Ideology. Now art school departments are funded almost exclusively on economic rather than "aesthetic" considerations the number of students graduating in art relative to other departments the number of nonart students taking art courses the number of art majors needing financial aid the number of art majors getting jobs, so attractive "opportunities" have to be provided for incoming potential students in the form of accepted standards of art to increase their chance of making it in New York or getting a teaching job, all of which filters backs as aggrandizement of the school department. But the proliferation of New York ideology is a *cause* as well as an effect of institutional entrenchment and the structure of art world relationships and one reason anyway New York Ideology holds the reins of power is that art schools departments have spurred it on as the preferred ideology thus allowing it to create its own market, in other words, one has to teach New York ideology because it is the dominant ideology though it wasn't the dominant ideology until it was taught that way. It is hardly surprizing and no doubt this phrase is hardly surprizing now either that the

liberal arts department in particular, at least as presently constituted, merely instantiate the class structure of society in general and the hierarchy of the art world in general and not only is education a commodity, *get* an education rube, but the language of liberalism itself becomes the ideal means of generating diversification at no expense to the status quo. For example when I once applied for a job at a liberal arts college I was told that they already had somebody who did my "kind of work" or so they thought you know the guy was interested in work past 1965 and in elaborating this decision, which I must admit that at the time I didn't take lightly, it became clear that while the school did have a number of "different" alternatives for students they were all subsumed under the broad rubric of New York Ideology, not at all atypically with an emphasis on Abstract Expressionism and augmented no doubt though it's only a guess by the usual quota of art history courses based on modernist interpretations you know Rembrandt as a formalist.

Women are never stronger than when they arm themselves with their weaknesses.—Madame du Deffand

Heretofore this article has focused on various aspects of the market system, many of which exceed the mere presence of money. The ruling class is not a compendium based on money alone but a compendium based on institutional control, which is subsequently used in an oppressive manner. With regard to this institutional control the "poor" are sometimes as much to blame as the "rich". This is readily apparent in the case of high art Technicians. Notwithstanding the fact that statistics of the appropriate sort are difficult to obtain, it seems a reasonable surmise that not all high art Technicians come from wealthy families. In fact, many no doubt come from poor families. Moreover, not all such Technicians actually become rich. Consequently, in concentrating on the market system in art, particular attention has been devoted to 1) producer-consumer relationships, 2) specialization of labor, 3) labor as an "abstract" value, similar to a salary in certain respects, and 4) the oppression inherent in all of the above. It must be noted, however, that discussions of a "market system" frequently confine themselves to assuming that this network of economic relationships is abstract, that is, *anonymous.* But for Technicians living in New York at least such analysis would be inappropriate. For example, while the labor of every Technician is assigned a specific value at any given point in time, how is this value arrived at? In addition, who is our audience for the most part? Reference is made to these questions in order to delineate the degree to which our personal relationships are inviolately bound up in our economic relationships and vice versa. (And though it will not be pursued as a coherent position, it could be said that such relationships indicate vestiges of the patronage system; or perhaps they indicate that the patronage system has been transformed somewhat, facilitating the preservation of economic control over production.)

In classical economics (Smith, Ricardo), the price of a commodity is determined pursuant to the interdependence of supply and demand: a surplus of supply relative to demand generating lower prices for the consumer, the reverse generating higher prices. But notwithstanding the rise of a more purely capitalistic market system, experience indicates that the art world does not operate according to the models of Smith and Ricardo. For one thing, while supply is obviously limited in a fixed manner for dead Technicians, this isn't the case with respect to living ones. More importantly, inasmuch as the production costs of art works must take cognizance of labor as well as materials it is difficult to determine these costs, as has been indicated above. In any case demand itself is not influenced in the usual manner, by the availability of the product in conjunction with its production costs. In view of these facts it is impossible to ignore the degree to which the supply and demand relationship in art *is mediated by history and politics.* For the reputations of Technicians, and thus the commensurate labor values ascribed to their works, are completely determined with regard to their position in the hierarchy of art history.

It has thus been characteristic of the present market to *increase the number of middle-persons* (e.g., Emissaries, the media, Entrepreneurs, museums, government agencies) involved in the art transaction. For middle-persons expedite the inflation/deflation of art world reputations; and insofar as they *do* assess reputations primarily on the basis of art history they, in addition, *obscure* the extent to which art history itself must be assessed on the basis of political and economic influences. Being a middle-person clearly involves some degree of power and theoretically a proliferation of middle-persons could create a more diversified market. But it might be more appropriate to focus on this role as a bureaucratic niche, wherein middle-persons mediate between the financial interests of buyers and the specialized training, aesthetics, required to produce and discuss modern art. In view of this situation it seems reasonable to suggest that, in the final analysis, both artistic "diversification" and its cohort critical "objectivity" merely serve to obscure the degree to which ideology is centralized.

In any case, for Technicians living in New York the presence of middle-persons is an index of market *familiarity.* It is common knowledge that most high art Technicians address their work to each other; while Abstract Expressionism may have instantiated this principle to the fullest possible extent it was not, as was mentioned above, atypical. But it is not difficult to ascertain that Technicians also address their work to middle-persons. This reveals an extremely important aspect of the socio-economic organization of the market. For in view of the fact that other Technicians and middle-persons exist as the audience, Technicians do not have to endeavor to construct an abstract or ideal notion of "audience". They do not have to predict who they are addressing their work to. Above and beyond the social elitism inherent in this situation is the extent to which it expedites the avoidance of one aspect of economic competition. For insofar as Technicians know their audience personally they are able to have a certain amount of influence on the sale of their work, making them less dependent on the vagaries of an anonymous market. This is particularly true with regard to New York Technicians inasmuch as many of the important middle-persons, as well as the important institutions, necessary for an international reputation are headquartered in New York. In this context Emissaries and Entrepreneurs are revealed to be especially significant. Generally speaking, these are the people who act as *consultants* to prospective buyers. They educate the "eye" of buyers, instruct them in the intricacies of recognizing good art, advise them as to the relative economie potential of this Technician or that Technician. Pursuant to this end they serve the interests of both the buyer and the Technician, as well as themselves, of course. For notwithstanding the fact that the buyer may eventually realize a substantial profit from the purchase of work by an up-and-coming Technician, the purchase itself inflates the reputation of that Technician, determining that most subsequent sales will be at higher prices.

But ultimately, despite market familiarity, Technicians have not had that much economic or artistic power, except as mongers of ruling class Culture. While Technicians, particularly New York Technicians, have been able to influence sales somewhat they have still been at the mercy of buyers, insofar as at present no work of art is a finished product until it is traded on the open market. This should make explicit the extent to which Technicians living in underdeveloped regions are rendered almost completely powerless by international art. Their social context is not structured such that they could exert any economic or artistic influence—at least in the event that they accept international art as the preferred model of art—in view of the fact that they have little or no contact with those people and institutions which actually determine reputations, international standards. With respect to Los Angeles or Rome or Cologne this situation is less of a problem. But experience has indicated that it is just as oppressive in the long run, determining that solutions *external* to current notions of international art are necessary, whether one lives in a completely underdeveloped region or not.

Conversation is a game of circles.—Ralph Waldo Emerson

Now what've I been sayin? What I been sayin is our very own market system *integrates* the art world. Now those are four-bit words, maybe even dollar words—and I warn you now friends, I'm gonna use em again—but I think everybody gets my meaning. I mean it's just like blacks and whites bein integrated, ceptin it's institutions I'm talkin about, The market system integrates institutions. But you ain't gonna catch me sayin that just cause institutions are integrated they're all the same. Sure money talks. Everybody loves the sweet smell of success. And art world institutions got the money, and they got the power. But they're

not all the same, nosiree. And it's the language of money that makes em different too. Why some are even fightin each other for money. Everybody wants their share of mom's apple pie. Course, they're probably different mostly so's they can make the system more efficient, you know dividin up the labor social-like. Like I said they all got the same ideology. But they each got economic power in a different way. Just look around you. Why right here in New York, right here in the Big Apple, we got institutional diversity, yessir I said institutional diversity. And I'm not gonna give you only *one* example. Why my dog Suzy could give you one example. And I'm not gonna give you *two* examples either, cause we both know you wouldn't be gettin your money's worth and I'm an honest man. I'm not even gonna give you *three* examples. No friends, I feel magnanimous today and I'm gonna give you *four* examples—and they're important examples, mind you, not your usual chickenshit ones.

First off, we got the media. When I say the media I mean things like *Artforum, Art in America, Arts Magazine, Soho Weekly News*—the stuff we read to catch up on the news. Now the media's always tryin to strike up a balance tween goin outta style and hangin on til kingdom come. On the one hand, like I said, the media gives us the news. Now the "news" comes and goes but to my mind, friends, they hand it to us on a silver platter, they *tell* us what the "news" is. I mean maybe I farted ten times in a row at the Leo Castelli gallery last week. Now that's probably some sort of record, but you know and I know that ain't gonna make *Artforum*, not even in the back. But they got *somethin* in *Artforum*. And if you keep buying it instead of somethin else well I recken you believe it's the "news". Course I can tell from lookin at you that some of you folks just read things you know your name's in, and I recken that's as good an excuse as any. I ain't sayin I'm any different. But that just means you like to be *in* the news. Course I can't deny some of you other folks just read *Artforum* to find out what other folks are readin about. But that ain't saying much bout news either. So *Artforum* and all them other magazines got the market sewed up on news. That's what you might call institutional power. C'mon folks let's hear it for institutional power. And let's hear it for financial security. Course, on the other hand, the media's gotta worry bout art goin outta style. I mean art history ain' t somethin to spit at, most folks find they can't do without it. Not everybody agrees on it, but most folks do and that's why we got a centralized ideology. Now you just ain't "news" unless you got somethin sorta new to say bout this ideology. Everybody knows this. But this way the media can have "news" and ideology all at the same time. They ain't gotta worry bout ideology goin outta style cause it's always comin into style. Course they ain't fenced it in all the way, cause their reviews and articles gotta take into account galleries and museum shows. But like I said most folks, specially folks outside New York, look to the magazines to tell em what's goin on. So if the media know what's goin on and they ain't worried about ideology goin outta style, what've we got? Well I'll tell you one thing we ain't got, and that's Ford Motor Company. I mean Ford's bout as interested in their old cars as they are in a bucket of donkey piss. All they care about is next year's models. Now you and I know art ain't like that: old ideology ain't goin outta style, it's gettin more *valuable*, least ways most of it. And since the media only give ideology a kick in the butt now and then—they don't harm it none—they don't do much more than give the market system a kick in the butt either. Let's face it friends, there's more than one way to get stuck with a conservative.

Now I know I talked bout schools before, and I don't wanta bore you folks, but this here subject's a real gold mine. Just look at schools. Why if we believed everythin they told us we'd probably spend our whole life in school learnin bout art. To hear em tell it there ain't no other way *to* learn bout art. And a lota us folks *do* believe em too. Course it ain't so hard to. I mean how many you folks tried readin bout modern art without havin some art education? Course most of us probably weren't much interested in modern art anyways til we learned somethin about it. And it's right comfortable learnin bout it in schools—ceptin of course when you get to feelin *too* comfortable and then you feel like pickin up the stakes and moving to New York. And if most everybody's learnin bout art in schools they got the market cornered on education. So let's hear it for financial security again, folks! Course the school system ain't stupid: no need for em to stop there. What I'm gettin at folks, in case you ain't already guessed,

is the market for art *teachers*. Now everybody knows where art teachers come from, and that's other art teachers. You gotta go to school to be an art teacher. It's one big happy family. And a lotta folks are goin into teachin full-time these days. Some of em just tryin to make a little money course, treadin water for a while. But a lotta em just wanta teach. And to my mind friends there's a whole lotta assistant professors worried bout being associate professors, and associate professors worried bout bein professors—and every body's worried bout tenure—instead of worryin bout showin in galleries or museums. Now I don't wanta steer you wrong: there ain't nothin necessarily wrong with this, it just ain't what many folks in the art world think about. It's like a separate world from the media for instance, and making it in New York, least ways as close as anythin comes to a separate world. Course I can't deny that just cause there ain't nothin *necessarily* wrong with it, I still got my doubts. I mean when it comes to learnin, teachers is teachers and students is students. And if you ain't hired as a teacher you're a student—there ain't much in between. And like I said before, we're all teachin and learnin the same ideology.

Speakin of galleries, they're kinda interestin too. Cause we all know the way galleries like to fence off their part of the market. I mean the O.K. Harris gallery ain't like Leo Castelli's, you get a different welcome at both of em. So if you wanta buy O.K. Harris—like work you go there. And if you like what Leo Castelli's got out on the front lawn you go there. Course this ain't sayin much for the art, cause you start thinkin one gallery's work's all the same even when it ain't. But at least everybody can tell everybody else where to go shoppin.

Now I ain't had a lotta kind words for Technicians, includin myself. But I might if we got the bit in our teeth and took our head. I mean we ain't takin advantage of our position, ceptin of course our institutional position in society. Folks look to us for creativity, yessir I said creativity, that's what makes us different, that's what we get paid for. But most of us ain't doin much more than usin different and unusual means to the same end. Course that's all most folks are lookin for anyways: the old ideology's gettin to be like a friend you can chew the fat with every mornin—different stories, same friend. Wouldn't be so bad if you didn't find out the friend was stealing you blind in the afternoon, you and your other friends. If folks *are* lookin to us for somethin different then why don't we give em somethin really different? I mean the whole situation's kinda like junk: everybody get off junk and you get rid of everybody feedin on junkies. Now I ain't sayin Technicians ain't feedin on folks too. But in the art world we're a lot more like junkies, folks feedin on us. And I think we gotta start cleanin house at the bottom, just like junkies. Some of you might call it the top, don't matter. Main thin is we always got the *chance* to produce work sayin fuck you! to the folks feedin on us. We just ain't *taken* that chance. We ain't taken it as Technicians and we ain't taken it in any other role. I mean lotta us are just Technicians, but some of us got other art world roles, mostly as Emissaries I reckon. Trouble is, most of us got the same idea bout our other roles we do bout art. Maybe the question is how to take that chance.

Please do not shoot the pianist. He is doing his best.
—Oscar Wilde

No, I think the first question is *why* we haven't (with the possible exception of the Guerilla Art Action Group on certain occasions) taken this chance in the last twenty years or so, why we have almost invariably chosen bourgeois alternatives. As I've indicated, much of this doubtless has to do with art being lodged in a society devoted to: specialized labor and roles; a tendency towards simplicity rather than complexity (the problem-solving ability of science/technology); class/gender/racial domination; an emphasis on output, productivity. But for several reasons—most of which, I admit, derive from theoretical assumptions about my ability, as well as other Technicians' abilities, to change this situation somewhat—I think this is only part of the problem: that is the problem should be stressed in a particular way.

The Myth of Objectivity, an academic cause célèbre for many years, has received quite a pummelling lately—particularly from academic quarters. The attack assumes that it is impossible to eliminate day to day prejudices from one's work and that so-called "facts" have largely been mere reflections of these (implicit) cultural prejudices. In the process, this criticism has exposed the connections between academic thought and bourgeois ideology, one connection being that Objectivity exists in the first place. Now the art world, at least Technicians, can hardly

be accused of Objectivity in this sense. But it is amazing how much we *do* subscribe to a complementary Myth of Subjectivity. This Myth seems to date from Romanticism, which was a politico-aesthetic reaction to the sterility of both neoclassicism and the prevailing social reality. During this period Technicians developed a belief in the power of self, especially the emotions and imagination, to challenge (essentially, escape) this sterility; and as a result they created a gap between themselves and that society. But this position increasingly led to reification of "society", rendering it an abstraction rather than a shifting set of relationships constituted by people such as Technicians. What Technicians gained in initial freedom and eventual self-importance, they lost in the development of a position which, by and large, excluded them from ever politically *affecting* the society they were opposed to. (In this light "art for art's sake" becomes an attempt to establish another society of sorts. Also, it's interesting that Dada, one radical attempt by artists to affect society *directly*, espoused what could be called the Romantic ideal of emotional spontaneity. Of course the contrast to both this scenario of Subjectivity and Dada is the radical tactics of Courbet and the Paris Commune, which were rooted in realism, in facing social issues head on; and it is interesting, I suppose, that the idea of the Commune has generally been overlooked by Technicians.) Given what had become an ingrained elitism, however, Technicians were still able to project themselves as highly "moral". This assessment still holds true today. But while Technicians, the art world in general, may disregard more mass-cultural prejudices than most people (substituting others in their place), our inherent elitism means that, in a socio-political sense, this morality exists almost by *fiat:* be a Technician and you're automatically the most morally and socially responsible people around. This hermeticism has meant that we rarely question more basic moral considerations, that is, the connections that *do* exist between art and a socio-economic system of production which is based on oppression. Perhaps somewhat simplistically I would say that while we have been and are *socially* liberal or radical, we are *economically* rather conservative. (I'm willing to bet, for example, that for all the homosexuality and disregard for marriage in art, a majority of Technicians have been members of nuclear units where they were, or were trying to become, the breadwinner. Certainly most high art Technicians have been male. Now I don't deny the extent to which male Technicians, even gay male Technicians, have been supported by women—at least initially and usually out of necessity; but I also don't deny the extent to which most of us have endorsed the social division of labor common to society in general.) So the Myth of Subjectivity, like that of Objectivity, merely perpetuates the ideology/structure of our society. And to a certain extent it does this, as I've already indicated, by paradoxically *denying* the subjectivity of the viewer (that is, consumerism).

The rubble of this socio-political implosion, then, is composed of a particular kind of art. If Technicians presume themselves to be a privileged minority, a hothouse of Cultural Wisdom they will tend to construct art which is devoted to *manifesting* rather than, say, *transforming* themselves and their knowledge. And no doubt such "internal" strictures as e.g. consistency reflect this process. It goes without saying that the only one in need of transformation is the lowly Mrs. Ballinger—and she needs to be transformed only to our point of view. The point is, our social role becomes incredibly ossified in this process; just as importantly, so does our knowledge. Our negation of society, by remaining undialectical, can ultimately *do no more than embrace that society.*

So we do get back to the question of *how* to take advantage of our at least potential opportunities for change. To begin with, while I am clearly a Marxist sympathizer, certain assumptions of Marxists about art also need to be questioned. Marxism has been almost promiscuous sometimes in glorifying art and Technicians as negations of the bourgeoisie. Doubtless this is substantially influenced by Marx's attempt to develop a revolutionary praxis corresponding to his intuitions about artistic praxis at the time. But due to a strong predilection for economic analysis, many Marxists today generally grant art little, if any, impetus for political or cultural change. Some Marxists even assume it will wither away with the rise of revolutionary praxis. I'm not at all sure this latter assumption will ever be realized; I'm not at all sure I would want it to be. But perhaps, at this point in time, it would be appropriate to invert Marx's intuitions: rather than constructing

a social criticism/praxis on the basis of art, we should construct art on the basis of a social criticism/praxis. As such, I am suggesting a (possible) praxis which is in contrast to that of bourgeois artists who have *always* assumed they were undermining the bourgeoisie, as well as in contrast to certain kinds of Marxist criticism which has assumed they *never* were.

As you might have already guessed, I think the most important aspect of this praxis is undermining producer-consumer relationships. (Notice I don't immediately leap to the alter of Socialist Realism.) Suggesting this inevitably involves me in a potential contradiction: this article itself could be seen as oppressive, by treating you as a consumer of my wonderful ideas. I have tried to avoid this. Just because you're reading an article I have written, it does not *automatically* mean I am a producer and you a consumer. My point of view as a writer, and as a person, has been to assume that we are all implicated in what I'm talking about, we've all contributed to it. Although it is I who have chosen to write this article, I think the most that can be assumed is that I have become discontented enough with what I was doing to try and stop doing it and that this journal was available to share my discontents—neither of which is a situation peculiar to myself only. And to the extent that we *do* share these problems we are both *subjects,* not objects, in the world. One of the reasons this article has at least attempted to be so subjective is to create a dialogue with *your* subjectivity: I'm not trying to *tell you about* the art world but to *talk about myself in* the art world. That includes my language as well as the ideas expressed by that language.

My point is that eliminating producer-consumer relationships means moving away from knowledge and communication which has become rigid and towards knowledge and communication which is based on *transformation.* Ideally, talking with someone should mean that both ourselves and the person(s) we are talking with *change* in the process of interaction: not only that, *what* we are saying should be regarded as shared, contingent upon the way we are discussing it. When we talk about "acquiring" knowledge, or knowledge of people, we treat both ourselves and our knowledge as objects to be exchanged, neither of which is altered in the act of "acquisition". As far as this article goes, I thus hope to evoke a response from you: not in *my* terms certainly, but not in terms of ideologies/structures which are alienating to us all either. In otherwords, while this isn't an exercise in abject humility—I do think I have something to say—I am only trying to clarify that we *all* have something to say about our world and, moreover, that we all have a *responsibility to ourselves* to try and make our world less alienating. Rejecting the Myth of Subjectivity isn't tantamount to rejecting subjectivity, exactly the reverse. The Myth of Subjectivity endorsed *reified* social behavior, at least after a short period of time, not self-fulfilling (except as self-congratulatory, of course) behavior.

For myself, several strategies beyond article—writing seem interesting now. The notion of groups is important to me. Presumably this is largely a result of having worked in a group myself, that is, Art and Language. Of course groups, in themselves, are hardly a panacea. As I said before, Art and Language has been as guilty as the 10th Street Gang in maintaining producer-con-

sumerism. But I think that as we accepted the implications of working together we began to accept the ambiguities of trying to learn from and influence each other—which eventually (and I do mean eventually) carried over to our relationship to our audience. As a group those of us in New York began to develop a fairly intense process of *socializing* each other, a socialization which was/is contradictory to the prevailing art world ideology. That is, we began moving away from producer-consumer interaction. Understandably, this was/is difficult. Without delving into the specifics of A&L in New York, it is clear that any group has to deal with the problems of authority. Authority comes in a number of forms: birth (male/female). status (reputation/no reputation), intelligence, wealth, time (self-supporting through art/not self-supporting, need other job as well), etc., and to varying degrees they're all difficult to overcome. But we have to try because advocating different notions of collectivity means, or should mean, advocating different notions of individuality: inter-subjectivity. A non-reified group is inconceivable without a corresponding development of non-reified individuals—not necessarily *a priori*, but dialectically, group and individual reinforcing each other. Now the intensity of this socialization is probably any small group's strongest and weakest point. It's good because relatively frequent, direct social contact means that your ideas as well as everyone else's are subject to a lot of stress: learning actually happens fairly often. Moreover, you generally (though not always, certainly: it depends on how much authority has been exorcized) begin to establish a context of mutual respect. On the otherhand it's not so good because, in our case at least, I think it made us feel "special" enough to keep on maintaining our privileged position in relation to the rest of the art world. I suspect we may have become victims of our own collectivity, reifying our small, somewhat formal group (versus, say, a loose collection of friends you talk with periodically; or a large community group where discussions are generally much less intense (in the way I'm using intense)) as the *only* means of radical action. I personally would like to suggest it isn't the only way. As I've already stressed, while the art world is highly integrated for the most part, its various elements also strive for a certain autonomy. And I think that in the case of Technicians and schools this could be taken advantage of.

Now I've consistently maintained that the specific aesthetic decisions of the last twenty years or so have usually reflected the drawbacks of our social institutions in general. This shouldn't be taken as a one-dimensional picture, however. It's not so much that all recent art to date is completely saturated by its institutional context, but that creativity has frequently been devoted to maintaining important institutional contexts rather than criticizing them. No doubt some aspects of all art outwit institutionalization; but recent art has tended to be consciously anti-*art world* institutionalization (*de*materialization, *New* Realism, *Conceptual* art (I admit these are art historical labels but they seem appropriate nevertheless)) rather than anti-social alienation in general. But as I've said, I don't think creativity needs to be co-opted in this manner. I think each of us, separately and/or in groups, can begin to construct a non-alienating art which really does have the market system *imposed* on it, which challenges instead of reflecting that market. Of course this is difficult. Since the market system is institutionally diverse, various actions within the system will usually appear to be fragmented. For instance it is quite easy to make art in Soho, which is sold in Japan during a Museum of Modern Art/USIS exhibition, and never make the connections between New York Ideology, money, international art, and US foreign policy. But that's just it: diversity isn't fragmentation, but specialization; and actions within the market system are also specialized for the most part, not removed from each other. The right hand always knows what the left hand is doing; the market system as a whole is able to become *more* integrated through specialization, much like a corporation. This says something about the way wealth and power are generated by the system. That is, since I've already recounted the importance of Technicians, I don't think we can single out this aspect of production when it comes to wealth and power. The usual target, of course, is rich buyers, people like the Rockefellers. But when you get right down to it, they aren't all that powerful either, at least not by themselves. After all, they have to depend on the same Emissaries and Entrepreneurs as the rest of us when it comes to determining economic and art historical significance. Moreover, New York work brings such high prices because it's taught almost everywhere, and be-

cause it's purveyed by the media as the dominant ideology. So I don't think we can single out individual buyers either. Under the circumstances, I think the only thing we can say is that *wealth and power are generated throughout the whole system* and that, as I said before, oppression in general isn't the result of a relatively small group of rich buyers but of an integrated system of institutions. As such it may no longer make sense to say the high art world "serves the interests" of the ruling class, as if they are separate entities; it may only make sense to say the high art world *is* the ruling class, or at least part of it—particularly since it is so much a part of city, state, and federal economics as well as corporate economics. This makes a critique of institutions especially important now. It also makes that critique harder to carry out, within the high art world anyway. For I don't think we'll be able to do away with the market system, except in a piece-meal way, just because it is the product of so many vested interests. This means it will invariably be able to dilute any concerted attempts at non-reified work: among other things, since the synchronization of deadlines for gallery shows, museum shows/retrospectives, media reviews, etc., is becoming increasingly intricate, there is a corresponding pressure on Technicians for high (that is, reliable) performance and productivity—a situation which doesn't allow much time for reflection. But despite these pressures I think it's possible to begin assessing our present social situation, become sensitive to the ways in which we are oppressed and we ourselves oppress, and do something about it. (The question of how one makes money under these circumstances is a real problem, and one I won't deal with here. I mean I feel ambivalent about using "political art" to get a grant. And it is a good measure of our society that taking a job outside the art world in order to feel more existentially consistent about doing "political art" is just as alienating as a job inside the art world. And rejecting the high art world for another art scene would merely embroil you in similar problems, I think, though I've considered it a lot recently. Yes, it's a real contradiction and at the moment all I can do myself is live with it. I don't mean this to be glib, I just don't have much else to offer at the moment, though I think about this all the time too.) Assessing our social situation, however, should mean talking about *our* socio-political problems (I feel relatively comfortable talking about the problems of Art and Language or the New York art world or even art in the U.S.); it shouldn't mean telling other people what *their* problems are (I don't feel comfortable talking about Italy's problems, or Argentina's—except as they relate to my imperialism—because people there can do it much better than I). Essentially we should take advantage of specialization to engender disintegration, creating a dialectic with those aspects of specialization already solidifying integration. This doesn't mean we can't assess our interaction with other regions/countries, as in the case I just mentioned of international art and imperialism. But our efforts should presumably be channelled in the direction of transforming our own oppression, rather than trying to mediate for someone else; though insofar as both of us may be involved in overlapping political systems, there are bound to be overlaps in both problems and solutions which can't be ignored.

Paradoxically, given all I've said about schools trying to corner the market on learning, I do think they might be transformed somewhat. That is I would like to see both art students and members of the art/general community where the school is located work together to establish a dialogue between institutional and community resources/problems. This notion corresponds pretty much to the strategy SDS adopted in organizing its "locals". It is probably a measure of SDS' success that its attempts at national organization failed. What worked were the local groups, dealing with local issues in the context of a somewhat shared ideology. As far as art is concerned this suggestion would work against the more academic, centralized aspects of schools. Moreover, it would undermine a certain amount of media control at the same time. After all, for those of us in New York *Artforum* etc. are the local media, and we are at least able to *see* and disagree if we wish with the events they report. For people living elsewhere this rarely happens—the result of an occasional jaunt to New York. Emphasizing local problems can mean a corresponding look at the problems of local media, rather than looking to New York for the "news". (For us in New York, of course, it means dealing with *Artforum* etc.) The point is, since most students *do* go to schools to learn about art, this

might as well be taken advantage of: institutionalized education still remains the single most important way to learn the information necessary for undermining the reified aspects of that education. (It is interesting to speculate, for example, about the influence of liberal arts education on art. On the one hand it has kept art allied with the status quo. On the other hand I'm sure it has, through degree requirements if nothing else, forced even art students to think about things they might not ordinarily think about—things which could make them a little more able to deal with the problems of language, alienation, institutionalization, economics, etc. common to the art world and society in general.) Of course, teacher-learner roles would have to be strongly challenged, if not eliminated, at the same time. There is, after all—and I suppose this is my main concern here—a kind of institutionalized gap between being a student and making it in the New York galleries/media, and if you're a student you're plodding through no-man's land (sic). Students are the children of the art world. I find this situation stifling, it perpetuates making it in New York, or some other large city as tantamount to "maturity"and it reinforces the idea that teachers should perform the rites of passage. Art students can be as ambitious as they like, but even students in the New York City area are rendered institutionally passive by both schools and the world of Culture many of them are trying to enter. I think some sort of community action might help to overcome this, for students in relation to teachers and New York and, just as importantly, for communities in relation to schools (since in many cities and towns schools are thought to be Cultural oases surrounded by community deserts). This is difficult, I know, particularly since students (armed with a high art indoctrination) might tend to project themselves as "experts" when faced with community concerns. But the problems of Cultural underdevelopment are pervasive, while little is being done about them. And I think a context of mutual respect and influence is possible under certain circumstances and is something to be worked towards under any circumstances. For example, at the undergraduate school I went to both teachers and students did a lot together to undermine teacher-student roles, and several community action programs were started though none in art; in New York, both money and interest exist for community mural projects. Now my school has subsequently been the victim of a gross financial and political conservatism, a common demise apparently these days, which changed both the faculty and the in-coming students; and while some murals have been done in New York a lot more could've been done by now. But I still have some hope for this kind of community aciton in the art world, as well as for the other things I mentioned.

New York, New York

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Many of the ideas here on art schools were developed in conversation with Allen Jones, at Antioch College. He provided the College Art Association statistics. Moreover, the more I think about it, the idea about film and video becoming popular due to institutional support may well have been his and not mine. Too bad our present emphasis on originality as a commodity forces us to treat ideas as property—the property of *one* person. It goes without saying, though apparently it needs to be said anyway, that credit for this article is hardly mine alone.

A NOTE ON ART IN YUGOSLAVIA

ZORAN POPOVIĆ AND JASNA TIJARDOVIĆ

I

A lot of people in the West associate art in Yugoslavia with Social Realism. According to Western propaganda there is no free individual work in "the communist countries" and, since Social Realism is "official" in the USSR, it's assumed all communist artists apparently must follow this party line. In fact, in Yugoslavia, and even Officially, Social Realism is not an ideology of importance. Today, social realism is a thing of the past, something nobody—meaning museums as well as artists—thinks about.

The victory of the revolution, the formation of a new state, and the close relationship with the USSR, contributed towards Social Realism's development during the immediate post-war years. According to Governmental and party apparatus, art was supposed to be "proletarian in content and national in form" and to glorify the revolution and social development. Social Realism in Yugoslavia did not improve in any theoretical, philosophical and aesthetic sense since it was content with the direct acceptance of the already elaborated Soviet thesis.

In 1948, after the resolution of the *Informbiro* (a very famous period when Yugoslavia opposed Russian domination) new social and political processes were slowly opened. In 1950, this brought about the first confrontations with Social Realism. This confrontation was resolved at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in January 1950, where the necessity of the democratization of the social and cultural structure as freedom for artistic creation was considered to be of importance. This liberation from dogmatism was encouraging for the artists so that very soon, at the Second Congress of Artists, another resolution was formed which criticized the previous praxis and theory: "it is necessary to resist the uncreative naturalism which the artists of the USSR intend to impose on the whole world as Social Realism." Lack of caution in this direction enabled the spreading of unthinking thematics, neglecting of form and cheap popularity.

The Russian avantgarde (the Constructivists, Tatlin, El Lizzitsky, Rodchenko and others) represent the first and only attempt at a real integrating of art activities into the society. There was a deliberate attempt to integrate a Western influenced *high* culture (futurism, cubism) into the society, an attempt to do this on a theoretically sophisticated basis. The society (not just a few isolated artists) wanted this; *everybody* was included in society and this was a very remarkable time.

Just after the second world war, the Western Countries couldn't tolerate the thought that any Communist country could produce good art. It can be said there would still be no appreciation of this period in the West except that, years later, similar objects were produced here (during the early Sixties, for example).

In Yugoslavia this Russian art was always appreciated (although often for more mystical than formal reasons). But nor was Western art rejected. Many Yugoslavian artists lived in Paris and only during the past few years has anything locally promising begun to develop. During recent years artists like Beuys and Buren have visited Belgrade. The visits proved negatively catalytic for many of us, mainly because of the amount of money associated with each artist. We couldn't understand what made them—and they were allegedly Marxists—so powerful and important. A lot of Yugoslavian artists did similar work but received no money, no accolades. So we all thought, given the notion of the Yugoslavian self-management system, that

we could make something of our own, which really belongs within our society and our culture.

Most Yugoslavian museums and Cultural Institutions regard as the Offical Art *any kind* of painting or sculpture. In the last few years, however, some museums and galleries have organized a number of exhibitions of so-called "new art." This includes Land Art, Process Art, Conceptual Art, and so on. So the institutions, or certain of them, do acknowledge recent art directions after, say, 1965. (There have been amongst some international artists—Soto, Hockney, Yves Klien, Pop Art, New Chinese Art, Mayakovsky, Vasarely, the Zero Group, Computer Art, Design and Anti-Design Conceptual Art, etc.).

There have been a few groups or individuals in Yugoslavia working since around 1966 in relation to Conceptual Art. They are the OHO group, (ƎKÔD, and several of the artists collaborating with the Gallery of the Student Cultural Centre in Belgrade. Also to be mentioned are those gathered about the Student Centre Gallery in Zagreb.

The OHO group developed a method which comprehends a collective choice of subjects that later were developed into individual work by each member of the group. The group was founded in 1966. Its ideology was first based on the Fluxus doctrine popular at the time. This propagated an objectivist, extremely "concrete" viewpoint. The work was similar to what critics call Land Art or Process Art. From 1969-70 the OHO group worked on strictly linguistic and diagrammatic propositions which were shown at the MOMA *Information* show in 1970. In 1971, the group stopped its activities and went to live in a commune in Sempas, Yugoslavia, only to dissolve a short time afterwards.

The (ƎKÔD group, founded in 1970 in Novi-Sad, is similar to the OHO group. They work in the direction of a linguistic type of Conceptualism. At the end of 1970 this group edited the magazine *Polja* No. 156 which was entirely devoted to Conceptual Art, containing texts by Victor Burgin, Robert Barry, Sol LeWitt, Joseph Kosuth, Ian Burn, Mel Ramsden and others from the Art & Language group. In 1972 (ƎKÔD exhibited at the Biennale de Jeunesse in Paris. Here they were confronted with "conceptual" works priced in the range of $10,000. This disillusioned and irritated them and on returning to Yugoslavia they ceased further public activity.

The Belgrade group (of which the number varies since the gallery is open to all who are interested), has determined the activity of the Student Cultural Centre Gallery from its inception in 1971. These artists work individually, but their collective co-operation in respect to the Gallery has helped them sustain their activity.

The artists in Zagreb have also been working together until they achieved some social and individual security. Their work is generally considered to be the "core" of Conceptual Art in Yugoslavia today.

In the beginning Conceptual Art was considered to be against the corruption of consciousness and the bourgeois ethic of the artist. That this has been proved otherwise by their counterparts in the West, that Conceptual Art is just a perpetuation of the Western bourgeois tradition, has been felt deeply by certain Yugoslavian artists. After a very active period many of the above groups and individuals decided to cease their activities or to substantially change them. Members of the OHO group no longer work together. (ƎKÔD group is still at work but no longer publicly exhibit. The Belgrade Student Cultural Centre is still an active center and is trying to determine its own particular program within our own cultural circumstances. They have shown particular interest in examining contemporary Western Art and have organized several international conferences for this purpose. During the past two years, they have also shown an interest in Marxist aesthetics.

II

These and other aspects of recent Yugoslavian art must be set against the backdrop of the financial and social status of the artist.

The working people in Yugoslavia are, every month, compulsorily taxed by 30% to 40%. This amount provides everybody with social security, health insurance, free education, etc. The Unions of the Republics (the six republics of Yugoslavia are administratively equivalent to states here) are financially supported by the Republics' fund for culture. An artist who qualifies as a member of a Union has a right to social security, health insurance, and at age 65 gets a pension.

In order to qualify for an artist's union you have to prove you are an "active" artist; you have to prove you have had exhibitions, you have to show catalogues, biography, etc. Since most people do not think that the "new" art just mentioned qualifies as art, this of course creates problems in qualifying as a member in the Union. Therefore many artists are forced to manufacture paintings and prints—more conventional work with which to qualify. But the Unions do a lot to help the young artist. They organize competitions, scholarships abroad, publish books, provide materials and so on. There is even a law in Belgrade that every new apartment building must have artists' studios. Also, almost every artist is provided with a cheap studio and apartment.

In order to live, that is in order to buy food, travel, and so on, the artist depends on sales. In the Western sense, there is no art-market in Yugoslavia. There is no investment or speculation in art. Work is principally bought by the Purchasing Commission. This work usually ends up decorating bureaucrats' offices. Only the Commission can buy works for the cultural institutions. Museums must ask the Commission to buy the works they want (recently the Museum of Modern Art (Belgrade), requested certain works from the artists of the Student Cultural Centre—so there is some pressure from the museum curators for the Purchasing Commission to change its statutes, i.e., its purchasing policies, in order to include films, video, etc.). Most works go into government offices and a few into museums. What goes where depends on similar curatorial decisions as those which take place in the West. While some work remains the property of museums, the majority are locked up in government basement vaults and eventually are sold in the *otpad* (a kind of flea market) for extremely low prices.

Since the administrators of the Commission *must* purchase from each artist once a year there is no personal taste involved. This would seem to be one of the sources of cultural alienation. To counteract this bureaucratic unreality, many artists try to sell to private buyers or even give work away to friends.

The Purchasing Commission buys something from every exhibition (there are a few exceptions: these are mainly "new art" exhibitions which, according to the administrators, might not even be "exhibitions"—but this is beginning to change). If the Commission buys the work of some artist it rarely happens more than once a year. So that is practically the artist's annual salary.

There are of course a few commercial galleries existing outside of what the government purchases. But these usually specialize in popular middle-class art, more or less what you see here in Washington Square. Some artists get quite rich from this type of work.

Collectors (mainly 'professionals' e.g., doctors, university professors) do exist of course but they buy work purely for their own pleasure. They do not trade in art works, though there are no legal restrictions against trading—anyway, it almost never happens. This could mean that, despite the purchasing commission, there is some kind of potential use-value of art retained.

Western art is being closely scrutinized by certain Yugoslavian artists. It is being seen however, as we hope the above remarks prove, in a completely different context of practical as well as historical/social problems.

At the *Projekt '74* exhibition in Cologne, instead of art-as-art we got art-as-politics. But, when the museum declined to accept the latter, it was shown at the Paul Maenz Gallery. This is part of the quantification of quality. Reducing every "quality" to "quantity," the bourgeois society economizes on intellectual activity. It understands "reality" at the lowest cost. It considers all aesthetical factors permeated with *un*material essence. The "magnificence" and "richness of expression and form" of the artwork exhibited at 420 West Broadway are represented as an essence (of culture, of history, of art) which no other language can depict. Any deeper consideration is simply proclaimed pedantry; everything that seems so "natural" to the situation is only a factor of good-show-business.

During our stay in New York, we tried to talk with as many artists and students as we could. We talked about what we saw and what we know of the galleries as well as our experiences in Yugoslavia. That meant we spoke somehow differently and perhaps sometimes more fundamentally. We have the feeling that this sort of "deeper" talk was thought to be inappropriate or strange, or looked on as a reflection of something having its sources in the socio-political system that we come from—as if we were expressing not our opinion but merely the Official opinion of our State. It seemed to be considered that what we thought or did was not of ourselves but somebody else, that we were mere products, finally, of a Communist ideology—and it is well known what that means. It is equated, for one thing, with Social Realism and that means 'poverty' in art. In New York, it seems that everybody believes they are thinking freely, democratically, as if this thinking has no connection with the society they live in.

New York, New York—Belgrade, Yugoslavia

PRICING WORKS OF ART

IAN BURN

How *should* prices of works of art be determined?

Before trying to answer that, we need some sort of an answer to how prices of works of art *are currently* determined. Clearly, a price can only be fixed relative to a particular market structure. It's widely assumed (and I assume it too) that the sort of market we have is not a decreed market but one subject to so-called open-market forces—that is, while it might be manipulated, it's not planned or managed. In this sort of market, the price of a particular work of art finds its 'own level' according to what advantages or 'privileges' it accrues in relation to a particular market structure. For example, the established fame of the artist, the current popularity of the style which the work relates to, the scarcity of similar works, the exchange value of the materials or medium used, the newness or oldness of the work, and so on.

'Viewed from the standpoint of the objective relations of capitalist society, the greatest work of art is equal to a certain quantity of manure.' (Marx)

The price of a particular work of art will go up or down according to the number and power of such privileges it secures or loses (not all privileges being equal). A particular work can alter its price by being moved from one part of the market to another (to a different marketing category), where what were once its 'commonplace' features become 'unusual' and the work becomes subject to different marketing modes. This has been especially true of much so-called Conceptual Art where more 'common' commodities (essays, photographs, photostats, etc.), morphologically part of a market with unexceptional prices, took advantage of the unique commodity market to achieve exceptionally high prices.

What is it we're selling when we sell something as a work of art? This is a crucial point. We're selling certain sorts of *rights* to a particular *property*. Setting a price then becomes a way of setting a standard (criterion) for the allocation of those certain rights to what (those rights state) is the work of art.

This has an immediate effect of dividing up 'the arts' according to their *modes of marketing*. How is this? *Because works of fine art* (e.g. painting, sculpture, etc.) *are the only part of the arts which are directly susceptible to the private property system.*

Historical first editions, original manuscripts, scores, etc., are also susceptible, though tending to fall more into 'historically-secure commodities' rather than straightforward 'art commodities.' However, in strict terms of the market, historical memorabilia do function the same as works of art and are 'valued' similarly by the owner. This is largely the result of the autonomous function of 'history' in relation to art production—so that old art is valued for its 'secured-history' and new art is valued for its 'potential-history.' So there is a difference between art and memorabilia—but from the market you'd never know.

But, returning to the point, the market-defined split has overwhelming repercussions on the various 'classes' of artists in the various fields of the arts: it determines *how* we get our incomes, which inversely has re-defined our concepts and methods of production. You don't sell property rights to novels, poems, music, and so on, at least not in anything like the way you sell property rights to a painting. Poems (etc.) are subject to a different form of 'ownership,' that laid out in copyright laws. There's a lot of talk currently about the fact that works of fine art are also subject to copyright

laws—but since copyright is a restriction only on 'publication' (i.e. reproduction), the application of the law seems more related to 19th c. market conditions, since it was common then to sell the copyright independently of the painting in order that commercially popular prints (e.g. chromolithographs) could be issued. In the 20th c. it has become more economically advantageous to allow 'free' reproduction of works, since this is capitalizable in the price of future sales.

To make the point further. When we sell the property rights to (say) a painting, we are *transferring* those rights. That is, we are transferring property rights we take for granted we own in the first place and that are ours to sell. I know that sounds perfectly normal, I just wanted to underline the extent to which we all presuppose a private property system is 'correct' or 'natural' to the fine arts, and that we ought to allocate our products via that market.

As I said, this market-sustained split in the arts has immense ramifications. Suppose we look at some. It's not insignificant that the work of fine art is embedded in our art language as a (more or less) *unique commodity*. (We sometimes use the word 'original'.) But isn't it a little curious that we talk so commonly of a painting as *unique*, but not a poem? What then is so special about uniqueness? Here is the point: uniqueness is the most highly treasured and privileged characteristic in the exchange market. Thus what *may* once have related to genuinely personal expression has been transformed into an impersonal factor of 'mere' economic activity. The fine arts have been integrated into the commodity market in ways not conceivable for other fields of art. And thus contemporary fine art has become the least able to express anything but an acquiescing reflection of its own economic dependence.

I guess this way of characterizing fine art as unique or original evolved in the early Post-Industrial Era when goods began to be mass produced and the work of fine art, having already become part of the commodity market during the Industrial Revolution, was forced to re-define its characteristics against the new technologies of production. We can perhaps glimpse this in William Morris' lecture before the Trades' Guild of Learning in 1877, ". . .the great arts commonly called Sculpture and Painting. . .I cannot in my own mind quite sever them from those lesser so-called Decorative Arts, which I have to speak about: it is only in latter times, and under the most intricate conditions of life, they have fallen apart from one another; and I hold that, when they are so parted, it is ill for the Arts altogether: the lesser ones become trivial, mechanical, unintelligent, incapable of resisting the changes pressed upon them by fashion or dishonesty; while the greater, however they may be practiced for a while by men of great minds and wonder-working hands, unhelped by the lesser, unhelped by each other, are sure to lose their dignity of popular arts, and become nothing but dull adjuncts to unmeaning pomp, or ingenious toys for a few rich and idle men."

Morris hints at the source of the incredibly privileged status of the material object (or whatever the market designates as its equivalent) in the fine arts. The source is in the fragmentation and specialization that became unavoidable (?) in industrialized capitalism. . .we know only too well the 'unmeaning pomp' of present-day art!

The characteristic of uniqueness has become central to the market drive. Its commodity value connects it to the economic value of *innovation*, which has become the dynamic of *avant garde* theory and first emerged about the same time as the use of 'unique.' Today, with the massive production of works of art, the artist is still forced to 'innovate' in order to achieve that 'truly original' work: the demands of innovation servicing the market by providing continuing product differentiation. With the huge market expansion of the past couple of decades, the rate of innovation had to be increased, so that finally innovative has come to mean the slightest and tritest formal difference. There are also bureaucratic restraints on what can count as innovation—for one, it demands a marketable *consistency*. Thus one must be original in order to achieve the 'unique' prices, and also consistent in order to sustain those prices—thus we must all be 'consistently unique,' no wonder things have become paralyzed! The whole problem being that, on the levels discussed, it's impossible to distinguish our typical art language from outright market language. We are no longer able to talk about our art production independent of market coercion—the fusion is complete. Is there *any* level we can?

Why am I going on like this about private property? There's a very good reason: it's the

connection between *property* and *power*. Who holds the power in the 'art world'? Who are really the decision-makers? The people who *own* art, who else. . .for Modern Art, like nearly everything else, it is the economics which today provides the unifying force. The cultural system has become completely dependent on the force (dynamic) of money, so being of a moneyed class makes you a potential (perhaps inevitable) decision-maker. Class in this sense refers not to a specific group of persons who have plotted to get power, but to a system that has institutionalized the ground rules for acquiring, holding, and transferring decision-making power and all the privileges that go along with that. The autonomy of our economic order permits the autonomy of the power of those persons, and has given them a bureaucratic base-structure for their power.

This is why that power is largely invisible to us. It is hidden behind bureaucratic walls, a jungle of paper experts separating the producers of art from the owners of art. This is the new, non-marxian conflict we face—no longer the capitalist openly exploiting the producers, bureaucratic organizations have taken over the exploitation as a service for the corporate rich. We have become ruled by 'the rule of rules': the decision power is shielded behind the barricades of second-rate minds and third-rate spirits in the museums and galleries, in the magazines, in the art schools.

This is what protects and conceals the private property system, encourages it to continue. But, in thus perpetuating itself, it sets up conditions which are antithetical to genuinely innovative or imaginative change. The economics has provided an impersonalization greatly contributing to the functional simple-mindedness and uniformity of contemporary art. Moreover, bureaucratization, wherever possible, has routinized, organized, rationalized, codified, quantified, and trivialized—and built in risk-avoiding self-preservational measures contradictory to the ostensive purposes of these institutions. We've come a long way from Thomas Jefferson considering the Constitution ought to be rewritten every twenty years. . .a 'permanent revolution' in the democracy.

Today, what aspects of our 'experience' get to be reified and thus economically privileged are unquestionably determined by the mode of marketing—which by now we have suitably *internalized* in our methods and means of production. We've all noticed how the art market behaves and reacts like a stock market—how prices paid for a 'promising' new artist rise virtually on the grounds of a few well-placed rumors. It's typical of this sort of market that expected future effects of that line of commodity are capitalizable in the current market price.

How can this be so? Don't artists have any say in the market? What needs emphasizing here is that the artist as producer has a contract only in a *production* market. Once the work has been traded in that market, it is then in a strictly *exchange* market (a market where goods are simply exchanged and doesn't involve any production at all). This is how and where manipulation can and does occur. But the point which needs making strongly is *the extent* that manipulation in the exchange market determines the price set in the production market. While the whole economy today is grounded in exchange marketing, it's hard to think of any other sort of work which involves production and yet is so *overwhelmingly* determined by performance in the exchange market and at the same time so free of legal constraint. (It's worth noting that a few artists have come to realize that the exchange market is the area of real manipulation and have joined in, buying back and trading their own and others works and cashing in on the re-sale profits.)

But it is here we begin to get a few implications of the highly deterministic relations between our latter-day concepts of a work of fine art, a system of private property, an exchange market, and the fixing of a monetary value. The artist is generally the victim of the very structure he or she is supporting: what the artist receives is determined by the production market, and the production market is determined by the exchange market, and the exchange market is subject to its own self-interests, to the whims and greed of the private, the corporate and the state powers involved in art investment.

It's obvious to everyone there's little relation between the price set on a work of art and the cost of production to the artist—that's almost never used as a criterion. Socialist theory explains how, in most of our social lives, we have come to apprehend only the *exchange value* of things and are no longer able to directly apprehend the *use value* of anything (". . .capitalism is the moment of negation: negation of use value, hence also negation of culture, negation

of diversity." Samir Amin, *Monthly Review*, Sept. 1974). You would have to be pretty naive to assume, if the price of your work increased ten-fold in so many years, that its use value had increased 1000% during that time.

Something else pointed out is that, in pre-modern-capitalism, man didn't differentiate between the time he spent working and the time he devoted to other social occupations—this would seem to add another argument to a point I've made elsewhere, that the economic principles adhered to by modern artists are 'out of phase' with the economic world we have been born into, and reflect an earlier, more *atomistic* stage of competitive market capitalism. That is, the production market we work in is atomistic and competitive, while the exchange market is monopolistic—and speculation in the exchange market makes the situation so fluid there is not able to be a stable estimate of the production value of a work of art. This means we don't have any voice, much less bargaining power, in the art economics.

Artists' refusal to put a per-hourly rate on what they produce seems to reflect a fact that artists' labor has never been commoditized. In this light, the occasional suggestions in places like the *Art Workers News* that the way out of the current market debasement of art is to set per-hourly rates on artists' time may represent a state of out-of-the-frying-pan-and-into-the-fire. That notion seems to be all about getting *into* the wage system, from which there is no exit. Gompers' idea that "the way out of the wage system is through higher wages" is particularly American in its carrot-like solution and has surely proven not to work! So, any attempts to make our economics more 'up-to-date' or 'realistic' have to be looked at closely to see what we mean by 'up-to-date'—is there any point merely swapping one exploitive circumstance for an even more exploitive one?

Something else which affects the actual monetary price is the way you define the rights to what it is you are selling. You might for instance place certain conditions or qualifications on the property rights you are selling, i.e., you want to retain certain rights over the property or receive certain services or something like that. For example, perhaps you don't want to give up absolute control over the property, as is transferred when selling an automobile; or perhaps you want to retain the prerogative to destroy the work in five years time if you don't like it then—obviously things like this must effect price because they are restrictions on easy and profitable trading in the exchange market. Such conditions stand as 'non-monetary goods' and substitute for part of the monetary price but are generally regarded as incumberances in the market (which prefers to recognize only monetary value). Which also explains something of the difficulty of legislating 'sales agreements' for artists, entitling them to a percentage of resale profit.

Consider some of this in the light of recent discussions about property rights vs. 'moral rights' (cf. Carl Baldwin, *Art in America*, Sept.-Oct. 1974), concerning possible legislature to make it unlawful for the purchaser to violate in any way an artist's work—a number of European and other countries do have a weak form of this law, the U.S. presently doesn't have any such law. The European law states the artist's right to object to any actions that "would be prejudicial to the (artist's) honor or reputation." This may be something odd in conjunction with a private property system, since the mere action of depriving the 'public domain' of certain works of art in many instances affects reputations, in fact it's quite a legal way of manipulating the market. (It's for this reason that many artists reserve their 'key' works for sale to only public institutions.)

That's another angle to consider: when we make something for sale, what is the difference between a work becoming public property or it being private property? (Admitting here, since many so-called public institutions in this country are privately owned and operated, we may have a funny notion of 'public' anyway.) So, what about *public* property—say a museum or institution purchases a work, what then? There are a number of factors: if a person invests privately in the art market and fails, that's held as a personal miscalculation and is just bad luck for him; but, if a publicly-owned museum invests in certain artists or styles which then fail to live up to their market promise, the public considers it has a right to be indignant and protest such 'waste' of public monies. Clearly there is strong pressure on museum officials to see that their investments don't fail—and to use the institutional power of the museum to hedge their bets. So questions of what gets hung and what doesn't, for how long, with what other works,

etc. are *far* from incidental concerns.

Moreover, frequently a sale to a public institution is regarded in itself as 'non-monetary goods' which substitutes for part of the price (since such a sale counts as a privilege which can be monetarized in future sales of other works by that artist). So, often, museums do buy at (and bargain for) vastly reduced prices, even though the work is often less visible (how many works does a museum buy which never get hung?) than if it's bought by a private collector.

The other sort of 'public property' is that which is purchased by a museum which is also a private corporation controlled by persons owning large private collections themselves (e.g. the MOMA and apparently most other museums involved in showing contemporary art in this country). It's hard to imagine psychological pressure not being felt by the museum officials to see that the private investments of the Trustees are guaranteed by the 'public' investment policies of the museum.

At this point, with our whole culture infected by market priorities, it's hard to believe that any sort of market could be an effective or trustworthy standard for sorting out some works as 'better' than others, for how much more money, and so on. The market has its own self-interests above all else—that's to say, it is interested in art only insofar as it represents money, and doesn't go beyond that. So we have to acknowledge, whether it's direct government or state enterprise in the arts, or the 'semi-public' corporate investment, or just private investment, it's finally all equally hazardous for the producers. It seems beyond me right now to know whether a free market is the best model for an efficient and equitable allocation of goods and for free consumer choice—perhaps it is, I don't know—but it's a long time since we had anything like that anyway. Perhaps, at some earlier stage of capitalism, the consumer was king, but today the commodity has become king and the consumer is left wondering what use he is other than a function of maximizing the consumer ethic.

'Every two years—formerly it was every year—the Government regales the public with a great exhibition of painting, statuary, &c. Industry never had such frequent exhibitions, and she has not had them nearly so long. In fact, it is an artist's fair—putting their products for sale, and waiting anxiously for buyers. For these exceptional solemnities the Government appoints a jury to verify the works sent, and name the best. On the recommendation of this jury the Government gives medals of gold and silver, decorations, honorable mentions, money rewards, pensions. There are, for distinguished artists, according to their recognized talents and their age, places at Rome, in the Academy, in the Senate. All these expenses are paid by us, the profane, like those of the army and the country roads. Nevertheless, it is probable that no one, either on the jury, or in the Academy, or in the Senate, or at Rome, would be in a condition to justify this part of the budget by an intelligible definition of art and its function, either private or public. Why can't we leave artists to their own business, and not trouble ourselves about them more than we do about rope-dancers? Perhaps it would be the best way to find out exactly what they are worth.' (Proudhon, *Of the Principles of Art and its Social Purpose*, 1865)

Anyway it's rather odious to talk about more virtuous methods of allocating goods when we are unsure about *how* what we are talking about qualifies as 'goods' in the first place. This is seen to raise a fundamental question about whether any sort of property system should apply to fine art. The initial question about *how* prices should be becomes a question of *whether* prices should be determined. That is, if we rule out the system of private property in the fine arts, there's no longer any issue of price. This would have a momentous effect, disrupting the entire superstructure of Modern Art with its dependence (for inspiration) on an internalized marketing structure.

But of course, that leaves wide open the issue of the artist's alternate means of income—about which I'm as confused as anyone else. To make an example of this difficulty: what would happen if artists were treated similarly to a protected public utility?—so that excess of a particular level of income was not retained by the artist but was either returned to the buyers or distributed for the benefit of other artists not gaining the expected income. Such 'primitive democracy' would certainly alienate the present nature of opportunism towards the market—perhaps even 'externalizing' it, reversing the process we've all been subjected to. This would eradicate all wealth-maximizing behaviour, though the spectre of a perhaps more gigantic bureaucratic lebenswelt is somewhat terrifying. And further, this says nothing of the questions of criteria (examinations? licenses?) for qualifying for such a scheme, nothing about alternate methods of allocation of works of art, nothing about whether you would want to fix standard (decreed) prices for works according to size, materials, styles, the number for sale, the needs or age of the artist, or whatever, or not fix any prices, and so on.

It's been argued, and I don't know how applicable it is, that private property is the source of all alienation. It's easy to see that private property creates a continuityof property rights, following hereditary lines; it's also apparent how this has been formalized as a 'social system.' And it's certainly true that private property is exploitive through maintaining the economic conditions whereby surplus value can be extracted from the producer through the exchange process. In socialist theory, once private property is socialized, the surplus belongs to the people and the material basis for exploitation disappears. However, in the socialist experiments so far, this hasn't seemed to be the case. So, while I tend to agree that "the main reason that art suffers in a capitalist society is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to secure in the prevailing circumstances the necessary conditions for the mode of consumption adequate to the true nature of art" (Meszaros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation*, 1970), it doesn't help me. Moreover there is no 'true nature' of art—no art is independent of specific forms of society, and our contemporary art is probably a good reflection of this society in most of its more impersonal and dehumanizing states: one state of which is an art which no longer has the capacity to change itself or do anything else but reflect the fragmentation of this society. Our art has lost its capacity to dream.

The big question is the whole property system in fine art and the sheer force of cold cash. Money is without doubt the most *impersonal* form of value, the most widely regarded as neutral. But, in this society, it's the most direct source of power of one individual over another. It would be naively idealistic to think (as Soviet economists were planning as late as 1921) one could simply abolish money, hut perhaps we have to make certain areas of our lives *immune* to monetary exchange. It is a serious question about the deterministic relation between fine art and money, and what would be the effect of eliminating the modern economic dynamic of art—that is, *what would be the effect of establishing art as a non-investment area?* Could it even he done? It might be the only way of re-integrating art as a viable social activity and the role of artist as an integrated social and individual role, the only way of having an art not wholly determined by the economic world we have been born into, and which has not only the possibility but also the impulse to change itself.

There is some urgency in these considerations. There are evermounting forces rendering any change like this impossible. Daniel Bell in his book *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973) is more optimistic, suggesting that individual private property is losing its social purpose and that the autonomy of tbe economic order (and the power of those who run it) is coming to an end. He asserts we are witnessing a change from market to non-market political decision-making—the move away "from governance by political economy to governance by political philosophy" and that means "a turn to non-capitalist modes of social thought." Maybe he's right. . .but meanwhile the art market seems to be coming even more capitalistic than ever.

The most significant change in the art market in the past decade is the shift in patronage from private to corporate or government sources. Individual patronage has been percentage-wise virtually squeezed out of the market. As a result, decisions of 'taste' have to be jusitifed institutionally or publicly, and so are no longer the prerogative of personal preference; the bureaucrat or corporate manager must not affront hut appease his shareholders, workers, customers, etc. The effect of *impersonal taste* on art isn't measurable but, in my eyes, our galleries and museums are overflowing with mutations floundering in corporate or bureaucratic standards. In the U.S., the Business Committee for the Arts, a private, tax-exempt, national organization, was set up in 1967 specifically to advise business and industry in greater corporate support of the arts. Has anyone yet bothered to ask what effect this might have on the arts? Is it all really a matter of tbe more money the better the art? Another recent development, an even more perturbing one, is the so-called 'art investment funds,' corporate-like organizations whose sole aims are to huy art, hold it for appreciation, then sell at a profit. For example, "if I buy a $100,000 painting today, in 3 to 9 months I want to sell it for a minimum of $150,000. The dealer gets 10% of the sale price, or $15,000, leaving Modarco with $35,000, or a 35% profit" (Ephraim Ilin, of Modarco, quoted in *ArtNews*, Dec. 1973?). Both Modarco and a similar organization, Artemis, pay dividends to their shareholders who are investing essentially in the art-dealing trade. Modarco also backs some fifteen galleries around the world and both have advisory boards consisting of professionals well-established in the art fields.

The result of this can only be further capitalization and cultural inflation in every sense. If someone pays two million dollars for a painting, the effect is to immediately deflate all other existing prices. Obviously our present inflation is not like the German inflation of 1923 when selling a Rembrandt might have brought you enough to live on for a few weeks only. But all markets are potentially as capricious as that. And I can't help feeling we are in the late days of the New York Bubble. The prices, for example, being paid by the new National Gallery in Australia for recent American art can only suggest the buyers believe these are *natural* prices, that the money bears some relation to the works of art and so in no way can these prices ever drop!

So, to ask how, if at all, should prices be determined for works of art is to ask what kinds of social behavior we want, or what sorts of rights should be instituted in order to achieve the preferred behavior. *That is basically a question of what sort of society we want to live in.* And it is basically a question of what sort of society we want our art to reflect, and whether we are going to have any *choice* about that.

New York, New York

TO ART (REG. INTRANS. V.)

ADRIAN PIPER

I want to consider a certain class of answers to the question, 'What do you do?' The class of answers I have in mind interests me because it reveals different conceptions of what it means to be committed to art, and thus different conceptions of what art activity consists in. Secondarily, it may also suggest different solutions to the problem of what *it* might be like to succeed in making one's commitment even nominally intelligible to some interlocutor *outside* the art context.

Within the art context, another class of answers, which I will not discuss in detail here, would be appropriate. Samples might include: 'Video', or 'Holography', or 'Performances', or some similar shorthand tag. Note that these answers could not be an appropriate response to the query when issued from a vantage point outside the art context, since they do not by themselves convey the particular use of media that seems to distinguish the art context per se from, say, television, advertising, or vaudeville.

The attempt here will be to distinguish more carefully some of the differences between members of the former class. These differences are largely obscured by their colloquial character, and by the purpose they serve in common, which is to deflect the question and change the subject. I will proceed by first calling attention to some of their grammatical and semantical implications, both through analysis and through comparison with grammatically similar responses with different subject matter. This discussion will serve the basis for a brief sketch of the logical interrelationships that seem to hold between these answers. Finally I will propose and argue for the addition of a new member to this class of answers on the grounds that it has certain merits which some of the others lack.

I.

i. 'I am an artist.'

Superficially, this is grammatically analogous to 'I am an architect', 'I am a cook', or 'I am a biologist'. But this answer, perhaps more than any other of the class under scrutiny, reveals the problem of identifying one's committment. While it appears to distinguish being an artist from being an architect, cook, or biologist, it does not in fact, because it is not incompatible with any of the latter. It may be construed as revealing a certain conception, i.e. an aesthetic conception, of how one sees oneself, together with whatever one's vocation actually is. Here the impatient rejoinder, 'Yes, but what do you *do*?' or 'Yes, but what kind of artist? (A bullshit artist? A culinary artist?)' is not out of place. The scope of this answer is so broad that it is not sufficient to specify one's vocation at all; it indicates only what we may call the aesthetic attitude towards oneself and one's work. In order to determine to what in particular the aesthetic attitude is directed, we need more information than this answer alone will yield.

ii. 'I make art.'

In certain respects, this answer resembles 'I make hammocks', or 'I breed collies', but is significantly different in others. *It* is similar in that it identifies the purposive, intentional, teleological character of the activity which forms the focus of the commitment. It tells us that, regardless of how this activity may look, it is intended by the agent to fall under the aegis of 'art', rather than, say, 'cooking' or 'biology'. To this extent it provides a partial solution to the difficulty encountered in i., for making art is, presumably, not the same as making five-course dinners or scale models of buildings.

Clearly, this distinction is highly tentative and open to qualification. But it is at least *prima facie* workable, for the former response is of a different type than the latter. The analogy for 'I make art' in another field might be something like 'I design buildings', or 'I make meals', while the analogy in art for 'I make five-course dinners' or 'I make scale models of buildings' would be something like 'I do videotapes' or 'I do lithographs'. The first analogy offers an intentional identification of one's vocation; it situates our activity within the context in which *we* wish it to be understood. The second analogy tells us more directly what that activity consists in, and presupposes the first. If one is unclear about the purpose of my, say, constructing small plexiglass cubes, I can clarify that purpose by saying, 'I am making art' *or* 'I am designing furniture.' But if one wants to know more specifically what my activity consists in, 'I make videotapes', like 'I make five-course dinners' specifics this.

However, 'I make art' is different from 'I make hammocks' or 'I breed collies' in the important respect that to truly aver that I make hammocks, I have to have successfully made, i.e. completed, at least one hammock; to claim that I breed collies I must have actually bred at least one litter. There are fairly standard criteria which I must meet here, and I may well have tried and failed at either or both of these endeavors. But I can truly say that I make art given only that I indulge in intentional, art product-directed activity. There is nothing, it seems, that counts as a *failure* on my part to make art, if that's what I intend by my action, and if that's what I have, in my own estimation, accomplished. I may, of course, make bad, trite, or unpleasant art. But I can't mistakenly think I am making art but in fact be making something else.

This is not to deny that, *in* making art, I may be doing something else, like satisfying my ego, giving vent to my anxieties, changing the world, or passing the time of day. But my activity under these descriptions constitute some part of an explanation of my activity as making art; they do not undermine my contention *that* I am making art. It seems that nothing, properly speaking, can undermine that contention, for any attempt of the form, 'That's not art!' only reveals an undecidable discrepancy between the artist's and the audience's conception of art.

So ii. exposes some of the teleological kinks in the character of a commitment to art, for failing as an artist means not: failing to make art, but: failing to ellicit positive critical response, failing to gain support or approval, and the like.

iii. 'I do (am doing) art.'

This actually covers two distinct responses, which deserve separate treatment.

a. 'I am doing art.'

Whereas ii. signifies a purposive, goal-directed activity, iii.a. does not. If I am doing art as opposed to making art, I am engaging in a continuous process in which the goal is, so to speak, achieved at each step. There is nothing over and above the activity itself that identifies it as art. In making art I may be interrupted or sidetracked; thus my purpose, i.e. the bringing about of the state or object that I take to be the art, may be deflected. In this *material* sense, I may fail to make art, not because I was actually making something else, but because my intended goal was not achieved. But in iii.a. there is no goal, separable from the doing, to achieve. So this answer suggests a different brand of incorrigibility: I cannot fail to be doing art if I intend to do art, unless I fail to act at all; for my doing art occurs at all points in the process. Compare 'I am doing art' with 'I am ice skating'. Failure in the latter activity, thus disconfirmation of the claim, might be demonstrated by my falling flat on my face every time I try to take a step on the ice. But what kind of condition would disconfirm the former claim? What kind of activity would I have to be doing for it to be *false* that I was doing art?

The continuous character of doing art has the apparent effect of mitigating the purposive character of doing art as a vocation, in the sense that doing art can be seen as a purposeless activity the way taking a walk is purposeless. This is not to say that it is random, or unintentional. But we don't necessarily do art or take a walk for the sake of any purpose or goal beyond the execution of the process itself. But if we needn't be able to say *why* we are doing art, i.e. *what* we are doing it *for*, the sense in which doing art is intentional, or deliberate, requires further scrutiny. For if there is no point or purpose to the activity, it may well fail of rational explanation altogether. Then we would have to have recourse to a causal explanation in just the

same sense in which the intention to take a walk may be subject to causal explanation in terms of nerve action potentials and muscular contractions. This doesn't deny, of course, that we intend to do art or take a walk. It just suggests that the intention is impelled by causes rather than reasons.

b. 'I do art.'

In opposition to iii.a., this states explicitly that in general, I do art. Even if I am not doing it this minute, this is broadly what my vocational commitment amounts to. iii.b. signifies an intentional attitude towards my activity: if iii.b. is true, iii.a. must be true at some point. b. implies a. in that it could not be true that I do art without its being true that sometimes I am doing art. iii.b. also answers the original question, 'What do you do?' with a slightly different conception of the vocation in question than does ii. To do art is to be actively involved in the process of art production at all points, and the response b. expresses this as a self-conscious conception of what one's commitment entails. To conceive of oneself as doing art rather than making art is to conceive of one's vocation as including this participation as an important and necessary feature, rather than simply as the production of some *further* thing which is itself important and necessary. In conceiving of myself as an agent, what I do is logically prior to what I make; for in saying what I do, I am saying what my actions *are*; in saying what I make, I am saying only what they *effect*, or bring about (compare: 'I stamped and cursed' with: 'I made a fuss.').

iv. 'I am into art.'

This is, of course, shorthand for: 'I am involved in art.' It suggests a state or condition of participation of the agent, rather than any product he/she might generate. In this sense, it resembles 'I am in love', 'I am into dogcatching', for it leaves unspecified the nature of that involvement, which might as well be passive or contemplative as active. In some ways it vies with i. in the breadth and ambiguity of its scope. It reveals a participation in or commitment to art in some broad sense of the words, but not in what that participation or commitment consists. i. expresses an attitude of self-regard; a way of fixing one's personal identity which is lacking here: I may be into art without having a vocational commitment to it. I may, that is, be into art without being an artist in *any* sense of 'artist'.

II.

Now I want to comment briefly on certain relationships that seem to obtain between these four responses. If it is true that I am an artist, then it must be true that I am into art. Being an artist presupposes an involvement in art, although the converse does not hold. So we can say that being into art (iv.) is a *necessary condition* for being an artist (i). Similarly, if it is true that I am doing art, it must at least be the case that I make art, since the art is produced coextensively with the doing of it. So making art (ii.) is a necessary condition for doing art (iii.), although making art does not *imply* doing art. And if I in general can be said to do art, it must be true that I make art, since it is true that my vocation, so described, must be instantiated at some point. Further, making art presupposes being an artist; for it makes no sense to describe one's activity *as* art activity and at the same time refuse to identify oneself in the relevant sense as its agent. (Compare: 'I'm not an artist, but I make art' with: 'I'm not an artist, I just diddle around').

These relationships can be systematized in the following way, reading '. . . → __' as '. . . implies __', or as '. . . is a sufficient condition for __', or as '__ is a necessary condition for . . .':

(A) iii. → ii. and ii. → i. and i. → iv.

This says that my doing art presupposes that I am making art; my making art presupposes that I am an artist; and my being an artist presupposes that I am into (involved in) art. These relationships are also transitive: I can be doing art only if I am an artist, and I can be doing art only if I am into art:

(B) iii. → ii. and iii. → i. and iii. → iv.

So we can think of ii., i., and iv. as each providing a necessary condition for saying that one is doing art (iii.). Now to say that ii., i. and iv. jointly provide a sufficient condition as well would be to *define* doing art as the conjunction of:

i. Being as artist;
ii. Making art;
iv. Being into art.

But this conjunction fails to provide a sufficient condition for saying that I do art. For it says merely that if I am an artist, i.e. if I bring the aesthetic attitude to my work, and if I make art, i.e. if I engage in art product-generating activity, and if I am involved in art, i.e. have a participatory interest in art from some unspecified point of view, then I do art, and therefore am doing art. This is clearly false, for nothing in this set of conditions suggests the voluntary continuity of the activity (as a *process*) as itself an intentional and self-conscious feature of my committment. Nothing, that is, suggests that the art is generated *by virtue of* my actions, rather than *consequentially upon* them. This is just to say that the conjunction fails because ii., which is logically prior to i. and iv., fails as a sufficient condition, as demonstrated in (A). If making art fails to provide a sufficient condition for doing art, then being an artist and being into art must fail equally, for the two latter are contingent on the former. It may be true that one cannot do art without satisfying these three necessary conditions. But there is another essential feature of doing art which is lacking in the attempt to define it so far.

III.

Above it was argued that doing art had a rather odd intentional character. It was suggested that one reason for this was the apparent aimlessness of the activity; that the intention to produce art is realized at each point in the process, rather than as an independent result of the process. In doing art, there is nothing over and above the doing that constitutes the art.

Now it might seem that this concept of art activity has rather limited scope. It may seem, at first glance, to characterize a highly rarified and faintly undesirable attitude toward the vocation, viz. the 'everything-I-do-is-art' attitude. It appears to preclude the sweaty, seamy, unaesthetic process of working out an idea, struggling with materials to make the thing appear the way one wishes, improving on abortive or inchoate beginnings in order to bring the work itself into existence. We may be (momentarily) pleased with the end product; but we might instinctively feel that we should hate to have our prior bumblings revealed at all, much less revealed as art. It might be argued that even in the context of a performance, one brings certain preconceptions—well thought-out preconceptions—which are necessary in order to get the thing off the ground at all. And these, we want to say, are not art the way the performance or work itself is art, for we don't *intend* the former to be art.

I think it is possible to admit the validity of this argument without impugning my claims about doing art, and without impugning the importance of iii. as a way of describing one's vocational commitment. For when we answer the question, 'What do you do?' by 'I do art', we no more suggest that everything we do as artists is art than 'I do philosophy' suggests that every word a philosopher utters is philosophy. The answer indicates a certain attitude to what we do, i.e. what we conceive of as being art activity: we might call this the *participatory* attitude. To conceive of this vocation as doing art rather than making art is to conceive of art activity as a process in which the agent's involvement at all points is a significant feature of that process, rather than merely as activity directed towards the generation of a product. It is to conceive of art activity as a series of *actions* rather than as the production of an *object*. This means to think of one's vocation in terms of oneself as an *agent* of change, rather than as a *medium* of change. In the former, it is the artist who does; in the latter, it is, so to speak, the art product which does, while the artist merely brings it into existence.

What is in question is the scope of one's conception of this vocation; whether the field 'art' includes what an artist does, or just what an artist produces. Now it may be true that we need some way of capturing this connotation of active participation with more accuracy than the notion of 'doing art' permits, for it would be desirable to eschew even the bare suggestion that such participation necessarily implies the continuous generation of art in the *evaluative* sense. That is, it would be attractive to be able to describe one's vocation as an ongoing activity—in *that* sense continuously generative of art, without that's having to mean that we continuously generate Art. But we must, for the moment, make do with what we have.

These reflections may provide a key to the logical priority of iii. among the class of responses we have been looking at, for it has seemed that this response provided both the most precise and also the most inclusive answer to the original query: the most precise in the sense that it answered the original question directly, in the same terms in which the question was posed; the most inclusive in the sense that it implied each of the other three responses we considered. Responding in the manner of iii. would nullify the need for ascertaining the

further information supplied by i., ii., and iv. This is to suggest that if we want to properly interpret the question as asking how far we have committed *ourselves as agents* to our vocation; if we want to indicate the extent to which our personal identity is also our vocational identity as an artist, then we must answer with reference to what we actively do, i.e. how we act, rather than just what we produce or generate. If we can successfully answer the former, we need not worry about the latter at all.

IV.

Now we are closer to specifying the condition that seemed to be missing in our recent attempt to define 'doing art' in II. What we lacked was a way of directly conveying the participatory attitude, the the importance of the active involvement of the artist as agent in the art process. What we lacked, quite simply, was the active verb construction. In proposing the regular intransitive verb *to art* for the purpose of filling this requirement, I am thereby altering slightly the ranking order of the four responses we considered, in the following way.

Let us suppose that 'arting' bears the same grammatical relationship to 'doing art' that 'working' bears to 'doing work':

a.	I do work	a'.	I do art
b.	I am doing work	b'.	I am doing art
c.	I am working	c'.	I am arting

If work (under some suitable interpretation) is my vocation in the active sense just discussed (i.e. such that 'I do work' (a.) is an appropriate response to the question, 'What do you do?'), then b. must be true of me at some point. And if b. is true, c. must similarly be true. a. implies b., and b. implies c. This relation is transitive: if I do work, then I am, at some time, working.

Above it was suggested that the 'doing' construction implied continuous production of that which was done: If I am doing philosophy, then philosophy is being done, or produced, at each point during which I am doing philosophy. But I can surely philosophize without doing philosophy ('That's life', he philosophized). Similarly, I can work, and work hard, without, as it were, getting any work done. Working (c.) does not strictly imply doing work (b.), for doing work implies that I can, theoretically, get the work done, successfully complete or terminate the process, while working does not. 'Doing work' can be thought of in terms of Ryle's concept of an 'achievement verb', while 'working' need not. So c. does not imply b. If it does not imply b., then it cannot imply a., for we saw that the truth of a. depended upon the occasional truth of b. And since c. does not imply that b. is *ever* true (although of course it seems likely that it might be), it cannot imply that a. is true.

Now to apply the same line of reasoning to a'.-c'. If it is true that I do art (a'.), then it must be at some point true that I am doing art (b'.). If I am doing art, I must be arting (c'.). Hence if I do art, then at least occasionally, I am arting:

(C) a'. → b'. and b'. → c'. and a'. → c'.

But just because I am arting, this doesn't mean I am doing art, for it doesn't mean that I am continuously producing art, nor that at some point I will presumably get the art done. I may well *never* get the art done. Here we find independent confirmation for the analogy. For the objection raised in III. was essentially that even if we art, we don't always or necessarily *do* art in the sense of continuously producing Art. The notion of arting thus provides a way of thinking of our vocation as an ongoing, participatory activity, without thereby committing us to the implication that we thereby get art *done* (i.e. get *Art* done). So if we think of

v. 'I art.'

as a fifth possible response to the original question, we can summarize the logical relationships that hold between these five responses, as follows:

(D) iii. → v. (i.e. a'. and b'. above → c'.)

(A) iii. → ii. and ii. → i. and i. → iv. (from II.)

(E) [iii. → ii. and ii. → i. and i. → iv.] → v. (substituting (A) for 'iii.' in (D))

(F) [iii. and ii. and i. and iv.] → v. (from (E))

(F) says that the conjunction of i.-iv. constitutes a sufficient condition for arting. Now that iii. is redundant can be seen from the fact that being into art, being an artist, and making art are jointly sufficient to imply art activity of the kind we call 'arting': they connote the participatory involvement (iv.), the aesthetic attitude towards the vocation (i.), and the vocational commitment to the generation of art products (ii.) which characterize that activity. It becomes clear that iii. was simply a rather clumsy way of signifying that activity, with the added inconvenience that it suggested the 'everything-I-do-is-art' posture, which we agreed was undesirable. So we can revise (F) to read

(G) [ii. and i. and iv.] → v.

This says that if one makes art, is an artist, and is into art, then one arts; the former three are jointly sufficient for the latter. We can formulate this conjunction as a single sufficient condition: If I am committed to an active, participatory involvement in the process of generating art, then I art.

That this conjunction is necessary as well as sufficient follows from the character of arting as we have adumbrated it: one cannot art without being an artist, being into art, and making art; for we want to be able to say that, even if the art is never finally made, this activity is what the process of making it consists in. We also want to leave open the question of whether the art is an independent consequence of or coextensive with the process of making it. This was another difficulty with iii., to which v. provides a solution. So

(H) v. → [ii. and i. and iv.]

That is, I art only if I have a commitment to art of the kind just described, and not otherwise. (G) and (H) jointly provide a *definition* for the concept of arting:

(J) v. ⇔ [ii. and i. and iv.]

So defined, the response v. tells us in essence that the speaker conceives of his/her commitment to art as entailing a certain self-consciousness about the process of producing art, independently of the actual or final work. It suggests that, in the speaker's estimation, this process is as important as the work itself; and that therefore, the artist conceives him/herself to be as responsible for the particular character of this process as he/she is for its end product. v. invites the further question, 'In what does your arting consist?' and unlike the analogous query for ii., this is not a request for further specification of the art media or product alone, but also for further specification of the actual *activity* in which the artist engages.

Now it may be that in the description of some particular instance of arting as a vocation, there is nothing about the process which one would wish to leave unspoken. It may happen, that is, that the sum total of this process is little more than thinking, acquiring and manipulating the materials, refining the work, and getting one's friends or associates to give some form of critical feedback on it. But this is improbable. It is more realistic to suppose that for most of us, the process of arting includes not only these features, but certain morally undesirable ones as well, like making certain personal or political compromises in order to make the work accessible to the right audience, undertaking certain undesirable transactions in order to acquire financial support for the work, alienating or promoting alliances with certain people for the sake of advancing one's position, etc. To conceive of oneself as arting rather than just making art is to throw the focus on the totality of this process. It is to imply that we can be held accountable for *all* features of this process, and not just for the finished work itself. It is to imply that in being an artist, we have more to think about than simply getting the work done by any means whatever; and that the ethics of the process bear as much scrutiny as the aesthetics of the product.

Cambridge, Massachusetts

ON PRACTICE

MEL RAMSDEN

That was the problem, in fact: to discover the point at which public and private intersect, and thus be able to attack one by depicting the other (T. J. Clark, The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848-1851).

1. There is a consensus on the part of the editors that two or three of us ought deal with some of the ramifications of the hydra-headed art-bureaucracy. So, I'm going to begin by propagandizing (i.e., adopting a heuristic) – one which perhaps brings me perilously close to the foibles of economic determinism. Consider the following: that the administrators, dealers, critics, pundits, etc. who once seemed the neutral servants of art are now, especially in New York, becoming its masters. Has adventuristic New York art of the Seventies (perhaps uncontrollably) become a function of the market-system? Isn't the way this market vectors human relations now a massive controlling factor in the way we now vector human relations? A simplified and possibly even misleading account of how the above has come about might sound something like this: there is prevalent in the New York art-world a ludicrous model of the individual in society (I say the New York art world but it does hold, I am sure, for other places too, no matter how far-flung. This is because most art "centers" and art-schools (etc.) fall for modernist hegemony—this can be known as "The New York connection"). This model may be generally and partially characterized as the idealist separation of private from political-social life. Such a separation has led to the celebration of indulgent individual "freedom." This appears to me to have had two alarming results: adventuristic art of the Seventies has become an insular and boring spectacle of fads, intoxications, diversions, infatuations and even the odd pseudo-revolution, all under the platitudinous guise of massive evidence of "creativity" and "artistic freedom." (This "freedom" some will always persist in citing as evidence that in this society the artist suffers no overt governmental controls and hence may still be "a rebel"; a freedom which, on the other hand, others cite as fundamental to "bourgeois ideology" and its "illusion of freedom"). Tied intimately to all this, as an essential part of the same "form of life," is the astonishing increase in art-world *assessors:* entrepreneurs, critics, curators, gallery staff, etc. In other words, *bureaucrats.* These bureaucrats administer the above "manifestations of freedom" by alienating them, treating them as a kind of gloss for the mode of existence of middle-life market-relations. This is a mode of existence in which we become prices on the media-market, in which we become commodities, a mode of existence in which what counts is the demand for *what the market defines* as your talents, in which all relationships have their monetary value, and it is their monetary value that *matters.* It is a mode of existence in which we become slaves to the "blind urge" to production-consumption and are thus assessed and administered by the bureaucrats only because the latter are closer to the sources of control (are higher in the market hierarchy). The above may be a bit vulgar but under these conditions I still think our activities become (except insofar as they perpetuate-stabilize the market) largely arbitrary. The reason is that the bureaucrats are able to subsume anything, even the rare cranky-iconoclastic work. The products may change, modifications occur all the time (an endless spectacle), but the form of life remains the same: the ruling market provides the standard of intelligibility. One question to raise about this standard of intelligibility is whether the market-relations are really *separate* from what we do? That is to say, just how far has market-standing been *internalized?* I know, for example, that rabid ambition and careerism – almost the New York art world's raison d'etre – are present in myself, even though I'm perfectly aware of their presence. This would lead me to believe, assuming there are others like me, and I know there are, that the market isn't just contingently there, that we don't just create freely and only afterwards get bulldozed by the market. That we now practice with the market in mind (and I'm not loftily excepting my own writing here). So, you can't pretend the market doesn't exist if it has been internalized. This means we have vastly more complex and paradoxical vectoring than rhetorically contrasting good (us) with evil (them). Remember, I'm talking about Imperialistic New York adventurism. If you learn about art in an art-citizenship school, this is what you "learn" about. I'm not talking about small town community art-clubs or even feminist art-workshops, though I do agree with Andrew Menard that these may offer some sort of alternative to bureaucratic practice. But what the latter really lack is *power,* and that's what we are really talking about, isn't it? Isn't it this power which enamours most of us with what we can call Official Culture? Official Culture seems to a number of us involved with this magazine to be inauthentic (at least today), imperialistic, and sometimes actually strikes us as positively mad. So I want to try and talk about what can be done about this. I hope by the time you've got some way into these notes it will be apparent that I think the only real road to change-opposition means looking anew at our social practice. But so stated that perhaps sounds a little too off-hand. Part of what I mean is this: in order to facilitate some hope of "authenticity" we might have to try and presuppose a tradition (community) which does not embody a commodity mode of existence. The possibility of such an "oppositional alternative" (or numerous such alternatives), if it is possible, can only arise within communities whose *sociality* (language. . . grammar. . .) is its own. There is a sense in which exchange value now represents our standard of sociality. I think we must try and provide a context outside of but aggressive to this apparatus—in other words, look for another standard of sociality.
I think this can only be done by self-consciously developing a small community practice. (Not so incidently, such a concept has, I suppose, always guided Art & Language. However, I myself first became really self-conscious of its potential after I got involved in the work Michael Baldwin did on the Art & Language *Documenta Index* in 1972. See also some of his and others' stuff on "logical implosion".) One thing I am sure of—it can't be done, not at present anyway, by making more and more adventuristic-revolutionary products (unless these can be embedded in an "alternate history," whatever that is). These only end up perpetuating and diversifying the market.

2. I don't of course at all think that New York artists want to be Imperialist puppets. However, it is entirely feasible to regard a growing corpus of their work in this way; which does not, and I stress does not, mean the work is at all *reducible* to such an interpretation. I merely think that even those who profess unique political awareness—having no doubt been "radicalized" at one point or another of their lives—just don't make the connections they ought to between their work and (e.g.) the spread of a marketing expedient like "international art." This is partly because of the difficulty of getting realism into our problem-body (practice). The general pattern seems to be to concentrate on the manipulation of spectacle, keeping your "politics" perhaps vocal but always "safe." At the base of this is *once again* the simplistic model of the private individual in society, *once again* the split between private freedom and political life. This combination of haute adventuristic New York art with vocal politics, sometimes even a professed Marxism, coddles a dialectical paradox. This is to me potentially interesting and even perhaps extremely useful, but usually we never get that far. Usually we are just made aware of compromise. Somehow the "confusions" turn out not problematically but just dull. Yes of course I acknowledge such a paradox may be difficult and even impossible to extricate oneself from and the only thing that seems, finally, realistic is to confront it; to realize it is just part of practice. The conventional double bind of Habermas' (etc.) implies retiring from the world and giving up the struggle within it—hence implicitly approving of it. Or, remaining in the in the world whose values you reject is equally a compromise. However, this is much too much a black and white dubbing. Whereas the paradox seems fairly realistic, to think it implies a "choice" is not. There is a difference between paradox and impotence. Impotence for example comes when one is, say, perfectly content with our competitive and egotistical civil society but against the political

structure on which it rests. Now most artists supplying us with adventuristic modernism, including myself, have a problem-world which (to different degrees) embodies such a compromise. However, what usually happens is that such compromise is glibly forgotten or glossed over. This is a poor show. (It would however be interesting if compromise were fully integrated into the work.) Some people also adopt a position of snobbish indignation toward the walled-up institutions of Modern Art and I don't think this is much good either. Hence we get crackpot museum-without-walls schemes involving shipping examples of Picasso and Braque's Analytic Cubism out so the people on Flatbush Avenue can see it—good grief! "Taking art out into the streets" is to me a more rampant form of consumeritis than even museums represent. At least if the work's hidden away people have the option of ignoring it, even if it is "good for them." Finally though, most current desire for change seems to lead to "them" swapping "their" professionalism for "ours" and this is simply to utilize the very same them/us sociality that has screwed-up the rest of the world. But anyway, there is at present (as if we didn't know it), a stepped-up politikkunst debate in the art media. No doubt it is becoming obvious to more and more people that Seventies Modernism isn't just goddamned anachronistic but, as a contribution to our practice, learning, and improvement of mind and society, actually borders on the scandalous. It seems to me however that such a debate lacks theoretical self-consciousness as well as, for that matter, practical-social awareness. Hence it is seriously flawed. Perhaps this is due to it being mostly so far an undertaking for art-critics. Because of their function, critics are notoriously serious about words but usually totally lacking in commitment. Or, their commitment is suspect, which isn't to say that what they write doesn't often make a lot of (dubious) sense. Anyway, "art and politics" becomes one more thing subsumed as part of Modern Art's internal complexity. One of the best ways to maintain a system's insular self-preservation is to continually try and increase its internal complexity, hence its steering capacity, while decreasing the complexity of its environment. Look for example at Jean Toche's threat to kidnap Metropolitan Museum personnel which was defended by numerous New York aesthetes, who by this time ought to know better, as "just art" and therefore no "real" threat to property. Also, why does Joseph Beuys' "society as sculpture" for some reason just strike me as ineffectual aestheticism? Or, the implications of manipulation seem to be quite sinister. Now in Beuys' case his art-world histrionics turn what might be some conceivably useful contributions to the debate into statements of truly unsurpassed vapidity—c.f. "Social sculpture with ideas." The contributions of Beuys and Toche, like the contributions of a lot of others, seem to drift indigestibly about in the *kunstwelt* glamour-careerist-empty-media until they lack any *trenchancy*. And this seems to be what I'm trying to get at: the "media" (etc.) coerces us and severs the ties with practice. Though this isn't to say it's just the middle-world-assessors-in-the-media's fault. I think that the point is more that the art-world takes the edge off everything—that actually Beuys' work is strategically awful—though, from what I hear, I'm probably *still* giving him much too much credit. Anyway, the vested interests are enormous since a trip with money linked with glamorous narcissism can coerce most of us. If the French made art domestic, the Americans have made it into a business—the art-market is reputedly the tenth largest industry in New York.

3. Seventies Modernism, the embodiment of undialectical idealism, relegates all market relations (etc.) to "incidental" background problems (note the similarities to the academic philosophy still reigning in Western countries). That such seeming "background problems" should come to the fore can be seen as the result of two things (actually there are other more complex historical reasons having to do with the internal collapse of Modernism itself, but this is beside the point at the moment): first, the enormous growth and increased power and control of this market over the past fifteen years, corresponding of course to the thrust of late-capitalism, is staggering. ("Late-Capitalism" refers to the increased degree of capitalist centralization, concentration, multinational corporate—international museum—activity and an ever more controlled and manipulated market). This means that the stage for what amounts to relentless art-imperialism is now *simply impossible to overlook*. The second reason these market relations have to be addressed is a consequence of playing the materialist. Actually,

it's a bit cute to say "playing" the materialist. Getting some trenchancy into the debate (on even as basic a level as sorting out cause and effect—insofar as cause and effect can be used to "explain" human activity) depends partly on materialist tools. It would be recondite debating here whether the adoption of materialism leads to an awareness of market relations, or, in fact, whether market relations lead, in the attempt to address them, to materialism. This is a waste of time and we ought to, rather, consider Wittgenstein's remark—"light dawns gradually over the whole." So, consider materialism here not as the wholesale embracing of an entrenched metaphysical theory (the tradition of Marx) but rather a strategic ad hoc device contingent largely on my (our) pragmatically complex index/circumstances here in New York City. I'm getting more and more pissed-off with all the social blinkers art has to wear in order to be ambitious. In respect to art, there's been a lot wrong with a materialist view. In the Thirties there was quite a lot of debate between so-called "new criticism" and left-wing Literary criticism. You got blokes like T.S. Eliot insisting on "transcendent" elements and the leftists grandiosely denying these. Thus what you got was a kind of undialectical idealism versus a kind of undialectical materialism and this sort of thing still carries through to this day. But here materialism is not undialectical materialism, so I don't think I need bother going-on about mechanism or economic determinism. Ideas reflect things, so it's said, but the reflection, like everything else, is dialectical; not inert, but active. Very loosely, the dialectical method (partly) implies we must look at things in terms of their histories, not just the state in which the object of scrutiny appears at the moment. It also, and again partly, implies our actions are tied to our existence in the world and the people around us, not just to a set of "universal" high thoughts and precious artifacts, except insofar as these do constitute a segment of "what's around us." To say human actions or culture are determined largely by politico-economic factors or to explain in a formula (as Lenin and others did) consciousness-in-terms-of-existence and not conversely is *not* to deny the role of the individual of course, but rather the contrary, to see that individual in dialectical relation to underlying forces. Such an approach is based entirely on the steering assumption that this is the most pointed way to free the individual (to act) from being an unwitting functionary of these forces.

4. To dwell perennially on an institutional critique without addressing specific problems within the institutions is to generalize and sloganize. It may also have the unfortunate consequence of affirming that which you set out to criticize. It may even act as a barrier to eventually setting up a community practice (language. . .sociality. . .) which does not just embody a commodity mode of existence. That is to say, I don't want to simply reiterate present society's mode of intelligibility and affirm market hierarchies. I do think, however, to neglect this kind of general "intelligibility" is to sacrifice a crucial (materialist) reference point in teaching. I am commited to teaching not as the means of dispensing a petrified safe-deposit box of wisdom (which is knowledge subject to passive consumption—it's sometimes called "objectivity") but as creating a context which first facilitates the recognition of our own problems. Perhaps this is a little too glib, saying perhaps no more than we need to replace training and comprtmentalization with practical learning and "experience." It's certainly too general since there are times when one does need training. So perhaps all I mean by "recognition of our own problems" is the recognition of the possibility of *practice*. What I teach need not a priori be alienating from your family or your locale—your family and locale are at least part of my (as a teacher) problem-map. Which is also to say again we need to avoid consumerism—life doesn't follow subject-specificity/categories as a formality. Teaching and learning depend initially on getting you and me to have commonality or shared points of reference. This in a way is a good reason for playing the materialist: you start from things we all have access to. It could also be that the very spontaneity of such a teaching/learning encounter may produce a (partial) oppositional alternative. Teaching doesn't merely mean getting others to spout your point of view. This "point of view" is just an object open to consumption unless it can be transformed by "learners" and internalized into their own practice. There is a kind of acute reflexivity necessary to articulate a language, sociality, outside of dehumanized forms of life. But such a language cannot be sustained unless I can teach,

that is, share, and sharing involves a commitment to others on the level of their material problems—I don't just want people to become acquainted with *kunstwelt* middle-life. All of which means that making something public is propagandizing of sorts. But it doesn't involve me either snobbishly ignoring people or ramming stuff down their throats. It involves me in strategies which incompass compromise—or could I call it existence? I don't want to go into this here but instead you should read David Gross' article "Writing Cultural Criticism" in *Telos*, Summer 1973. He goes into Kierkegaard and Brecht's concern with the ideological and moral consequences of modes of presentation. Me talking to you doesn't involve anything patronizing like "translating" my "elitist" language into awful-Artforumese or more publicly-entrenched art language. (It happens that some speech, some forms of language *can't* be "easily" translated, and that certainly includes a certain amount of Art & Language). Commitment to teach and learn is a commitment *first* to dialogue, to commonality not point of view or authority. Teaching is constituted through a particular person's praxis. This is what we're after. (Otherwise materialist tenets like "existence determines consciousness" don't make sense(?).)

5. What does an apparent buzz-word like "bureaucracy" mean? Briefly, by bureaucracy, I do not allude to a massive centralized organization but to the fact that major cultural decisions (which for example determine fundamental things like the way we learn, the practical relations between people) lie *out of our control* and are now all basically directed through the impersonal operation of market institutions (e.g., commercial galleries) and private administrative control (e.g., here *Artforum*, the MOMA, etc.). Those individuals who are obedient or unselfconscious functionaries of such bureaucracies, I call bureaucrats. This isn't intended as a definition at all, but it's all we need for now. The hope for oppositional alternatives to this has tended to be dealt with as something of a black and white philosophy of science *blik*. The trouble here with T. S. Kuhn's "paradigm change" literature is it seems to imply we "rationally" move from one institution to another. Again, we exchange "their" professionalism for "ours" thus allowing more for an alternate bureaucracy than for an alternative to bureaucracy. A couple of years ago it was said that we needed, not a paradigm shift *to* but a paradigm shift *from*. However, the logics of Kuhn's paradigm shifts are still too binary at this stage. I'm not going to end by swapping one monolith for another, it's much more indeterminate and compromised than that. In fact, rather than seeing so-called alternatives in terms of Kuhn's academic reasonableness, consider instead the spirit of Bakunin's oppositional crankiness in this (1868) edict: "I shall continue to be an impossible person so long as those who are now possible remain possible."

6. Could a critique of adventuristic New York art involve me in acting like an art-critic? It seems to me that art-criticism provides us with a paradigm case of what art-world bureaucracy really is. Even when it is carried out by those who are not just participating in careerist soldiering, it's still close to totally untenable since it treats most art as rationally there and as neutral spectacle. This means a lot of it is bourgeois criticism quite simply: a celebration of the world as diverse but neutral spectacle. But criticism, when you get right down to it, is basically stuck with assessing and grading. The activity of grading derives its sense from both the commodity treatment of persons as well as from the unreflexive, unproblematic and entrenched commodity use of language. The link between this mode of treatment of "things" and our way of relating to each other (the market form of life) isn't accidental. The critic matches market force—the voice of things. Contrary to seeking some sort of uncovering of ideology, the critic veils it. The role of criticism in our present art-state is to act as some kind of police-force. Unlike radical theory, its task is to keep order by singling out individuals (creating hierarchies) and judging the worthiness of things. But it has no programme, no method, and makes no declaration of principles and commitments—indeed, to do so would be to destroy its specious "neutrality." It thus appears, since it makes none of its premises explicit but relies on being a bureaucratic functionary, as unassailable. It has authoritarian significance, clearly. For instance, it is assumed as "rational," a right God-given, that the critic "appraise" art-work. But suppose the artist should criticize the critic? If so, it is mostly written off as sour grapes. Under this kind of role-dogmatism, there are standards of intelligibility

such as experts/laymen, teachers/learners, dominant class/subservient class, producers/consumers. These are market points of reference which are maintained as "natural." Almost all art-criticism, especially the hack trade journal kind, is incapable of reflexively acknowledging this market function as epistemologically, not to say morally, at all problematic. I may be more or less uninformed on this matter, but I have yet to read such a problem even acknowledged. It also affirms market hierarchy through the separation of being from writing. Its "writing" and, I stress, its *existence* lies wholly in the middle-life of the market. It talks about problems as if only others had them. It approaches, in other words, a "rational" middle-man's overview. This isn't just typical of the privileged civilization-touting secure academic; it's also shared by the hip young movement-dubber. They are both, insofar as they are role obedient assessors, cut off from practice. I think it's about time we got together and told them: either see your own status as problematic or shut-up. But with our currently pervasive market apparatus there is compromise involved in anyone saying anything at all. Will for example my remarks here also be subsumed—and how unproblematically? It's not just me becoming self-conscious about my capacity for meek role-obedience, there also has to be effort put into understanding even the way my language/grammar confirms market hierarchies. Even as I am writing this, I know we all have to be market speakers since we have to speak rather than remain silent. All speech, even essentially the "controversial," gets consumed by public relations. I think to try and speak differently is in a way to try and live differently. Also, one difference between ordinary criticism and critical theory is that the latter might mean us writing in awe of the impossibility of avoiding market hierarchy.

7. Part of the drive for the disassembling of institutions is to escape from the institutions' topicalizations and sanctioned problems. Positivism, as Chomsky recently said, has nothing to do with science, it has *to do with* Capitalism. It reflects the privileges of power in that it involves solving technical problems in the interests of whoever sets those problems and determines what are the right solutions. I mention this since it seems to point to the enormous difficulty of each of us—me included—even locating our own problems/existence. Perhaps I should expand on this: institutional dismantling now also involves dismantling myself; I am part of the problem, which is why I mentioned materialism before—the institutions are not just contingent. It isn't possible to treat problems like this as objects of contemplation any longer. Contemplation must be seen as a particularly comforting ideological relation. To understand the mapping between a priori compartmentalization and my/our possibility of practice means acknowledging a potentially pandemoniacal existential situation; it isn't a feature of bourgeois "observation" or "appreciation" (I'm not being righteous about the bourgeoisie—another buzz-word—either, since I am a member of such a class really). It seems to me that one of the many shortcomings today of holding the classical nineteenth Century Marxist view is it really has no way of accounting for the bulldozing of the individual in 20th Century consumer society. For instance, I think a lot of people firmly believe the more they are able to purchase, the happier they will be. I am vulnerable to this too, it's a feature of my life which I don't just know about and dislike—I actually like it. This is what the internalization (which I suppose is Reich's term really) of capitalist rule really implies. In the face of a totalitarian social reality such as this, it should at least be open to controversy whether we continue idle debate over the "nature" of art. That is to say, the "nature" of art isn't just a positive technical puzzle abstracted from the material conditions of "its time." Everybody knows this, I think. For me it simply doesn't go far enough; I don't think it can be abstracted from particular times, locales, personal pragmatics. That is, I think it is more interesting if it isn't and more dull if it is. To talk about "its time" as if "time" is apart from any particular individual is reminiscent of academics who always talk about knowledge the same way: apart from anybody having knowledge, that is, undialectically, always apart from what *we do*. It seems to me that such an "objectivization" is the occupational disease (or rather the occupational norm) of assessors and bureaucrats. There are other causes of objectification: the Australian art-farts who bought the 2 million dollar Pollock don't want it "competing" with Arthur Anybody's fucking pastels. With money on the scene, with assessors on the scene, with a massive hydra-headed bureaucracy in operation you've got to get hierarchy, not relativization. Oh sure, you can't fit everything in a gallery

or in a trade-journal so what you do is select. Most of these selections are done on the basis of "progress" though it appears as if they are just data-collections. Again, there's not a lot wrong with this except that it's a bit superficial. But what's queer is again you've got this funny middle-ground of assessors and entrepreneurs (including us artists acting as our own entrepreneurs) which has a tremendous amount of *power*. The Pollock doesn't compete, it's cannonized. That's the whole idea, it enters "history." (Don't you think, reader, that my own grammatical enculturation enforces the subject-specificity of the status-quo? Just re-read the above.) I seem to be getting a long way from my point: So to restate, the bulldozing of the individual in this society may be a bit misleading thus described. As I mentioned before, this society is not merely forced upon us by physical coercion, as some societies may be, but there is an *internalization* of capitalist rule within the very concept of the self. People *do* equate happiness with the ethic of consumption. The hold is secure enough that even though I have a certain amount of masochistic glee over the current economic crunch I'm not at all certain whether I would like to see this society and its institutions disappear (including even the unjust in this society and its institutions). It seems there is today a gelling of political, economic and administrative processes within a massive overarching apparatus of control over all aspects of everyday life—which might begin to give us some idea of the kind of thing we're up against. Unless it's here already, we seem to be approaching a moment of ultimate totalitarianism. This is not a totalitarianism of human dictators, but one where institutions tenaciously and self-correctively rule. However, notwithstanding all this, I still have some kind of hope. Perhaps paradoxically, there may now be opportunity for oppositional alternatives. How might these be initiated? For myself, one way may be to *acknowledge* that the capitalist apparatus has been internalized and that "disassembling its relations means disassembling myself." Thus any sort of *oppositional* or "*subversive*" *critical activity must not* and does not leave me pure, unscathed and free. Quite the reverse: if I accept the problems of this society as not just something going on contingently in the background, but as my own problems, then reflexive theory becomes (maybe) both externally (socially) aggressive as well as individually therapeutic. Or, it may be effectively socially subversive to the extent that it is individually therapeutic, or vice-versa—so long as you can connect it all up dialectically. (This kind of contradiction is (loosely) related to the way the capitalist brings workers together in order to exploit them but also creates the conditions for unionization.) All this implies acknowledgment that my concept of myself, my role (practice) is the biggest problem of all. This is, I believe, much more effective than snotty pronouncements from some lofty throne of ideological superiority. Insofar as oppositional activity means the gradual deconstruction of many of our own internalized assumptions, we seem to be left at present with two choices: either accept the arbitrariness of compartmentalization under capitalist rule or, on the other hand, live quite self-consciously in a state of uproar. That is, "confusion" is the reflection of irrational society, rather than the product of stupidity.

8. But suppose I consider a typical example of art under capitalist rule: formalism, especially in literary criticism for instance, was early on in the U.S. developed by those enshrined in universities and dependent for their living on conservative institutions or an academic audience for their influence. It is rooted in University Academia. It is also not an uncommon thesis to consider formalism as rooted in Capitalism. Nor is it uncommon nowadays to dwell on it as a stalking horse. It may be useful here however in providing a common point of reference for further discussion of that even more deadly presence: bureaucratization. Very generally, formalism holds the art object alone is worthy of interest, that it's autonomous, that cultural and social connections are split from "the result." (Under formalism I include all recent "technical" work which is routine and stylistic, dependent on furthering and stabilizing the diversification and manipulation of spectacle.) Arguments as to what's wrong with formalism ought to be fairly standard by now (e.g., it assumes the cultural *supports are uncontroversial and only* "the product" is subject to change and development). Thus it never questions productivity as such. This restricts art—just as I think Ad Reinhardt clearly saw in the late fifties—to endless spectacle. (This has led to a bankrupted, and in my view, even wholly demented and pompous acceleration of specialization, the real dynamic of adventuristic

art in New York today.) Formalism (just like positivism) and our lives compartmentalized (fragmented and specialized) by capitalist society go hand-in-hand. Usually under capitalist rule the worker is alienated from his or her product ("the seller of labour power like the seller of any other commodity realizes its exchange value and parts with its use value"—*Capital*, Volume I). I suppose that, in an integrated society workers, as skilled crafts people, control their activities and hence the attributes of their products. Hence the worker's attachment to his or her product results not only from pride in the object of their labor but also and I think, crucially, in their personal regard for the community it serves. Now just contrast this to our lives in New York City: under reigning Capitalism the worker's hopes, community goals (if indeed there are any), cultural life (if indeed there is any), need not be, and usually are not, compatible with the products of their labor. We reach a state where our work becomes totally alienated from our psyche, and finally our community—and to such an extent that we may eventually be incapable of helping ourselves. Now this may to some of you constitute a tediously familiar Marxist whipping-post. I think it's very true, nonetheless. What I'm trying to get at is this is just the effect of formalism (and, I think even more relentlessly, of bureaucracy): it alienates the product from community. Allegedly, the only "real" worth of our activity becomes something "transcendent," that is, "beyond" the community. You take on an alienated mentality in order to further diversify the history of Modern Art—hence you service "big" culture. Your community becomes that of middlemen, you work for career. Career is determined by the way you neatly package and sell yourself—e.g., through commercial galleries, *Artforum*, *Art International*; and, finally, we are enthroned in the kunst-Valhalla of blue-chip bureaucracy, the MOMA. These have an implicit structure all of their own which also works toward further reifying and keeping products external to community. Most artists (and just lately increasingly) see their "real community" as the market-place or (in New York anyway) the people they know as fellow entrepreneurs. These keep us in touch with a market which is abstract, which is nobody at all in particular. Under such conditions, all of us regard ourselves, in the spirit of free *competition*, as atoms, which makes us *even more* vulnerable to market relations. Working for an *abstract* market (or one whose *telos* is abstract) is then interpreted, somehow, as being the very embodiment of "universality" which is, further, a leak-proof guarantee we are in the presence of pure-white shit-hot morality. (Such a model of conduct, I think, implicitly motivates a lot of modern art. It is a conception of abstract good, what Lukacs critically called "the icy finality of perfection," and it has been philosophically under question—especially since Kierkegaard.)

9. Because of the last 120 years of art in advanced technological societies, formalism is a point of reference we all share. Also, a critique of formalism is in the air, coming, as it now does, from within the formalist-modernist regime itself (of course it's always been hotly pursued from other quarters but the fact that it now comes from within I hope augurs something desperate). But wherever it comes from it is promising. An attack on formalism constitutes, if it is "real" and thorough and not just routinely flogging a dead horse, an attack on art-imperialism as well as, finally, on the "big" society itself. Lawrence Alloway, for instance, has begun to flirt with exotica like systems theory which perhaps hints at going beyond guffawing at the Greenbergers to view formalism as implicit in the whole adventuristic and publicly-celebrated American Post-war tradition. (It is adventuristic in that in your work you have to "go off" somewhere and be outlandish, you have to stress campy-sixties-cool-snobbery-non-involvement.) Max Kozloff, in an article already—I think perhaps justifiably—considered an old-chestnut by the growing art and politics coterie, has argued that Abstract Expressionist and Pop artists unwittingly perpetuated, even celebrated, the political Cold War climate during the fifties and sixties. These artists were confident their personal activity was independent of, even aggressive to, the socio-political base. It wasn't; partly because their ideological strategies were romantic, ill-fitting and unable to withstand the real power of U.S. foreign policy at that time. In the mid-seventies we are still carting about the tawdry baggage of all this. Adventurism is transparently a function of the prevailing political climate, it's always ideologically and practically *conservative*, and it will continue to be so long as that ideology/practice remains un-

examined—which it will continue to be so long as the work remains formalistic, etc. (Saying it's a function of the prevailing political climate means that it is conservative. It doesn't mean of course that it is reducible to it.) Formalism is also a convenience for bureaucrats of all sorts since our work is subject to administrative assessment much better when it's dependent in the first place on passive product consumption, on alienating pragmatics, intentions, community, etc. Just think, it's much easier to flog to corporations, and if it has no intentional problematicity (other than to eagerly be part of the "history of art"), then it's easier to pretend it's "international." In this sense, formalism is a muzzled *weltanschauung*, maintaining itself by tenaciously regarding 90% of its nexus as unproblematic.

10. I have seen in the U.S., as well as in art-schools in England, students whose work resembles (say) Jackson Pollock's or Frank Stella's but who have actually never heard of either. According to my own observations as well as what Ian Burn and others tell me, this is fairly typical. So who is responsible for such a scandal? History, community, intentions, problems of context and society all become incidental—just let the students get on with their products: "objects," "things," then no matter what their intentionality, their indexical context-bound nature, you can "train" students to be motivated by external rewards, bureaucratic status. I'm saying that if students' productivity is separable from their intentions (and I think students do have complicated intentions and contexts which don't just add up to "I want to join art-history") then you can gratuitously subject them to market requirements. That is, you can get comparisons, i.e., whose product is "best"? This means the final problem is *grading*. Under such circumstances, grading is conducive to the development of alienated and bureaucratic mentalities—good training for the "real" kunstwelt. Laissez-faire art-education may be a liberal "free-for-all" but the goal of that free-for-all is *external* to its intentional value (in most cases that is—when students are not all hip enough to become bureaucrats straight away). The goal is grades by which "freedom-loving" art-educators confer Official market-status on students' work (I don't mean to suggest there are no art-teachers aware of this problem, there are a lot). All of which adds up to a set of restraints which are insidious, to say the least (I wouldn't mind quite so much if the grading were explicit, but I can't see a bunch of liberals agreeing on an academy, with overt instead of covert rules). In art-education, almost more than in art-criticism, we can see people obediently if unwittingly perpetuating the bureaucratic strangle-hold. Under the guise of "freedom" we get instead an even more insidious power. Comparisons are dispersed from the view of various beliefs about "composition," "form," "color," "space" and a mish-mash of misinformation about art-history as an object of consumption: one-great-object-after-another. All this renders "learning" totally useless in terms of a contribution to understanding and community. It becomes completely alienated from these and is entered into as a contractual relation with "big" corporate society.

11. According to Lawrence Alloway's book review in *Art in America* (September-October, 1974), "present opinion in New York often resembles a kind of impulsive or accidental Marxism. 'Art is alienated when it falls under the general law of capitalist production, that is, when the work of art is regarded as merchandise.' Here we are at the threshold of recent complaint and dissent that represent a politicalization of art undreamed of a few years ago." I myself am not of course completely familiar with "present opinion in New York so I've yet to really see the outward signs of this "politicalization"—so-called. On the contrary, I really don't know what Alloway means. Could he be talking about strategically simply incidents such as Jean Toche's kidnap threat or even the related "infantile" scribblings of Tony Shafrazi? You couldn't exactly call these paradigms of art's politicalization—or could you? Notwithstanding this, Alloway does attempt to deal with the problem of context which I assume is part of his "politicalization." (Incidently, I'm not unduly obsessed in Alloway. I wrote a lot of this on holiday in Maryland, and the *A in A* was all I had with me.) As I've been saying, if art isn't just an autonomous object, then it is embedded in the rest of our social experience. Hence it is less a question of "art" and more a question of "culture" (this is probably a bit vulgar). Alloway seems to recognize this. He furthermore attempts to illustrate it. How for instance does Alloway's attempt gell with my (and others) manic animosity toward formalism? He quotes "a well known example of form-systems analysis": "a bomber in flight is part of a system that includes electronic factories (where parts of the plane are manufactured), the training of pilots (the outcome of debate about various methodologies), gas storage, intelligence reports (concerning the target), meteorological reports (weather en route and over the target), and so on." He continues: "a system therefore is a portion of reality composed of related units. If we put a work of art in the place of a plane we may be in a better position to see it in relation to the support-system (previous art-history, age of the artist, patronage) and to the goal." Now this embodies a kind of anthropological descriptivity. To initiate enquiry into "culture" Alloway starts off by treating it as an object of contemplation. This "portion of reality" which has "keep off" signs hung all over it is not in fact a portion of reality at all—it's part of our practice. It is not nature (the form of life is subject to *controversy*, for example, as to whether we ought to have bombers at all). But the above makes it appear that way and in fact subtly bolsters the status quo because that's what quasi-descriptive accounts do. They speak about problems without including the speaker within them. Thus we are left with a kind of middle-life, which isn't what "culture" implies. It *does* imply practice and learning, saying we *ought* to do this and not that. Regarding the "product" as a given and then "the system" following determined "naturally" is of course ideological too. This is the ideology of "observations." He treats the problems of formalism, of culture, as a critic's problem, a problem that can be resolved by finding the right *interpretation. It is the domain of the middle-man; there is no practice.* He removes the possibility of himself having to *act*, to *decide*; there are only descriptions, there are no *commitments*, there is only the middle-ground of unreal half-lit market assessment, veiled under specious "neutrality." This is just an insane surrogate for existence. Perhaps this is unfair? Perhaps Alloway is not unaware of this? However, it isn't just the absence of the speaker and his commitments which is troublesome but (as Terry Smith has remarked and contingent to this tendency) ending up with a simplistic model of the art-world "system" as akin to a natural organism which, supposedly, you can't do anything about. This is another way the status quo, almost automatically, bolsters itself. The causal model goes something like this: (1) the artist is the prime mover; (2) the art-work the life-blood; (3) the critic the catalyst; (4) the dealer and museum the distributor; (5) the audience the lapping-it-all-up fodder. Notice here how everything begins: from the artist's "creativity." To me this is idealistic (and even the separate question as to whether the above *ought* to be the case is also idealistic; in fact it's silly since it's supposed to transcend practice). The entrenchment of such a model acts as an extremely effective ideological device preventing us from seeing where the real power relations lie. So, the vectoring between art and society can't without furthering the hegemony of "neutrality" be dealt with descriptively. There is a bureaucratic "rational" necessity to leave yourself out of the picture. Finally, such vectors must be removed from the grey middle-men and regarded as practice. Art and Society are subject to material transformation—something which entails that it is "political," and perhaps political in all sorts of ways. The vectors "art" and "society" are not just hanging about waiting for us to fall over them (more grey). No, they are (can be) constituted by our conduct, which means they "exist" when we get moral; that is, consider the possibility of practice.

12. Webster defines "culture" as "the enlightenment and refinement of taste acquired by intellectual and aesthetic training." Does this mean it is contingent upon the separation of our practice from our social problems? (consider the ultimate praise: "a masterpiece," of which "piece" is the more recent, more palatable democratic equivalent.) The power of such culture just turns the majority of people into spectators (consumers or tourists). It promotes passivity and we all imagine all we can do is watch while this wonderful pageant of culture marches by. Here "culture" belongs to people who are "just doing their jobs," to "professionals," to "experts." If you think about the concept of culture in this society, the fact that it is specialized is hardly surprising. However this specialization is allied with tremendous power. In other words it is allied with mass-communication. The whole perfidious theory of mass communication today depends, essentially, on a minority in some way exploiting a majority. True "communication" implies not

only reception but an opportunity to reply, to answer back, sociality, not consumerism. But consumerism is an extremely effective narcotic. You consume it because you like it and it's "good for you." If you don't like Modern Art then—well goodness me—you must be an ignoramus since it's inconceivable anybody could know about it and still dislike it. This means you "learn" about it by *assenting* to it (or most of it since you may dislike details). Hence Modern Art becomes essentially a form of unproblematic consumerism. Now how does such consumerism determine something, say, like Aesthetics? Most Aestheticians, including Marxist Aestheticians going on about all that crap about whether art ought or ought not be allied with the working class, treat art only as something we "appreciate," rarely as something we *do*. Aesthetics is to my mind a gratuitous corpus of literature concerned with interpretation, as if that's the only way art can get "philosophical." That is the real straight-jacket worn by aestheticians—another philosophical "discipline" born from occupying, janus-faced, the middle-ground. But anyway, this whole notion of high culture can be called Official Culture. It is alienating but this alienation is disguised as "universality" which is another way a privileged class disguises the particularity of its language. It leads to compartmentalization and, so long as this grey mechanism perseveres, your problems are likely to be technical. It seems to me that "art" within such a culture is largely a question of either maintaining or pseudo-problematically messing about a bit with subject-marginality. Given this, whether something is art or not doesn't seem to be a question of very much interest, having more to do with enforcing grammatical enculturation. However, it may be interesting as a question if the consideration of such a question can be kept embedded in the relativized "dialectical" exchanges of a small community/society and not torn from this embedding to be judged by some half-lit external standard of "civilized" excellence. This kind of "culture" cannot be separated from our language, our dialogue, our "communicating" and transformed into something which amounts to power over others. It doesn't exist apart from our talking together or our consideration, our specific social learning needs. Perhaps I can show you what I mean: under such circumstances, a question like "what is art?" may be modified to become "I have this concept of art, how does my concept match yours?" Thus the question becomes socially *specific*, dialogical, not concerned with matching an a priori standard of excellence or, rather, not "merely" concerned. Now, the point is, given two or three hours, given perhaps a day or two to talk to each other, we might generate enough points of reference to learn something about the question. Learn, that is, meaning understanding something of our own problem-world, not just consuming an existing body of knowledge. (Perhaps at this point I ought to remind you, reader, that this is what I am here in this article trying to suggest: that such an imploded dialogical strategy, regarding "art" not as a definition outside of conversation but as a "social" matter embedded in (our) conversation, may be both an effective opposition to the bulldozer of Official Culture *as well as* a way of affirming our own sociality outside of "mere" contractual role relations. I want to make it clear that I think unless we first change our sociality we won't do *anything*. In my view the small group, commune, community must provide a methodological base—like the family a sheltered space—for (our) sociality outside of bureaucratic big culture. A simultaneous implosion and explosion must be conscientiously developed; "culture" though internalized becomes externally aggressive (i.e. political). In my view this is the only way left at present to do art in New York—or maybe anywhere else in the West. That is, the only way to proceed is to develop a community, a base from which one can try to destroy the traits the market preys upon. (I want to emphasize also that such a belief underlies the critical dimensions of this article.)

13. Bureaucracy in the art-world is just like bureaucracy every place else. It is fundamentally a method of centralizing power and control. I don't mean to point to the Weberian thesis that bureaucratization is inevitable in the modern world because of the largeness of its organizations. Nor do I think bureaucracy can be characterized by insisting it is just part of an inevitable historical process whereby bureaucratization is just like pollution—the price we must all pay for advancing technology. Huge organizations as well as manic "advancements" are instead, frightening correlatives of burcaucracy, not full descriptions of it. Also, in a lot of recent writings of the Left, bureaucracy is often linked with alienation. Alienation, especially in the U. S. however, is popularly located not in the pattern of power under capitalist rule, but merely as some sort of psychological problem solvable by individual means. The literature of reactionary shrinks provides many of us with the illusion that the massive social conditioning which goes on today, is really the private problem of individuals! So, here I want to locate alienation at the roots, as a social, not individual psychological problem. To repeat what I said earlier, by bureaucracy I do not allude to a massive centralized organization. I allude to a middle-life mode of existence. Its language is that of grading; its raison d'etre market intelligibility. Fundamental problems like the way we map on to each other (learn from each other) as human beings lie *out of the control of us*, and in the control of "automatic" market institutions (the ways in which mass-communication chops us up). The key to the *power* of these institutions lies in the ease with which they perpetuate and control *roles*, an ability which extends not only to the increased number of assessors, but also the artist as well. Since the cultural ascendency of the U.S. this spectral administrative world, half-lit but pervasive, has I think grown at its wildest (though it was of course present long before the post-war-U.S.-period). Anyway, the interests of market intelligibility, the commodity treatment of persons (glaringly apparent in the New York *kunstwelt)* are perpetuated by art-world bureaucrats who claim to be (but are in fact not) "impartial administrators" of culture. An important feature is that they hold market power by fuzzing the lines of power. They make decisions appear rational and universal when they are often whimsical, biased, and quite consistently *insane*. Here I am thinking of, for example, the commercial gallery establishment, *Artforum*, and the MOMA (the latter is also a bureaucracy in the most frequent sense; a ponderous impersonal organization). But as I said before, the artist too may be an administered functionary. What does such a person look like? Our self-image is almost the same as the self-image of the majority of white-collar workers. Our aim becomes to sell ourselves on the market. Thus our success does not stem from community praxis but from our socio-economic role, our function in the bureaucratic system. Our sense of value depends on our success. Our talent (or *what*ever you might call it) becomes capital, and the task is to invest it favorably, to make a profit of ourselves. In other words, community exchange is seen only as a commodity, turned into assets of the personality package conducive to higher and higher prices on the personality market. Of course, I don't think there is a conscientious plot afoot by certain moguls of power to "control" culture. This isn't what I'm trying to get at. What I am trying to get at is that it's part of the *automatic* function of the administrative apparatus to further augment the grey-official alienation of culture. It's a bit like a ship without a captain. This is because the whole art-world bureaucracy is a smoothly functioning part of imperialist-capitalism. One distinguishing feature of this capitalist society is it is probably the only society in human history in which neither tradition nor conscious direction supervises the total effort of the community. It is a community where the requirements of the future are largely left to an automatic system. Under such conditions, which are obtrusively conspicuous now in New York and the international-*kunstwelt*-carousel, alienation becomes much more than another embarrassing leftist buzz-word: it is now an overwhelming everyday feature of our lives.

14. A "search" "outside" the art-bureaucracy magnifies certain difficulties in making our work "public." If you deny administrative outlets you may cut your own throat by denying access to a public—is this so? Tied to the problematicity of "making work public" is the kind of concept of audience you have, and, as I say, in the second half of this century "audience" has become more a question of a manic rational power construct than a question of mutual exchange or encounter. It becomes a power relation between a producer and a consumer (or, from another angle, a power relation between various competing producers), rather than a dialogical exchange between two or more persons with the potentiality for transformation and (re) socialization (learning) of that encounter. The need for a "mass" audience is not just restricted to the rating worries of TV executives—it is a need fundamental to the histrionics of our present public relations world. So, alternatives to the present system of distribution, if they are to *challenge* that system, cannot challenge this concept of mass-audience, since such a concept means power and, at present, without this power one

can't be an "alternative." All of which is reminiscent of some Philosophy of Science controversies (Feyerabend and others). This further suggests there are even more difficulties with the concept of "alternatives." If alternatives just mean the diversification of present power relations, we're stuck with a sort of mass-communicative hegemony —unless we can work out some "strategic" way of communication which isn't oppressive. Furthermore, this means it might not be an alternative anymore—and I don't know what to say anymore about all this (except that I find it frustrating and so forth). I mean there have been "alternatives"—not necessarily conscientious ones—but alternatives of sorts, which I suppose is all we can hope for at present. One was Seth Siegelaub's so-called "network of booksellers and mailing lists." But in this case there was a nasty guiding art-imperialistic concept of spreading "information" globally as if it existed impersonally somehow, independent of anybody in particular having practical needs (frailty). This is typical de-authored "objectified" information and it ought to be seen for what it is by this time. (I'm overlooking the most obvious "alternatives": *Art-Language* and *The Fox*. They are at least mouthpieces of a community, supposedly not functionaries of a market, although they could/may be.) I don't fully fathom the above and I don't even know whether it has all that much applicability here. Obviously a lot of what I am arguing against actually forms my own writing at present—I know that. Is it important that we ask about the relation between audience as rational construct (i.e., one which overrules the diversity of different social formations) and the need for systematic market growth? Perhaps the root of such difficulties lies in the "technocratic" abstract umbrella nature of the market itself. We now work not for our particular "practical" community needs nor for specific individuals, but for "history" and an abstract market. (They used to work for individual patrons during the Renaissance and they used to work for the Church earlier on—they at least knew who the patrons were.) Actually, a paradigm case of regarding audience "rationally" is the International Program of the MOMA. The International Program, according to my mood, often strikes me as foolish, though I mostly find it insulting. It ships "culture" to (e.g.) S. E. Asia under the patronizing guise of making it available to those who "lack its benefits." The MOMA thus presents "neutral" spectacle, torn from context. The relation between art as a "specialized" language and its social and historical environment raises broader and "real" questions as to the relationship between mind, language and society. MOMA travelling shows get reduced to a genealogy of things (masterpieces no doubt). However, just consider the (potentially at least) useful opportunity for a problematic learning nexus ("translating" work from one historical/social embedding to another) which is instead turned into a form of gross consumer tourism, a spreading of the product-corpses of static cultural goodies. The reason art can be "international" (a rubric which, as Ian Burn points out, is correctly a market not a cultural term. And while I think of it, Ian did a certain amount of the groundwork necessary to draw attention to art-imperialism I know this also counts for some of the others) is not the result of any daft McLunacy like the growth of a "global village" but because of a global acquisition system, always needing to expand, automatically operating apart from, and systematically bulldozing, any local practice.

15. Though it was implicit long before 1970, the emptiness of New York art and adventuristic Modernism since this time have been, for me, historically quite remarkable. They are not problems that are solvable by acting the snob. It isn't possible, as I said before, to stand outside of our society since we have actually internalized much of its implicit structure—only critics, bureaucrats and those who don't know any better can do that. Her alternatives in the Kuhnian sense can be seen as a bit simple. (We can however call, as Lenin did, for *legal and illegal work.) That the crazy commodity* structure has sovereignty now (impinging on our very relations with each other and finally ruling those relations) is a fact I think many of us are aware of. The trouble is that most artists' conception of their practice quite simply excludes them from dealing with this as a problem. We're stuck in that case with methodology without ideology; we're stuck with Andrew Menard's "technicians"—birdbrains perpetuating a relentless routine. Thus any reminders of bureaucracy and sociality and the possibility of us acting morally in the face of all that are dismissed as "Leftist" or "too philosophical"—or, God forbid, "not art." Which reminds me

during the present congealing of recession, inflation and depression, the word "capitalism" is never mentioned in the popular media. The pillar of our economic system, its frailty, is never mentioned. All you get *on* the evening news is a string of "events." This isn't just an isolated neglect; as Harold Rosenberg remarked, notice how the Soviet Union is always part of the "Communist Bloc" whereas we are simply "the West." One characterization is ideological, the other geographical. It's almost as if the U.S. can't bear to contemplate that its societal relations might not be God-given and natural. Just mention "capitalism" and people start pigeon-holing you as a shit-stirring "Leftist." A lot of us react in exactly the same way to art's market-relations—a bit like those men who never tell their wives how much they earn—art is above all that. There are a number of artists appreciative of market problems. This has led, to use the terminology of the treacherous movement-dubbing pundits, to the label "political artist." Within the circle of adventuristic modernism such a term is fadish. Carl Andre, presumably because of a lot of his cloth-cap art-worker capering, is "political." Daniel Buren is political and so is Hans Haacke. (Though I sometimes think that the work of the latter two, while it interests me to some degree, is political in that it is "about" politics.) Buren is French which makes it difficult for a lot of us anyway and, although I think some of what he does has to do with gaining advantages (bargain-hunting) for himself, I suppose he is drawing attention to the *kunstwelt* power matrix. Haacke's work, too, interests me, though it often comes close to alluding to politics as a kind of alienated subject-matter. That is, he always presents us with *other people's* " politics" *(Guggenheim Trustees,* etc.). But I have a more serious question: if we all agree we ought to relentlessly assail art-imperialism, then such an assailing becomes largely a matter of *tactics*. Or, rather, our tactics should embody alternatives (given my earlier reservations about alternatives); this means "critical theory" must be informed by a (prospect of) "radical theory." Now to make "art" from a critique of the present power-matrix without doing so from the point of view of an alternative seems to me career opportunistic and foppish to say the least. Anyway it's basically impossible. However, usually the "alternative" practice is never apparent, and it ought to be (if it isn't just dandyism). All of which I suppose leads me into trying to say what I mean by "politics." I can't come up with a simple definition. Leaving aside the connotations of "political" which have to do with power and authority over others (though these are not simple but difficult and problematic aspects) as well as political in the sense of merely voting, I think it has to do with emphasis falling on elaborating and advocating what is right, moral and ethical. Now, to some this may imply going so far as to advocate alternatives and to others simple acceptance of the diversification of the status quo. But of course *both* are "political." To me, this makes the pundit's term "political artist" or "political art," superfluous. Unless it simply describes those who are contextually, historically and practically self-conscious—in which case it ought to describe all of us. (That it seemingly doesn't is some indication of what's going on today in the *kunst*-carousel.) Now this could go on indefinitely and I don't really want to get into it here. It's *enormously* complex and hard, in fact impossible to deal with in isolation. "Politics" constitutes a matrix with ideology, culture; and all of these, in different though overlapping ways, are embodiments of the *ought* (sometimes of *telos).* But there is another strange use of politicalization. I mentioned it before. It refers to a *haute* adventuristic style combined with the expousal of "radical" politics. This is a sort of politicalization which is common but hardly serious. It is always *safe,* making sure that professional (roles) conduct—the real source of manic-acquisition hegemony—is quite secure. There was, for example, massive indignation in 1970 over the bombings in Cambodia and the Kent State shootings—as there ought to have been, but barely a murmur over the closer to home *kunst*-star plundering. As William Blake said, "He who would do good to another must do it in Minute particulars; General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite and flatterer, For Art & Science cannot exist but in minutely organized particulars; And not in generalizing Demonstrations of the Rational Power." *(Jerusalem.) This is a guide to practice.* I don't think this means there ought to be no generalizing demonstrations, just that we better also look closer to home.

16. *Earlier on* I looked over one attempt by Lawrence Alloway to put some hooks into "culture."

It wasn't a very useful attempt: it simply removed from culture the possibility of practice. My point was you just can't descriptivistically treat culture as an object of contemplation. It is something you and I do, not something we discover and then contemplate. I also went into the causes of what leads us to believe it is only up for contemplation—e.g., the assumption of consumerism. There were, however, other earlier attempts to deal with the hegemony of market-relations. Twice in New York in the late Sixties there was the possibility of examining market-political vectoring. There was the formation of the Art Worker's Coalition as well as the Leftish (albeit simple-mindedly so) aspirations of some of what has come to be known as Conceptual Art—that is, before Conceptual Art began to dance along with "narrative art," "body art" and other movements in the pseudo-pluralistic spectacle of the Seventies. However, both the AWC as well as Conceptual Art proved much less than trenchant. I don't actually know a lot about the AWC or its history. I didn't think a great deal of the few meetings I attended but just the fact that people got together was, in the New York art world, itself fairly remarkable. (Which reminds me of something else. In March of 1974 Lawrence Weiner suggested to me we co-host a series of discussions concerning "art's relation to critical modification/coexistence with the existing social structure." It seemed at the time and I still think it is, a fairly good idea. But out of about twenty or so persons invited only seven came. Most were "away," some no doubt *avantgarding* it in Europe. Others stayed away obviously because they just are not interested in talking—which is okay. But the most spectacular absentee was Lawrence Weiner himself. At the very last moment the MOMA asked him to fly to Australia for the MOMA show *Some Recent American Art*. He went of course and so would I—who wouldn't? I point to this incident not out of perversity but rather because it seems to be a small tableau of the way "international art" demolishes the possibility of sociality and practice and rewards us with atomization, alienation and "private" opportunism.) But anyway, the AWC did show that a solid (or almost) group was actually strong enough to make New York's *Kunst* Valhalla listen a little (I'm thinking of the MOMA). However, the AWC was essentially a liberal coalition. The liberal theory of the state, for example, never sees any troubles as a question of replacing at the root capitalist administrative and economic institutions but as solvable by a turnover of political representatives. Mao's little pamphlet *Combat Liberalism* puts it this way: "Liberalism rejects ideological struggle and stands for unprincipled peace thus giving rise to a decadent philistine attitude and bringing about political degeneration." (Why would anybody want to quote Mao? I refer to Mao as well as to Lenin and others, not because I am commited or even in the slightest bit enamoured with their uniform proletariat society of the future, but because they very often offer insights into ideological as well as methodological problems, historical and moral circumstances, that have a remarkable practical localization in actual events unknown to many perhaps "superior philosophical minds." Certainly I found Mao's *On Practice* and Lenin's *Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, especially helpful to me). But anyway, under liberalism, economic problems—for example some of the economic consequences of *kunst*-star plundering—are never seen as the consequences of an essentially exploitive consumer-acquisition-ethic, but of political mismanagement. It is thought this can be cured by electing "progressives," getting your own people in power, replacing the prevailing leaders with ones who have less vested interests. (I don't think this kind of liberalism is restricted to Americans by any means whatsoever, but it is often blithely regarded as totally uncontroversial here. This isn't so surprising: in a country where the only two political parties with a faintly realistic chance of being elected nationally at present stand for almost the same gung-ho capitalism; where all media—appallingly insidious TV advertisements, not to mention the programs—for instance, perpetuate this ethic, who can blame people for thinking "politics" is simply a matter of changeovers in personnel?) But the AWC gave me the distinct impression everything would be "just fine" if only the institutions would *behave*. Thus in their proposal that museum boards of trustees ought to be made up from "one third artists, one third patrons and one third museum staff" they confirm a fundamental liberal belief that the institutions are "all right" just so long as we can replace those in administrative power with "our people." I think a similar attitude informs co-op galleries and the

quest for economic advantage; gaining your "fair share" is the impetus behind most Artist's Unions. It certainly seems to be the aim of at least the National Art Worker's Community to gain for their "dissatisfied" members an improvement of the opportunities to *compete*. (Trade) Unions have traditionally been first social and political movements and secondly economic forces, but a lot of people see Unionism as an aid to "mere" economic bargain-hunting which, in this country, for some reason tends to ally the Union with corporate business, and erode a political role—except the conservative role.) Don't think I'm underestimating the reality of constant pressure to partially surrender our position in order to come to terms with everyday economic "realities." Many Labor Unions, in Great Britain for example, find themselves in the paradoxical position of needing to improve their economic standing in "the system" while at the same time working for the eventual overthrow of that "system." I heard Hugh Scanlon (president of the Amalgamated Engineering and Foundry Worker's union, one of Britain's largest unions) recognize such a paradox on *Firing Line* (speaking of paradox). I mention this since all of us seem to be caught in a similar bind and, perhaps, so too was the AWC. That is, it may not have been "merely" liberal? But this notwithstanding and whatever the case really was, I think the key to the Coalition's liberalism actually lies elsewhere. What perplexed me more than anything else when I attended the few Coalition meetings I did (and I certainly don't want to leave the impression I was one of the luminaries—I wasn't) was the formal refusal to discuss and debate "work." I assume, under commodity-market-rule, that "work" is just what the commodity-market says is "work." A principle way the hegemony of market institutions may be assailed is to make what is and what is not "work" controversial and to *keep it* controversial (though the institutions also have the capacity to *totally disregard* such a strategy). This really makes work (and I suppose I keep harping on this) strategic, not effete- (and in an odd way that sounds like Spiro Agnew) stylistic. But according to the Coalition "the AWC has never offered any opinions on the content or form of art which we consider the concern of individual artists alone" or, as Lucy Lippard put it: "The Coalition is neutral; it has always been a non-aesthetic group involved in ethics rather than aesthetics." ("The Art Worker's Coalition" in *Idea Art*—another one of those anthologies edited by Gregory-paradigm-opportunist-pundit-Battcock). This remarks sums up my real divergence from AWC "politics." Lucy confirms, I think, the fundamental competitive social relations through which the power structure maintains tightest control on organized protest and so-called "spontaneity." She typically assumes a separation of private from public life. They were all determined to remain "professionals" (possessing a positive-technical privileged concept of "work") in the face of a system whose *most impenetrable defense* is precisely that its attackers do want to stay professionals. Or, to put it another way: they would not move from the role-structures granted to them by that *very same* "system." Without the antedeluvian separation of "ethics from aesthetics," the AWC would have been a much sharper tool. Pandemonium-problematicity would have broken out. "Work" may have come from sociality-practice

instead of insular glamour-glitter careerism. This is because *practice,* that is the art itself, would no longer have been taken for granted. They chose to regard their role as artists as privileged and the institutions as petrified-political—a neutral background temporarily needing knocking into shape. It was perfectly acceptable manufacturing massive canvases as well as bitterly complaining about the need for commercial galleries. Not that such complaints shouldn't have been made, just that when they are made from the standpoint of *a priori* compartmentalized settled interests-purposes, they don't really seem very serious—do they? *Overlooking* paradoxes rather than *integrating them into work* is part of the shallow logic, the "unprincipled peace" of liberalism. This, the impossibility of praxis, amounts in the long run to a surrender to the dead "logic" of bureaucracy. That is, by maintaining the maximum isolation of the individual, the individual finds freedom in "spectacle"—something which leaves the present controlling power roots undisturbed, *an exceptionally effective wedge* between ourselves and possible social action.

17. I remember finally coming to the conclusion that the impotence of the AWC lay in this refusal to deal with "work"—what we each *do*; that is, *practice.* It appeared sure that part-time *politiking* wasn't enough, that we now must have a revision of the commodity status of the work itself—at least that's what I thought at the time. More rubbish has been written about Conceptual Art than most other art "movements." This is appropriate since most of it is rubbish. Most of it was really about Art-history and formalism anyway. I say "was" because I only really treat seriously, that is seriously qua "conceptual art," that which I was aware of and the aspirations I was aware of, around 1968-70. (Since I am against talking about art movements as manufactured historical niches, seeming to exist only as mainstream media middle-life, apart from what any particular artist does, keep in mind (e.g.) Joseph Kosuth's work from this period. Actually it astounds me how even those who pride themselves on being historically minded become remarkably a-historical when it comes to this period—which is too bad in a way.) Anyway, at this time there were certain half-baked "leftish" aspirations which promised to give the work some access to social practice (instead of the work simply manifesting the societal status quo—"taste," "money," "power," "privilege"—it might now have access to society in an *ideological* way, where we *had a choice about the kind of societal, moral, (etc.) presuppositions our work was going to reflect).* However, these aspirations finally missed the point in a revealing way: despite the rabid contortions of the object-framework, the power structures of the art-world *by this time* operated *totally independent of these.* In fact with a "higher" logic all of its own. Suppose I try to go into this a little further: as the promotional cant would have it, during the Sixties some work was made "questioning the nature of the artwork" as marketable commodity. Of course in actual fact and in most cases, the fact that this work could have assailed market-relations wasn't conscientious and, given some of the work then and since, not even conscious. Most of it was paradigm empty-stylistics. This is perfectly understandable given the Modern Art tradition—most "histories" of Dada and Surrealism—not to mention Courbet and the Early Russians—systematically ignore their material-practice problem world. Which I suppose is fortunate for art-historians since I suspect that if these people treated this work as not merely having a bureaucratic art-historical niche but actually meaning something in local temporal-practical terms they would have to begin to do history differently or even not at all. Actually, art-historians could do with a good deal of maligning: they constitute an army of drones equipped with "astounding" empirical "insights," fodder which will never run-out since there's always something more and more and more to say about Corot or even Arthur Anybody's pastels. So it seems to me we have yet another useful device for perpetuating the middle-life of the status quo. As George Orwell said in *Confessions of a Book Reviewer:* the worst of the job was "constantly *inventing* reactions towards books about which one has no spontaneous feeling whatsoever." He didn't like the job but there are plenty of people (with tenure and who are "well known") who find it quite to their liking to prolong their own bureaucratic middle-life. But returning to the point: in "early" Conceptual Art there was indeed some (potentially) strategic socio-material meaning—never mind what's happened since. (It should be said that "doing without the object" is not necessarily to question the *status* of the object. The latter would of course involve us in

looking at the vectors with galleries and, ultimately, with society—which was partly the course of some of our earlier writings.) But I seem again to be drifting from my point. Doing without the object—as I called it above—seemed at first and most obviously to grow from questions raised by the Minimalism (Judd, *et al.*) of the mid-sixties. The need for us all to go-on after their utilization of objects in (again as the cant goes) an extremely robust "literal" way, produced an art-form which didn't, in the conventional sense, appear to need objects at all—again in the conventional sense. Now suppose I pursue this line of argument: it could be said that trying to refine and extend the Modern Art tradition after Minimalism produced, in the form of Conceptual Art, a *contradiction.* This seems okay. It seems to lead onto noting that in the Marxist sense, a contradiction is a process wherein the normal operation of a "social or cultural system" produces a condition which tends to undermine normal operation itself. Hence change comes to take place because the system creates, through it's own internal contradictions, the conditions for its own breakdown. Such a characterization of revolutionary change is, interestingly enough, also fairly consistent with T.S. Kuhn's "paradigm shifts": a system breaks down when "anomalies" in one paradigm model force new paradigms to come into existence. Thus in both dialectical social analysis (Marxism) and an extremely fashionable segment of contemporary Philosophy of Science, "revolution" is considered sufficiently characterized as a dialectical movement out from a set of entrenched norms. So, it seemed (again to pursue this further) whereas the AWC had been disarmed by an essentially inadequate reform program, Conceptual Art might indeed be such a "revolution." It *wasn't,* and there were reasons. First of all it wasn't even a contradiction because it was basically limited to insular-tautological spectacle. It wasn't *enough;* it was a diversification, not a contradiction because this is the way the institutions *make* things work today. That is, today institutions have become autonomous. They constitute a bureaucratic tyranny which brooks no opposition. They are in other words *logically separate* from (our) practice. This implies that the just-doing-my-job artist's role also severs the ties with social practice insofar as it is bureaucratic. To put all this another way: it may be that the range of maneuvers now available to us under Modern Art are simply *out of phase* with the institutional conditions inherent under late-capitalism. Hence, if our labor and means of production seem to be our own free possessions to do with as we please, "freely" so to speak, it's only because we naively operate according to an outmoded model of competitive capitalism. And this is just out of phase today, given the kunst star media-life which easily and greedily coerces (our) practice. The inability to really bring about change, Conceptual Art notwithstanding, is because our mode of operation is "professionalized" specialized, autonomous, and essentially quaintly harmless (but essential to) the mode of operation of the market-structures. The basis of control of such a market is its *role* structuring and the artist as a-willing-or-not-conscious-or-not efficient economic unit. Of course we've all moralistically refused to see these problems as anything other than incidental, or, at best, somebody else's business. The situation becomes, to me, even more vain as we ourselves finally become our own entrepreneurs-pundits, the middle-life of the market our sole reality. To increase the frenzied manipulation of spectacle is absolutely fundamental to New York Adventurism. The Cultural imperialism unwittingly exported everywhere by this adventurism is heinous and alienating—finally even to those who produce the exports. The bureaucracy will subsume even the most persistent iconoclasm unless we begin to act on the realization that its real source of control lies in our very concept of our own "private" individual selves. The far-out and the outlandish is deeply rooted in the U.S. as evidence of freedom and of the truly moral—it is the lack of examination of such a concept that makes most present day radical-art radical-daft instead of radical-fundamental.

HISTORICAL DISCOURSE

MICHAEL CORRIS

Isn't it about time we stopped treating historical discourse as the "natural" product of "neutral" observation, the privileged "commodity" of historian-critics, and started questioning it as the propagator of the cognitive monopoly of modernism? Some questions concerning the status of interpretations, as well as the status of the principles, are in order.

In the conventional scenario the critic-historian plays the role of mediator between the "uninformed" public and the work of the artist. What emerges is the hierarchy of the "well-informed" granting the art-historical propaedeutic to the "ill- or uninformed". The historical grant of recognition is tantamount to a conference of status on the recipient (artist), while the appreciatory grant of patronage confers status on the consumer.

According to some theories that have bearing on the historical development of the practice of criticism (the public sphere as outlined by Habermas), the current situation of the entrepreneural status of art critics-historians is analogous to the triumphant entry of the troops of liberation's transformation into the forces of occupation. The bourgeois public sphere, which was once constituted by all the institutions as democratic checks on the power of the aristocracy, has been transformed into a bureaucratic dispensary of cultural truths. The potentially caustic, though archaic, notion of "public opinion" originated in the public sphere. It was a point of departure for effective political action, had meaning for the emerging bourgeois class, and was predicated on the late 18th Century (then radical) ideology of Liberalism. The almost total capitalization of the public sphere, as a function of monopolistic capitalism, makes participation in that domain dependent on the economic-ideological resources of monopolistic capitalism.

Given the structural features of the economic activities of the art world, what sort of relationship-dialectic are we to posit for its media?

"He was lying not far from the door which opened on the hall; a deep knife wound had split his breast. A few hours later, in the same room amid journalists, photographers and policemen, Inspector Treviranus and Lonnrot were calmly discussing the problem . . .

One of the most questionable aspects of interpretative discourse is its assumption that it always addresses an "alien" object from the geniality of an omni-understanding. Art objects appear as proturberances in the flow of time: "One need not *like* the new. The well-informed, 'well-seen' reader need only disagree intelligently."[1] Or, "(the critic) records rather than reforms, discusses rather than disposes."[2]

"'No need to look for a three-legged cat here,' Treviranus was saying as he brandished an imperious cigar.' We all know that the Tetarch of Galilee owns the finest sapphires in the world. Someone, intending to steal them, must have broken in here by mistake. Yarmolinsky got up; the robber had to kill him. How does it sound to you? . . .

Hermeneutics—the formalized discourse of interpretation—is a rational enterprise (even though it originated in the context of the development of the cultural sciences as proceeding from a different methodological framework than the natural sciences): "rational" because Hermeneutics does not question the basic presupposition of objectivity. The 19th Century founders of the cultural sciences were convinced that the object of their inquiries was the "comprehensive life-context". They specified a different kind of object domain than science, one that was constituted

intersubjectively and not subject to the monopolistic epistemological claims of positivism (wherein "knowledge" is identified with the results of an inquiry exemplified by physics). The orientation towards that "object" did not differ qualitatively from the orientation to be found in the natural sciences, but rather *quantitatively*.

The terminal quagmire for the proponents of 19th Century Geisteswissenschaften was their inability to reconcile their belief in the virtues and possibility of a cultural *science* with their concept of understanding. "Nature we explain, psychic life we understand" (Dilthey). What was to be *understood* was the symbolic structure of the expression of the "life-experience". They were to operate in the "space between projection and thing projected" which was "dark and void." The theoretical model is one postulated on *empathy;* understanding as substitute experience.

"The most valid reason for contact between critic and artist is that the critic becomes close enough to the art-making experience to understand and tolerate as well as admire the whole complex situation in which the artist operates . . . "[4]

The model for cultural creation is romantic: the representation of an inner state through signs given in external experience. To correctly understand these signs, we must reconstruct them experientially . . . "verum et factum convertuntur" . . . " the first condition of the possibility of historical science is that I myself am a historical being —that he who *studies* history is the same as he who *makes* history." (Dilthey)

"Possible, but not interesting," Lonnrot answered. "You'll reply that reality hasn't the least obligation to be interesting. And I'll answer you that reality may avoid that obligation but that hypotheses may not. In the hypothesis that you propose, chance intervenes copiously. Here we have a dead rabbi; I would prefer a purely rabbinical explanation, not the imaginary mischances of an imaginary robber."[5]

What Dilthey and other cultural scientists after him failed to deal with was the "theory-ladeness" of observation, and the "impure" (from the point of view of natural science propaganda) observational account that followed. Could they recognize this in their attempt to justify a cultural science on methodological grounds?

In that context, "meaning" continues to have the status of a *fact*, an *empirical given*. That is, interpretation presupposes certain *necessary* relationships in the domain of culture, while simultaneously eliminating all contingency. The possible inadequacy of this methodology is never hinted at; yet all problems of interpretation are framed by it.

Dilthey recognized that "interpretation would be impossible if the expressions of life were totally alien . . . unnecessary if there was nothing alien in them." Interpretation, therefore, had to lie somewhere between the two, assuming there was *"something* alien that the art of understanding has to assimilate."

Dilthey also recognized that the dialogical commonality of a community was crucial in constituting the various aspects of their intersubjectivity (I am paraphrasing this in terms of the history of Art & Language discourse). Dilthey was too much the rationalist to admit the notion of indeterminacy as an epistemological limit applied to his system. For him, the frailty of language was something of an obstacle to be overcome; ideally through hermeneutics. Oddly enough, Dilthey assumes authenticity as characteristic of the totality of relationships between individuals in a society and their cultural "products." Conventionality is not mentioned, since Dilthey does not assume a hierarchial relationship between the interpreter and the object of interpretation; for the interpreter the connection is immanent in *language.* This notion exists currently as the doctrine that works of art are reducible to expressions of/in a symbolic language. The critic merely breaks the code (Kubler, in *The Shape of Time,* reacts to "Cassirer's partial definition of art as symbolic language" by stating "the structural forms (of things) can be sensed independently of meaning."[6]

Interpretive schemes can never be as compelling as the myth of scientific rationality, since they frame themselves in their own language. As methodology is the key, professional interpreters are always looking optimistically towards the development of "ever-new aids to the solution of their task, just as natural-scientific inquiry has evolved ever-new refinements of the experiment."

"Awareness of contemporary attitude, mood, issues, must be backed up by a set of working criteria, constantly in the experimental stage, which emerge and change, though not radically, with each new work confronted."[7]

All those logical heirs of Dilthey are caught in a covert positivism. In desperation, the contemplative mode of pure descriptivism is taken up—the radical empiricism of modernist criticism/history . . . "that indefinable faculty, 'a good eye.' "

Historians and critics persist, because as virtuoso specialists they are relevant to the rational administration of a far-flung art-market-system. When "cultural objects" are further reduced to commodities it is not so much a question of rescuing interpretation, but a question of "rescuing" the consumer from his contemplative relationship to these objects. "Democratic access" to objects of contemplation is ludicrous: it simply exposes everyone to the same cultural hegemony.

Art history/criticism, like all control systems, depends on maintaining a monopoly position.

Risks? As William Burroughs puts it, the con cop's arm around your shoulder, his soft persuasive voice in your ear, are indeed sweet nothings without the tough cop's blackjack.

Sometimes I feel as if there is no escape from those sweet nothings: "Dematerialized art is post-esthetic only in its increasingly nonvisual emphases. The esthetic principle is still an esthetic, as implied by frequent statements by mathematicians and scientists about the *beauty* of an equation, formula, or solution."[8] Or, ". . . the artistic work appears to be endowed with a certain internal coherence and relative autonomy which thwarts its reduction to a mere ideological phenomenon . . . (However) to characterize art according to this ideological content ignores a key historical fact: class ideologies come and go, but true art persists."[9] Further back, "This stability in the value of art, the semblance of its nature as something wholly above history and society, rests upon the fact that in art we find above all a dialogue between man and nature."[10]

Let's consider the transformation of our relationship, as artists, to art historical discourse as technical into practical. From the point of view of its origination, historical discourse can be construed in at least two ways. These being (1) a body of discourse given to us by historians and critics, (2) what we ourselves have to say about our history. This means a bit more than passing judgement on the manner in which we are "positioned" in conventional art history/criticism by historians/critics . . .

If we consider our relationship to the discourse of historians and critics in a technical sense, we are talking about *their* organization of means (philosophy of history . . . hermeneutics) and *our* selection of alternatives within the parameters of that given methodological frame. It becomes a matter of how we can best deal with historical discourse in terms of our own interests. This is a bad situation.

But for those who wish to make the best of a bad situation, there is feminist art history. A relatively persistent tendency on the part of certain feminist art historians (Cindy Nemser) has been the insertion of historical discourse referring to domestic artifacts or works of high art produced by women (i.e. their selection of alternatives) into an institutionalized framework of history (i.e. the given parameters of academic art history: a *science* of history). Their aim, the reconstruction of a history of art relative to the needs of women and/or the re-constitution of male-dominated art history with women's art, seems to have been programmatically reduced to either the correction of the constitutive subject matter of a given body of historical discourse, or the proliferation of pigeon-holes in a conventionalist's catalogue of 'art'. In this sense, the search for a history that speaks to one's own conditions has been reduced to a technical problem, since feminist art historians have already presupposed the usefulness of the historical perspective.

But this is not to say that it is exclusively a technical problem: we ought to acknowledge the further ideological importance of acquiring a supportive history . . . and this is certainly problematic from the point of view of a male's critique of a women's point of view of the art world.

Feminist Art Journal, A.I.R., etc., take notice: "A central problem of women determining strategy for the women's movement is how to relate to the male left (or, the male artist): we do not want to take their modus operandi as ours, because we have seen them as a perpetuation of patriarchal, and latterly, capitalist values . . . What we definitely *don't* need is more structures and rules, providing us with easy answers, pre-fab alternatives, and no room in which to create our own way of life."[11]

What Cathy Levine wants to avoid is the "tyranny of tyranny", the invasion of Ms. magazine Diary of a Mad Housewife-The New Woman- middle class, college educated, male-associated-you-can-have-your-share-of-the-American-Pie-values into a women's cultural movement that finds prescribed roles and the Protestant/Jewish work/achievement ethic unacceptable.

I have to agree with Lefebvre that "history as a process and history as a science do not coincide, though they converge."[12] To us who have yet to secure our own history, the de-institutionalization of art history hardly seems an appropriate concern. But I recognize that the Feminist Art Journal, Cindy Nemser, A.I.R., etc., neither represent the totality of feminist political-ideological sympathies among women artists in New York, nor can they be expected to waive responsibility for the promotion of inane, authoritative art history. (I am perfectly willing to support my claim on their own grounds, as art historians, providing it is nowhere near Johns Hopkins Hospital.) To do otherwise, it would seem, would be to practice the worst sort of condescension.

When I began to think about my relationship to a given art history . . . historical discourse . . I had some of these problems in mind. Reconstructing a history in resonance with my interests (collaboration) and needs could not be considered apart from my desire to avoid the authoritative thrust of art historical accounts.

In that case, "reconstruct" is a poor choice of words.

I suppose that my primary motivation was to escape from the consumer role that the art world media imposes on all of us; where their preferred versions of history, preferred models of criticism are the products we are obliged to consume.

Of course, you get to the point where you can't bear to look at another art glossy. But after all, this sort of stoical resignation serves the interests of the art world media as much as the ploy of carving out a bit of your own turf.

It was the classic dilemma of shit or get off the pot.

Delving into history wasn't just a question of satisfying my own curiosity. I am sure that a few anecdotes about Courbet's drunkeness ("Did you hear what Gus, that devil, actually *did* at that Anarchists' convention?") or re-reading the Hayward Gallery's catalogue "Art in Revolution" would have done the trick, if that was the case. It seemed to me an impossible feat to divorce my concern—coping with history, constituting history, feeling in a vital state of mind about some portion of art history—from my sociality (*Art-Language, The Fox*). Several years of talking to, and working with, a group of people in an informal collaborative relationship could not, however, be ignored. Dealing with history had to be reconciled with my collective experience, importantly so.

I wondered why there were no comprehensive accounts of artists' collectives or a social history that incorporated, as a major perspective, the conscious use of the concept of community as an ideological tool by artists. But the further I was drawn into researching original source material (playing the artist-historian or, rather, reconstituting both the role of 'artist' and the role of historian') . . . I scanned, for instance, various Constructivist manifestos, the somewhat arcane Proceedings of the American Artists' Congress (1936), and the program of the Féderation des Artistes of the Paris Commune (1871)—the more apparent the complexity of the problem of reconciling what I had defined as my dual needs. For one thing, my interest in documentation—preferring related socio-political-economic source material (in the case of the Constructivists, this took the form of a parallel history of the supression of the various moves towards workers' self-management 1917-1922 . . . was it possible to give some depth to the cliched relationship of the Constructivists to the Bolshevik Revolution . . .) to examples of objects of art—immediately precluded locating these materials in the usual art historical "spaces". Except for the Constructivists who were presented as a ready-made art-socio-political scenario by art historians and other entrepreneurs (curators), most of my material was to be found as listings in Lee Baxandall's *Annotated Bibliography of Marxism and Aesthetics*. I was ecstatic at the prospect of leafing through the pages of journals like *Left Review* (1934), *Our Time* (1948), *The Red Stage* (1931), *The Liberator* (1919); not to mention the Soviet English-language publication *International Literature* (1933), or our own *Daily Worker* (1926-1935) or *The New Masses* (1932).

Yet another difficulty appeared: these sources were already embedded in the historical tradition of the Left, and the 'heroic' period of American Social Realism, the 1930's: their secu-

larized reliquary.

How could I avoid being captivated by this material? What was my subjective relationship to this body of discourse; indeed the only body of discourse that covered the notions of appropriation of the resources and modes of production and distribution of art by artists in opposition to the capitalist value structure . . . and of course, collectivization. . .?

Such a relationship, perhaps heuristic at best, was not to be discovered ready-made; however, there was a generalizable cultural problematic that was, in some sense, shared. But to ignore my own internal needs here would be to historicize in the manner of those legion journalist-art historians-critics. A journalist, you will recall, is someone who defines the forms of consciousness, in which historical movements are initially reflected, on the periphery of daily events. Cultural Bolsheviks . . . not to be confused with the historical Bolsheviks.

I was not interested in writing more boring art history, even if it was a history of collectives, or a more socialized history of art. Social historians of art still rely on materialist presuppositions about the nature of history, but only as an exploratory theory . . . "What if . . .?" As all art historians their ultimate point of departure is the art object. The possibility of up-dating their methods can be realized up to a point . . . beyond that, we fall into scientism. As historians, their allegiances are basically professional.

We should look elsewhere . . .

Yet while these documents certainly had some relevance to my "project" of history (cf. Brecht's "history as project": Brecht's rejection of the Hegelian view of history in Lukacsian esthetics led him to believe in history as a project, "mediated by given social realities, but proceeding from the concrete transforming praxis of human beings."[13]) in opposition to the "official", authoritative, alienating body of modernist historical/critical discourse, they seemed marginally connected to the vicissitudinous context of current praxis. I could hardly consider seriously espousing any of those aspects of praxis as revealed through my delvings into Constructivism, or the Commune of 1871. In fact, I could hardly consider them as representing praxical points of reference at all.

I do not want to abandon this project. So much of this material takes on the character of supressed information, due to the hegemony . . . cognitive monopoly . . . of the modernists; it is valuable in its own right as contrastive to the "sources" of inspiration for formally-obsessed historical/critical experts of the art media.

I am in favor of anything that contributes to the demolition of the myopic modernist machine (MMM).

Speaking of the MMM's media, I am not impressed with *Artforum's* politicized version of "putting on the Ritz" (Cf. Feb. 1975 issue).

MMM's sweet nothings are certainly widespread: it's really scandalous that an Art History major to whom I showed my material on the Paris Commune was amazed, having never heard of the Fédération des Artistes (which was organized by Courbet and Pottier as a kind of Proudhonist-inspired collective for the mutual benefit of all Parisian artists . . . no distinctions were drawn between "high"and "low" art for the purpose of membership. This union, by the way, advocated the "control of the realm of art by artists".). Nor am I really impressed by Linda Nochlin's treatment of this event in the context of her above-average treatment of realism: she doesn't even mention it. The Paris Commune is spared this ignominy only because the human residue of its brutal suppression happened to provide M. Manet with some "realist" subject matter: death. (Certainly, given the glorification of the Commune by Anarchists and Marxists alike, you may contest my sentiment here; yet it is unlikely that the Fédération would have emerged otherwise.)[14]

The social historian is obliged to consider the poeisis of the art object as an embodiment of the socio-political vectors of its time rather than as an attempt to transcend its cultural context. The art object thus transvalued becomes the *ideo-object*.

The reader may sigh: "this complaint is squarely in the context of historical nit-picking." The question I put to Nochlin is: Why aren't there discussions (. . . the courtesty of your own mode) around the ideological ramifications of this and other examples of the sociality of particular groups in the late 19th Century? As an art historian, her commitments lie elsewhere: meaning, again, in the direction of the community of art historians.

Getting back to the problem (art history and me): faced with this dismal lack of ideological resonance with my intentions for the project of constituting a survey of artists' activities in the context of socio-political practice, etc., I found myself much less inclined to consider doing a historical reconstruction. The constellation of methodological alternatives really discouraged me. Dropping this notion (rational reconstruction) allowed me to consider the concept of a trans-temporal mapping of that historical body of discourse onto my own discourse indexed (loosely speaking) relative to collectivization, collaboration, and so on. The resulting map is in opposition to the dumb linearity of most historical discourse . . . although it is obvious that the points of contact/points of reference between two items of discourse (. . . this on the macro level. . .?) are highly problematic.

Let's consider our relationship to a given body of art historical discourse in a practical sense. Here we can't escape a critique of the presuppositions of that discourse. This covers far more ground than merely the theoretical presuppositions of a given body of art historical discourse: for example, the placement of art historical discourse in the public sphere implicates it in a critique of the media-public sphere as well. Such criticism would complement the theoretical criticism dialectically, since it is criticizing a mode of presentation of that discourse . . . the complete practice of the MMM.

Now the art world media would have us believe that it is merely a mode of communication. If you believe *that*, then don't bother reading any more: the notion that there is a relationship between art historical discourse and current art-praxis that can only be described as authoritarian, hegemonic, and restrictive, will strike you as mad.

If you want to consider how such control is carried out effectively through the media, you have to re-consider the art historians' claim that their discourse ought to be considered simply in terms of its content. You have to resist the fragmentation and look at art historical discourse and the complementary media in a dialectical way. MMM.

There is really no separation that can be justified: we can't "examine" "communication" in terms of "message", "channel", "noise" because these positivistic fragmentations are methodological principles of the first order, as the entire interrogative framework has developed in conjunction with the larger public sphere.

Perhaps we can begin to introduce some questions concerning the intentional dimensions of MMM's sweet nothings. Or should I say "dimensionless", relative to the historians' instantiation of the ideo-object. Again, the persistance on the part of the producers of historical/critical discourse that the resultant of the praxical vectors of "making" "cultural" "objects" can be resolved unproblematically by direct reference to those "objects".

That is, the accommodation of the various dimensions of praxis, as seen by a community of practitioners of the "science" of history whose content-matter is categorically-fixed as "art", is only possible through the total objectification of that content. The instrumentalities, a rough history of which was provided in the first several pages, consist of a range of cohesively-evolving methodologies, always expressible in terms of a rigid body of art historical discourse. This body of discourse, in turn, is dependent upon the objectification of praxis, reducing its "subject" to a docile "object" capable of classification, etc. The conventional distribution of praxis along the lines (as in pedigrees . . .) of painting, sculpture, and so forth has a hold on us to the extent that we conceive of ourselves, our praxis, as typifications of these categories. What existed originally as a short-cut or simplification of the immensely difficult task of establishing a cultural science, proceeds to become a naturalistic model for the future production of objects (that is all it can be) and the basis for this hysterical plea: "Let us suppose that the idea of art can be expanded to embrace the whole range of man-made things, including all tools and writing in addition to the useless, beautiful, and poetic things of the world. By this view the universe of man-made things simply coincides with the history of art. It then becomes an urgent requirement to devise better ways of considering everything man has made."[15]

Why a cultural "science" at all?

The various competing methodologies of MMM must harken back to this primal objectification. Using the model of the ethnographer, MMM's historian/critic takes the object for informant. Biographical-socio-cultural asides enter into his discourse as he dispenses his conventional obligation to give details about this informant.

For instance, Lippard monitors the "Conceptual Art" through the filter of "dematerialization", in conjunction with the "stimulating dialogue" of artist-critic: the entry of the 'historical event' coincides with the beginning of the historiographic event.

For whose attention do these methodologies compete?

The academic skirmishes fought out in mock-intellectual battledress in the pages of 'intellectual' journals like *Artforum* are utterly fatuous. (One installment of the "Problems of Criticism" series, I remember, entailed Steinberg's transformation of Greenberg's "flat picture-plane" into the "flatbed.")

Are there alternatives within the discipline itself questioning the foundation of objectification: the historical "fact" is ontologically privileged in its linguistic expression. "Transcending" the current discipline-bound presuppositions on the production of historical discourse amounts to abandoning history as it is currently practised. For one thing, this extreme form of incommensurability, directed at Art History, is born out of a personal dissatisfaction with the rationalization of "knowledge" parceled out to the specialists through recourse to the discipline: it is not a plea for a *new* history.

The practice of history, particularly the positivistic history of "objective discourse" has been compared to the discourse of the schizophrenic: "in both cases there is a radical censorship of the utterance, . . . and there is a massive reversion of discourse away from any form of self-reference, or even (in the case of the historian) a reversion towards the level of pure referrent—*the utterance for which no one is responsible.*"[16]

Why should we adopt this mode of discourse for our own when dealing with the expression of our history?

We might consider the possibilities of an approach that is more reflexive, self-referential; one that demonstrates how underdetermined "objects" really are, as points of reference, without the benefit of the ideological grid of the historian-as-observer. The historian bases his discourse on a well-structured collection of objects. Well-structured means that he has sorted out his type-token distinctions pretty well; he *knows* what he is talking *about*. Without recourse to objectification, the notion of completeness—what his subject is—a collection of historical objects is impossible. Collections of historical objects once appeared under the rubric "style(s)": the "domain" of discourse was defined in terms of inside/outside, anomalies were either "transitional pieces" *into*, or *out of* that domain.

It's easy to set up a methodological frame for historical discourse when something as clear cut as "work" exists. The unproblematic objectification/reduction of praxis (sociality . . . errors . problems . . . conditions of learning . . .) to "protuberances in the flow of time", to "work", yields the Kubleresque "prime object" in a series of objects (in its extreme form), social histories in its more "receptive" form.

Considering art history from the point of view of your own history, i.e., having a retrospective: ". . . You have to treat Art & Language as a *social* notion when you're talking of a history . . . The art history is a kind of facade which is face-to-face with the art public, the internal history is more interesting because it has to do with the interface between each of us . . . Is there any way to get out of the public-relations kind of history coming out of all this ("official history")?"[17]

Art History, as a sub-species of the "science" of history, emerged in the mid-19th century in France. Its first practitioner, Theophile Thore, founded it as a scientific enterprise. Steeped in Comtean positivism, it was to be an "impartial history, . . . freed from preconceived theories, ideals and all wishful thinking."[18] As a scientific enterprise, it was closer to Geology or Astronomy than Physics, taking as its methodological (and epistemic) base a radical empiricism.

There is more to this than a simple likeness. It is "culture" participating in the propagation of the cognitive monopoly of science. It's been pointed out by Habermas that "positivism first appears in the form of a new philosophy of history." This "new philosophy" was penned by Comte, who attempts through it to justify "the sciences' scientistic belief in themselves by constructing the history of the species as the history of the realization of the positive spirit."[19] "It is clear that the impact of man on nature depends mainly on the knowledge it has acquired regarding the real laws of inorganic phenomena." (Comte)

Comte's philosophy provides the middle-ground between the end of classical epistemology and the emergence of the philosophy of science as the model for knowledge. This is what Husserl was all puffed up about in some of his writings.

At this point, I suggest having an [illegible]'s at (1) *The Shape of Time* (Kubler); (2) [illegible]-materialization of Art (Lippard . . . the 1968 essay). The former conceives of history of things as mappable onto a directed graph as a series of formal decisions taken/abandoned; the latter's essay is heavily innundated with scientistic jargon (all the trendy stuff of the late-60's is there; how many of us were immune to that?) and profound anecdotes by Nobel Laureates on the beauty of the "order" of nature.

What about the occurrence of the concept of "progress" as a feature of art historical discourse á la MMM? The swarm of epigones of positivistic historicism are the logical heirs of the Comtean positivism.

The MMM doesn't really start rolling until Courbet: the mid-late 19th century is the fountainhead of modernist history (in terms of the emergence of art history and especially art criticism in the mid-19th century we might have to look at the collapse of the state-patronage system and the entry of the artist into the rapidly growing market-place).

The real legacy of Comte is objectivism: limited access to the world through the objectification of the world. Comte's "positive spirit" is the final stage of evolution of individuals-species, having gone through a "theological" and a "metaphysical" stage. "Positive" is constantly contrasted with the "merely imaginary" (*reel-chimerique*), the "undecided" (*l'indecision*), the indefinite (*le vague*), the vain (*l'oiseux*), and the absolute (*l'absolu*). Modernist historical discourse and positivism both share the basic rule of the empiricist: systematic observation. With different consequences, however: for the positivist, knowledge is identical to scientific knowledge; for the emissary of MMM, the history of art is taken to be the *natural history of art-objects*. "Progress" doesn't cut much mustard as an evolutionary trend, being formalistically "readable" through objects (the metaphorization at the bottom of *The Shape of Time* is predicated in terms of early-middle-late replications of "prime objects" (for the fine arts, masterpieces), Kubler tenaciously holding to his objectivity, refusing all mention of as subjectively-loaded a term as "progress").

Well, almost: "Each generation of course continues to revaluate those portions of the past which bear upon present concerns . . ."[20]

"If you expand your history to include, for example, your reading, the fact that you lived in NY, or La Jolla, the point is that you don't in fact give up that history, you embed it. But if you take all this in art world terms, then all you've got are the objects. And the gallery-goer has a standard contemplative relation to them. Haven't we gone on in the past about this "the trouble with art history is that it's a history of objects"? The continuing tyranny of art history is that it should remain a history of objects . . ."[21]

It seems as if the art community would prefer to divorce "content" or "subject matter" of art history from its context in praxis, rather than face-up to the implications of their relationship to a group of specialists whose discourse reduces them to objects against the backdrop of a "cultural" landscape, naturally-determined, and in a law-like relationship to their products. It is impossible to avoid the ideological dimensions of art history as being the fixed yardstick of praxis, given in the past and nurtured by the official standard-bearers of art's progress, in the art world media. "Is our work Conceptual Art?" remains the paradigm of the interrogative potential of MMM. Another one is "What do you do?"

For the historian/critic, "work" is only that which can be subsumed by historical/critical discourse; analogous to the way in which a distributor of art works defines his product tautologically. In other words, anything which fits the historian's semantic model of discourse . . . this is like beating a dead horse . . .

How well have we internalized the values of MMM? We all have our resumés, however modest. A commodity isn't a collection of vague potentialities, but a collection of empirically-sortable items. Exhibitions. Publications. Teaching positions. Bibliography (the institutionalized response of a community of experts . . . cohorts). The problem of notational possibility is never raised.

Historical discourse is really resistant to that sort of problem; it's limited to a narrowly-defined domain. The history of art is not so much an array of exemplars all in a row, as an array of

examplars which presuppose a definite poeisis. The art student, in the course of his education, is continually struggling to break away from the given history of art as a useable catalogue of resources. *What is retained is the sense of a continuity of praxis.* Historicism tries to convince us, among other things, that the history of art has a logic of its own. The impersonal inevitability of the historical process itself appears to be "one huge, dead, immeasurable Steam engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference to grind me limb from limb."

The history of art makes it very clear to me, and other people I'm sure, what sort of behavior is to be considered influential. Clearly, if you are doing that sort of work, in some sense you are responding to the great tradition of art as it is institutionalized in the market relationships fostered by the galleries, etc. Now I don't mean to say that this work . . . this sort of criticism . . . is the only sort of authentic activity . . . I am saying that you ought to consider the dimensions of art activity to include those other than the vectors of object-making. The history of art in that sense is generally uni-dimensional. Materialist history tries to take into account some of the ideological and economic dimensions of the productive relationships that are the heart of object-making.

A sweeping rejection of (art) history might be totally insane; however, it would be more convenient to *forget* Art History (as a model and otherwise). Except that those ideo-objects are forever with us (remember, our relation to them is not simply historical . . . Futurism, amore?) But I do mean that the objectification of everything *is* insane. Yet it is supported by the role of the historian/critic and the institutions of history and criticism. Now I realize that to some extent, objectification is unavoidable; it's the price you have to pay to get your self into the public domain . . . "making the work public" . . . shows . . . retrospectives . . . all these exert a positive pressure in favor of the rationalization/objectification of praxis. But let's not assume that it has to be accepted across the board.

You can probably guess that the technical problems of coping with our own history can get complex, involving a lot of obscure instrumentalities . . . maps. One of the things I have learned, however, is that trying to constitute points of reference . . . indices . . . that refer back strictly to our dialogical context, in the context of public displays, is the wrong tack. Why not take the context of public access as the point of departure for "history" here? I am not certain whether coping with our own history is either a technical problem or a practical problem; it's probably a bit of both. Maybe all I am saying is we have to see our relationship(s) to our history(s) dialectically; not as static global perspectives to be filled-in eventually, but as shifting points of view. Practical questions, in the sense of "practical" used here, are posed with the acceptance or rejection of norms . . . such as norms of public access . . . *their* behavior pitted against *ours*. I am sick of being so "well-informed" that no one will talk with me . . . who you talk *to* says a lot about your conception of yourself as an authority . . . as well your conception of learning, which I suppose is part of being an authority. Unlike those inhabitants of a Proustian time-zone, *we have histories*; we are in medias res, art-wise.

It is no joke that art historical discourse supports a mode of production that restricts me insofar as it fails to acknowledge my praxis, or that artists produce works in response to it. It isn't funny because it is sheer exploitation: for example, all of the fragmented domains of productive activity like Feminist Art, Black Art, Conceptual Art, etc. They serve the diversity of the market, and that serves the myth of individualism, and that serves the hegemony of the current productive modes . . . not to mention the art historical sleight-of-hand needed to "re-discover" women, etc. Progress and 'marginal' cultural objects . . . marginal cultures . . . the identification of history with anthropology . . . the historian takes as a reference point the unity of his cultural history . . . "Western civilization as the most advanced expression of human evolution" . . . Kubler speaks the language of imperialism in a most sophisticated way: "After neglect, conquest is the other great occasion for incomplete classes [Kubler's euphemism for cultural dead-ends], when the victor overthrows native institutions and replaces them with extensions of his own. If the victor has alluring benefits to offer, like Alexander or Cortes, he makes the continuation of many traditions both unnecessary [!] and impossible. The *locus classicus* for incompletion is the case of sixteenth century America, when native initiative quickly ceased under the blows of the Conquest and the attraction of superior European knowledge". [22]

The detached overview is most at home given the grand sweep of history. "Seven Centuries of Western Art . . . every period . . . every style . . . every great artist . . . The Time-Life Library of Art will educate both your eye and your sensibilities to what great art is all about . . . to know what to look for when you see a masterpiece, and what it means when you find it . . ." [23]

Playing with art history is a waste of time. You are confronted with a continuum populated with items . . . tokens . . . a sequence in time. All the various philosophies of history seem to be able to supply is the means whereby this continuum is naturalized even further: progress, revolutions, eschatology, causal relationships . . . "The analogy of the track yields a useful formulation in the discussion of artists. Each man's lifework is also a work in a series extending beyond him in either or both directions, depending upon his position in the track he occupies. To the usual coordinates fixing the individual's position—his temperament and his training—there is also the moment of his *entrance*, this being the moment in the tradition—early, middle, late—with which his biological opportunity coincides." [24]

For the idealist historian there is an underlying reliance on the increase of material-historical resources and the resistance of a model of behavioral continuity for a justification of progress. What seems intolerable to the idealist-historian is the existence of contextually defined events; those occurrences transpiring outside of the theoretical range of his philosophy of history, which generally means supporting the status quo productive-relationships. Interestingly enough, his discourse is centered on an undefined, vaguely progressive *telos*, which often amount to assertions such as "increased leverage on nature" or a greater degree of "freedom of choices" (those nodal points on Kubler's directed graph of art history). The belief in progress is supported by the belief that knowledge is cumulative, that the lessons of the past are essential components of the domination of the present.

Distinctions like "idealist"-"materialist" point out that all historical discourse serves as the basis for the correct transmission of a visibly mapped-out tradition: the secular reliquary. Historical discourse circumscribes what it considers to be the limits of "creativity"and "innovation". Its authority is derived, in part, from the fact that it serves as a major criterion of legitimacy for a particular kind of practice. Imagine a Proustian time where none of the recollections were your own.

We ought to look at these problems of authority as they manifest themselves in our own back yard. I used to consider *Artforum* as a trade journal, but for most of the art community, it is an intellectual journal . . . a liberal forum. When you start to look at the art media in terms of its self-projected image, you begin to see a sphere of influence that overlaps the practitioners, appraisers, and potential audience of appreciators/consumers/buyers. From the copy in that ad, the "public sector" seems to be the intellectual no-man's land of the culturally pliable. The characteristic producer-consumer framework for learning-sociality is expressed somewhat differently in each of these separate "worlds":

historian, artist, layman (though there are overlaps). For the art historian, there is the "job" of the reconstruction of history in the context of the specialist: this is basically the academic side of art history. The art historian who positions himself in the art community does well to slide between the roles of historian and critic-in-residence. For example: Max Kozloff, Lucy Lippard, Rosalind Krauss, Jack Burnham, *et al.* In fact, art historical credentials are essential for entry into the high echelons of art criticism in the media.

The point of art criticism when it emerged as the cultural champion of the bourgeoisie was to provide a buffer against the cultural hegemony of the ruling class . . . artists were sick of being ignored by the official critics of the Salon. But while the liberalized public sector broke up the monopoly of culture of the ruling class, it was also utilizable as a tool to sustain the newly found leverage of the bourgeoisie. In time, the public sphere became an institutionalized vector of the power of the middle-class: it's a favorite quip of Marx to point out that the bourgeoisie would prefer an alliance with the aristocracy rather than form a coalition with the working class.

The art world media is not the idealized realm of free access at all. Editorial policies constantly aim at creating a liberal balance of opinions within the journalistic framework of responsibility to one's readership . . . which is to say, most realistically, "no one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of his audience."

Kubler takes care of the learning-conditions "surrounding" the emergence of cultural objects by reducing those conditions to a member of the set comprised by the tokens (objects) of the tradition (genus of objects; prime-object) of *formal*-problem solutions: anything that is still in a viable series *works*. All series start with a "prime object" and finish with something less than a "quality" object.

You might think that criticism is going to slip out the back door, particularly if you see critical discourse in opposition to, or separate from, the context of learning—making cultural objects. You might think that criticism merely sets down the conditions for learning vis a vis the hot-hand of journalism . . . or in shaping and reinforcing consumer-producer roles. But criticism is as much interpretive history (current) as history is historical interpretation. At any rate, both criticism and history proceed from their closed-set of learning conditions/praxis (the discipline) outward, towards the objects of their scrutiny. For past history, retrieval from objectification is impossible. But it is perverse for artists in the present to capitulate to that objectification. Responding positively to art history as it is presented is in some measure, a statement of assent to the methodological foundations of that historical discourse.

"What is interesting about the art-historical supports dropping out, is that from that point on there was an effort to no longer subscribe to the imperatives of Modern-art history; being able to survive in a situation where we don't subscribe to those things is of interest—it's as interesting as the notion of sociality—we would lose interest entirely in the rewards of the careerism of 'professional artists.' You may like it in many ways, but the question is about the *meaning* of the work . . .We want to look at the conditions of the production of cultural objects . . . and how that mediates the relationships amongst people . . .we don't want to show what experts we are . . . that would contravene the whole hope of changing the mode of organization amongst people . . . conditions for learning . . . You have this body of work which is potentially able to take us out of the tyranny of our institutions, the next thing you know, bits of it have got gold frames around it . . . people are offering us the keys to the gates of the kingdom of public institutions, i.e. money . . ." [25]

Historical discourse *transformed* can be conceived of as a critical process, *embedding*; not simply the "grammar" of successive tokens.

New York, New York

NOTES

1. Lucy Lippard, "Change & Criticism: Consistency and Small Minds, in *Changing*, p. 32.
2. Ibid., p. 25.
3. All Quotations by Dilthey were found in part II of *Knowledge and Human Interests*, by Jürgen Habermas.
4. Lippard, p. 25.
5. Jorge Luis Borges, "Death and the Compass."
6. George Kubler, *The Shape of Time*, p. vii.
7. Lippard, p. 26.
8. Ibid., p. 259.
9. Sanchez Vázquez, *Art and Society*.
10. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 235.
11. Cathy Levine, "The Tyranny of Tyranny" in *Black Rose* Vol. No. 1 1974.
12. Henri Lefebvre, *The Sociology of Marx*.
13. Quoted by Eugene Lunn, in "Marxism and Art in the Era of Stalin and Hitler: The Brecht-Lukacs Debate," *New German Critique*, No. 3, Fall 1974.
14. Insofar as the economic collapse *and* the Commune of Paris of 1871 is generally considered to be an outgrowth of the defeat of France by Prussia, you could argue that the unionization of artists would have taken place without the short-lived commune. Nochlin hardly makes her position on this clear; I feel it is an unfortunate gap in her discussion. After all, she does include William Morris' efforts in a similar direction.
15. Kubler, p. 1.
16. Roland Barthes, "Historical Discourse" in *Structuralism*, ed. by M. Lane.
17. Unpublished transcript, May 1974. Participants included: Ian Burn, Michael Corris, Preston Heller, Andrew Menard, Mel Ramsden and Terry Smith.
18. Linda Nochlin, Realism, p. 42.
19. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Chap. IV.
20. Kubler, p. 123.
21. Transcript.
22. Kubler, p. 110.
23. Taken from an ad for the Time-Life Library of Art, appearing in the *New York Times* Book Review section.
24. Kubler, p. 6.
25. Transcript.

EDUCATION BANKRUPTS

DAVID RUSHTON AND PAUL WOOD

It is worth recording the bankruptcy of art-education at an infra-structural level. The few accounts which have been given by people working in the area up to now have concerned themselves exclusively with undergraduate art-colleges, or else a generalized cultural critique. From our point of view however, the former accounts seem overly particular, the latter overly general. While it is difficult in a general critique not grounded in descriptive particularity to avoid sloganizing, it has become apparent that the ideological desert extends beyond art colleges as standardly conceived (schools, post-graduate departments, teacher training colleges, etc.).

It would be a pauce essentialism which held that the problem retained an identity throughout, but on the other hand the relations can be identified: in fact it is in sorting out the reinforcements of orthodoxy as spanning contexts (as well as noting the insidious nature of orthodoxy at a microscopic level) that teleology could reside. Perhaps attempts to go beyond this would be pious or utopian.

Moray House College of Education in Scotland accepts all academically qualified applicants to its graduate art course. The need for an interview has possibly not arisen because it is usually found that the majority of students have attended undergraduate courses which have altered little since the teaching staff attended them. Students that do not fit usually leave. Hierarchs in the college say they have a remit to train teachers to fit the specifications of existing school curricula, and a teaching qualification can be denied because a student fails to fulfil the ideals of that specification. Such remarks are aimed in the direction of students who fulfil the formal obligations of the course (punctual, active, etc.), but remain critical of what they have to do and of the "definitions" of teaching that are embedded within the training programme. Habit-forming constraints have the pernicious effect of reinforcing half-baked preconceptions about what has to be given up as an aspiring teacher. This is manifest in the conservative set of allowances made toward any idea of doing work, a situation in which it is remarked that art staff are kept informed by the academic staff of the views adopted by students on tutorial topics such as de-schooling, discipline, corporal punishment. Criticism of the course leads to the student being labelled a political activist, and on those grounds a teaching qualification would be denied.

Non-critical teacher training is no method for developing a critical practice in education: Nellie and the new recruit on the shop floor—an effective operationalism which of necessity, for its effectiveness, is not inquisitive. The training programme is not excusable by deficiency, but is a concerted attempt to sterilize whatever deinstitutionalised learning has occurred for the students since leaving schools. Voicing concern over the problem of education within the academic seminars and tutorials is of little value because these rapidly become a forum for providing student-teachers with defences against recalcitrant pupils. (A sociologist at Moray House was approached by the Local Education Authority to investigate the truancy of a large number of its pupils who had been forced to stay at school for an extra year by the raising of the school-leaving age. The brief for the sociologist was couched in the expectation that ways would be found to get these pupils back to school. Naturally the pupils were not in a position to employ a sociologist to provide reasons as to why they should not return to school.)

Yet the continuing breakdown of a working relationship between a pupil and his school/teacher would suggest that these problems do need some critical consideration. What better place than in the institutions that provide teachers for schools? The institution that is unable to cope with a diverse range of points of view seems to fly in the face of what generally might be called "education". The inflexible institution concerns itself with admistrating: an entrenchment of administrative formalism.

Alongside that sort of institutionalism . . .

I had a crit lesson one of those days when I was at the school. The tutor sat through this lesson and the kids were quite rowdy—there was a problem with the number of rulers; they were fighting each other for the rulers. The dilemma was that I was standing talking to somebody about what they were doing. Should you stop talking to the kid, and thereby suggest the noise was more important than what he had to say, or ignore the noise and continue? It wasn't desks thrown around the room, just two kids tugging at a ruler—it didn't intrude enough to think about interceding, so I just ignored it. Then I heard the woman who had come down from the college say "This is not the sort of thing we want in this classroom." It was unwarranted that she should have suggested this was something we didn't want to take place. If it had been more prominent than what the kid was saying, then I suppose I'd have said "Stop shouting" or "Stop interrupting everybody." That went on . . . and for the crit at the end I took the tape recorder in . . . the tutor makes out a form which contains a criticism of the lesson, which the student teacher is expected to sign to acknowledge that the tutor has attended the lesson. Now the form doesn't contain a qualification to that effect, so a signature could be taken as signifying agreement with the criticism made. In order to counteract that bureaucracy I said I wanted the tape recorder to be on if any elaboration of the points in the "General Performance Rating" were to be made. She said she wasn't going to talk. That went on; we argued about this business until she remarked "I don't think there's a rule in the college saying you're allowed to use a tape recorder." She seemed to think it was an affront to the dignity of a teacher and the relationship between a student and his tutor. And I said unless there is a rule to the effect that it is prohibited then there is no law (nullem crimen sine lege) . . . She suggested there should be a rule actually permitting the use of tape recorders before you could use them.

The predominant relationship between student art teachers and pupils in schools appears to be one of appropriation. It is a standard feature of that training college that teachers are "assessed" in terms of the "work" of "their" pupils. This quasi-Leviathan doesn't even approach a notion of collective consciousness. Rather it mirrors bureaucracy—a particularly unfortunate anthropomorphic metaphor for the mind (brain?) and the limbs. As is consonant with idealism, reality is the province of the former. Decisions are taken by the mind/teacher concerning the organization of the raw matter (sic) assembled by the limbs/pupils. Given such one-way traffic, it has to remain unclear what sense of identity can be said to attach to the productions "of" the pupils. The notion of "their" work seems to be adventitious, or at best a fringe benefit: a guarantor of multiplicity /pluralism to be taken advantage of. That is, an inbuilt feature of a system built around the decision making primacy of an individual, namely the teacher. Obviously, standard notions of (dialectical) equality are going to have to be tempered in such contexts. But the scandal arises not as a consequence of what is probably a necessary deviation from a standard egalitarian model, so much as the characteristic self-image of unproblematicity attaching to the guarantors of the situation. Liberal aspirations —providing a broad range of materials, etc.— are going to be useless (counterfeit piety?) so long as they reside as superstructure on an unquestioned base of aesthetic principle: a belief that it is possible to order, to organize, to judge, to identify products in isolation from the intentionality out of which they emerge, in terms of *a priori* canons of e.g. taste. It is so much the worse for this model that this cannot be held out as a *logical* a priority; it is merely an *historically inherited* set of norms.

To assume that, educationally, there is anything worthwhile or advantageous in conventionalising a teacher training institution upon at least the most formal aspects of a school is grossly derisive of what the students have done since they themselves left school. Moray House does not naturally enter into criticism as part of its learning programme. Passing the recalcitrant buck up the administrative ladder is approaching the problem of dialogue with the view that warts should be excorcised, not seen as the result of an ailing body. (A learning context is a critical context; that's how what is learned is embedded within what has already been learned.)

Rather than being post graduate in its approach to learning—to do with our roles in society and so on: the role of questioning, critique and research; rather than having the teaching course map onto those erstwhile post-graduate activities it is mapped back onto its object level: the school. Some elision has taken place—they have their identity, their functions, and their self-image affected by the institutions that they penetrate at the level of labour. Those work places tend to feed back behaviourally into the constitution of the training colleges. For all the vaunted liberality, the operative term is training, not learning: the confinements of the job specifications inherent in training; the performance of an individual in a limited time with a tendency to measure that individual's capacity in gross terms (products, behaviour etc.).

Setting this against a background of things at Newport Art College in Wales . . . taking education, the relationship of lecturers to pupils as opposed to the relationship of student teachers to pupils . . . the problems seems to fit here too. There is an analogy between what seems to be the case in institutions like teacher training colleges, where there is a relatively definite goal, and the Diploma of Art and Design Colleges where a more open-ended concept of work is carried on (which lecturers strive to ameliorate, making piecemeal adjustments to this notion of on-going work). It may be unclear what the precise sense of goal is in teacher training colleges, but that doesn't affect the similarity of the colleges' dilemma: there is no mechanism, no arena for the students to sort out some critical relation to their work. There doesn't seem to be any institutionalised way of working out how students can arrive critically at any sense of "ought" in what they do.

I went to a lecture at Newport Art College on The Role of The Critic. The problems of that lecture surfaced on two levels of wrong-headedness, and it seems they are sufficiently ramifiable to act as a nexus, or as a propadeutic for a critique of The College. The two levels are "theory" and "practice". Practice first: what happened (standardly enough) was that for an hour and a half my role was that of consumer: of a taxonomy of critical modes. Followed by the lights going up, followed by a request for queries, followed by silence. In the face of an hour and a half monologue you could expect half an hour's dialogue to progress from shell shock to a more ordered state. So I began to frame a few remarks, rather discursively groping towards an adequate articulation of, and expression of dissent from, what I considered to be an invidious embedded epistemology. Before getting that far it was revealed that I had better get to the point as the lecturer had to get to his train in a minute and there was no time for anything further . . . A lecture with no time alloted for discussion, which was something that seemed to be taken for granted by most people. Consequently I never got beyond a quasi viscious registration of dissent about the content; and nothing at all beyond amazement at the form—viz the belief states of those involved in its organization, and its implications for the structure of The College.

Quite apart from any general questions over the format of reading from prepared notes etc., the objection is to the concept of learning /education/relation to information which lies behind setting up a situation which is devoid of any dialogical facility. It is as a symptom of ideology that this is worth dwelling on, as an assumption that the concept of (a bit of) information is a starter in human *(Geisteswissenschaften)* contexts. This overlays two assurances: (i) that it is possible to provide a descriptive picture of such contexts, which is in essentials unquestionable, though admitting presumably of relatively peripheral "adjustment" (ii) that those in the audience are getting on with something sufficiently trouble free to be able to "apply" this "information" in accordance with some intuitive semi-criterial bridging notion of e.g. "interest".

That is to say the relation of individuals to information is conceived as unproblematic—beyond quasi-statistical and/or psychological difficulties. The panorama of what goes before them is treated as naturally relatable and as equivalently unproblematic as the activity from which they are supposed to interpret what goes on. There is no countenancing that that relationship could be problem-laden and not governed by simple means-end teleology. It is not really thought about at all beyond a natural expectation that other people do other things, such that the relation to information is one of witnessing. No social sense of relation, only a natural sense. Given those terms, it is not consistent that self-awareness can enter at all. That much seems derivable simply from the structure. It is precisely that consistency which is so objectionable, i.e., the professed theory of orthodoxy is a good mirror of orthodox practice. It follows that a far reaching critique of ideology is required, since it is not merely a particular theory, but the generalised picture of theory—its function, its relation to doing something (practice), the (apparently) complete absense of any entertainment of reflexivity—which is as it were the "object". One isn't going to get anywhere by pursuing expectations internal to the model (playing the game) or by expecting ones own expectations—embedded of necessity in a different model—to be fulfilled (i.e., they *won't* see the point). Without a balancing trick on the interface of required generality and necessitated particularity you might as well stay silent—which is going in the direction of talk about "ways of life", performatory aspects, the function of rhetoric, etc.

In post-graduate departments, the difficulty is in some respects the exact opposite of that often encountered in schools. There, the situation is often, as it were, one of educational underprivilege. It is not unusual for children with a stake in the school art department to be there having been sorted out as "inadequate" in some—usually intellectual—way, by the incumbent education system; whereas one encounters in a post-graduate department, by definition, the institutionally successful, a position no less tenaciously adhered to and re-inforced than the results of more standardly enshrined career paths.
Any open ended-ness that some teachers might foster in schools can't but look like (paternalistic) benevolence, because the sense of what is being relaxed is an informational factor which only the teacher has access to. The pupils' position does not allow for the development of a critique of choices, given the overriding academic extensions of the educational bureaucracy. The strong product bias accentuates institutional process to the debasement of praxis. This leads to an enforcement of something like pedagogic epocentricity, and the spread of "discipline" from its penal to its overtly Victorian, moralistic, self-denying, Protestant-ethic connotations. "Self-discipline" comes to mean the pupil shares the teacher's values . . . a slipping away of visions of a dialectical or moral education—away from the possibility of discovering or making sense of, or re-articulating what one is doing in relation to the rest of the world—in the direction of an operationalism. And slipping into an instrumentally ordered crypto teacher/pupil hierarchy, in some particular context, seems only symptomatic of what goes on throughout the education spectrum.

Which can be traced in a general sense to a pervasively fostered and rehearsed pastiche of positivism concerning the nature of oneself as an individual, as a point of reference, and one's relationship to working.

In a slide lecture a comparison was made between the work of some young children and a Matisse drawing of a woman. Both drawings were labelled "expressive". Clearly, only quite gratuitous morphological comparisons can hold between these drawings. In terms of the drawing operations (work) concerned, the child's ability to make marks was limited, while in Matisse the reductionism proceeds from a conscious decision to limit the available calligraphic vocabulary. However we might treat "expressiveness", it is not about marks in isolation but about the *modus operandi*; the *doing* not the result. The history of the *doing* was naturally different for both. The obvious implication is the futility of value-judgements formed in terms of the one and applied onto the other.

An implication of the above is that there is a deliberate attempt to retard the child's "language acquisition" in drawing, which seems to run counter to the pressures put on the child in other parts of the school curricula. The term "creativity" is being used in teacher training colleges such that one function of art in schools is the controlled release of chaos ("excess energy"): an escape from rationalism. Two ways to go: encourage the naiveté to remain (or rather, don't deter it); encourage enquiry into method and vocabulary so that the child's activity can be historically aware. It seems that so-called "bad work" (i.e. work that is not like Matisse, etc.) results from a floundering attempt at making sense of doing art against a background of doing subjects which more actively go on, and are (possibly misleadingly) goal-directed.

Can we attempt to attack statements which allegedly come from "twenty years experience" and "knowing what I am doing"? Trivial incidents, tenuously related to the general idea of removing yourself from the picture . . . seeing yourself as engaged in something which is in all essentials external to you, so that you can order it, evaluate it, describe it, from a position which is not embedded within it: neutral and external. *That* ideology is inconsistent.

Like that lecture: it might be worth taking that embedded epistemology as an exemplar. We had an adequate enough (?), though selective, survey of critical modes, issuing in a tripartite generalization of possibilities, viz. historico-contextual, subjective (Diderot *et al.*), formalist. It doesn't matter much about the historical accuracy or otherwise, of that. What is important is the absence of the utterer from the picture, and what that implies—namely a quasi-sociological aspiration towards descriptivity. This in turn implies the lack of a picture of (the ideology of) the concrete situation, such that one is not in the "community of equal and rational observers" but faced by a group, the nature of whose being-in-the-world (as regards the nature of the activity they are pursuing) is itself largely a function of the ascendency of one of the critical modes distinguished. That is one instance of a kind of inconsistency. Another is even more brute (but still a function of that spurious objectivity: or is it just bloodless?). By criticizing the critics of the Armory Show for not picking out as valuable the items that confronted them, and for not understanding the contemporary art, then failing to understand remarks addressed to him, the lecturer exhibited utter purblindness to the implications of context. *That* seems to be the basic issue behind these authoritarian posturings we're dragging up here: context. The point is that quasi-descriptive quasi-historical models don't map the concrete situation. The ideas described are abstractions, and not identifiable as the objects of faith of the audience, by the audience. In a model ignoring commitment, ideological embedding remains cardboard. Moreover, niceties aside, it begins to look like a straightforward abrogation of responsibility, *inter alia*, the responsibility to sort out the limits of one's world-picture (if that makes sense). On the other hand, that is expecting the fish to understand the water. The point is, an account of such relations (basically, of some individual to some information, mediated by a notion of his "activity") isn't accessible from empirico-positivistic bases which is not an argument *in vacuo* of course, but a distinct thesis on the nature of such relations. (That's why we can start talking about responsibility etc.). The difficulty is getting someone whose theory (in this case, orthodoxy) abrogates the possibility of their seeing X, to see X.

It's rarely entertained (career preservation?) that sometimes "we" (lecturers/teachers) might be the slate, and "they" (students/pupils) might be capable of writing. The relationship that the bureaucracy entertains, being non-dialectical, must be didactically inclined. But the inconsistencies don't come out as the mappings occur (or it's a question of expectation); the inconsistencies are there, but the more institutionalised you are the less noticeable they become. (The limiting case being, I suppose, the orthodoxy we're going on about, where they are in the nature of the case not so much unnoticed as unnoticeable: literally out of reach of those who promote them.).

Further, the education system is a reflection of the society in which it is embedded. These institutions are not enclaves of a dying epistemology. The consistency of the educational institutions with broader societal structures—particularly the consumer ethic—has devalued any ideological and axiological inquisitiveness, encouraging an ontological self-aggrandisement: Les Chemins de la Liberté succumbing to The Self-Images of The Age. The hierarchs' utterances are at one with the institution because the hierarchs are the embodiment of the institutional norms (an institutional tautology?).

There is a psychological inducement, emotively careerist, to judge heavily on one's values, and if the values don't fit, to stiffen them up to meet the requirement of pontification. The teacher training context is an attempt to promote a shallow commonality of value-surface, a sense of self-importance generated by the sense of being privileged or specialist. Strangely, all the moral/axiological stuff is not positively covered: student teachers are expected to make those jumps from the position of allegedly knowing something. All that "knowing" might boil down to is a natural organisational ability, trivially available to teachers and not pupils because they have a retainable control over the immediate environment and its objects (the classroom and its materials). What we're asking is how come so few have doubts about the transition to privilege, a transition which denies the problems of teaching someone and is never outweighed by applying privilege benevolently. It's far from a context offering scope for revision. There are demands for putting aside notions like "self-doubt" for the sake of gross educational catchphrases like "keeping on top of them", "one step ahead". For fucks sake can't they see this is likely to promote alienation? It means you start bandying around the institutional values as though they were skills.

"To show up the sterility of the purely analytic approach to naturalism we need only turn to Sartre's treatment of the same phenomenon under the name of "bad faith": through novels as well as through theoretical works, Sartre shows in detail how the premise "I must act according to my (socially defined) nature' is the very foundation of the bourgeois ethic, which since it serves interests other than its own is obliged to be, in Sartre's own words, "sham from beginning to end". "Ideology and the Human Sciences: Some comments on the role of reification in psychology and psychiatry," David Ingleby in *Counter Course*. Penguin Education Specials.)

We suspect that the reasons for going to art college are largely negative, which presumably affects the generally self-oriented crypto psychological tenor of a lot of the so-called "work" that goes on, and which militates against any hint of sociological structuring. That's usually left, at best, as a contingent rider which, by tenuous derivation, may be expected to "show" itself: and that's just not sufficient for even a mildly tractable/useful sense of praxis. Such bases look on the transformation of dissent into critique as at best adventitious. The pressures towards a career in the art college context appear to be less well-formed than in other areas. "Career" itself is not a neutral term, as it is bound up as a function of a particular world view; it is a value-term about how you are going to live as well as what you are going to do (life projections). This isn't a cavil against the absence of any sort of career concept, it is dismay at the absence of any structured sortings of "anti-career". It is as much a fault of the art college in defaulting its responsibility toward de-institutionalism as it is of the teaching college in riding roughshod over the humanistic education at least potentially available within a college of art. It's a fault of their humanism relying for the most part on laissez-faire individualism that fractures any attempts at collective responsibility. This is the liberalism which has been "lost" through its appropriation by capitalist structure(s).

Galashiels, Selkirkshire.

COUNTERFEIT INTERVIEW

PRESTON HELLER

When the man who has authority to say it says, "Go!" and when he who has not authority says, "Go!"—then indeed the saying "Go" along with its content is identical; appraised aesthetically, if you will, they are both equally well said, but the authority makes the difference.

Kierkegaard

Heller— Last year, I dropped into a painting studio at Lehman College here in New York, and listened to a conversation between a teacher I knew and one of his students. They were talking about a painting the student was working on. The teacher, Roberts, said the student wasn't painting, but drawing, because he was only using black and white paints. He claimed that to paint or make a painting, you had to use colors. The student vaguely appealed for his "freedom" as a student, but that didn't change Roberts' mind a bit. So as an appeal to something other than the "authority" of the *teacher/student relationship*--I talked about Stella's work in the late fifties. Roberts wasn't buying that either: he insisted *they* were drawings too. That was amazing, since Stella himself said he was trying to *eliminate* drawing completely. The thing went on for about a half hour and I left but Roberts hadn't given up any ground. I just found it strange—that *Stella's work wasn't brought up by either side in the argument, but by an outsider.* What was the student supposed to "learn" from that argument except not much more than—"Roberts is the teacher and I'm the student—he'll talk and I'll listen."

Stafford— *That kind of thing happens all the time. And it's fairly obvious why this guy Roberts, and a lot of other teachers, want to perpetuate their roles as teachers. But, why do you think a lot of students go along with this?*

Heller— Maybe it's the threat of a bad grade or, if they're in graduate school, of hurting their chances for a good job recommendation. But for most students I know, this is only a *strategy*: they're only interested in going along with the grading system, so they can outwit it. Actually, I think most students do outwit their school's bureaucratic structure *in general*: everyone knows which courses are easy, which teachers grade easily, which teachers have something to say (that is, they are able to distinguish among "authorities"), and so on. Certainly when I was in graduate school, and I don't think it's that much different now, many of the students I knew were just looking for the security of an MFA, which was supposed to lead to a good job. There was also the fact that graduate school was an extra two years in which you could work—usually without the responsibility of an outside job. In any case, we didn't associate ourselves so much with the school as with the art world at large, you know, galleries, the Museum of Modern Art, *Artforum*. By doing this we had some success in escaping the authority inherent in the teacher/student relationship, grades, etc.

Stafford— *So are you saying that by outwitting the school bureaucracy, students pretty much escape authority?*

Heller— I know I thought I had, and so did my friends. I didn't care much that my teachers didn't understand my impressions of Morris and Andre, I knew I was "on my way to becoming an artist." What I slowly began to realize was that gallery shows or a show at the Modern or an article in *Artforum*—essentially the concept of being an artist—was just as authoritarian as most of my teachers—more so, I guess, since all my teachers, good or bad, were trying to "educate" me about the art world made up of those galleries, museums, *Art in America, Artforum*, etc. In the end, my teachers were victims as well as perpetrators of a particular kind of authority structure. And to the degree that my friends and I followed, unselfconsciously, the implicit precepts of the galleries and museums and media, we remained victims and perpetrators as well.

Stafford— *Could you be more specific about this "authority structure"?*

Heller— Let me answer that question a bit indirectly right now. I think it's important to realize that schools, in part, reproduce the material conditions of production common to the artworld in general. I mean, what kind of courses do you normally see offered in art schools?

Stafford— *Well usually you have painting, drawing, sculpture, design, photography, film, and maybe something like "new forms".*

Heller— Right—and a lot of students ignore these divisions and actively do "mixed-Media" or what-have-you. Unfortunately, at the same time they ignore the extent to which such strategies play right into the hands of *technological* innovation—at the cost of questioning anything like why students in Toledo try to copy New York art, or why *Artforum* is under lock and key at Rhode Island School of Design—while *Art in America* sits on the shelf and collects dust. That's the kind of thing I'm talking about when I mention an "authority structure": our art world institutions—and this involves them all—have co-opted our ability to determine and/or transform our *own* histories, our own language and culture. After all, "art" is a system of meaning, and meaning isn't produced by artists alone, but by a complex of social, that is, art institutions. So you have to accept the fact that the production of art is largely controlled by those institutions which manage cultural power. And quite clearly, it's to their advantage to maintain this cultural power.

Stafford— *That's understandable. But what I want to know is how—in what ways—this institutional power actually "co-opts" our histories and language, as you said.*

Heller— It happens any number of ways. For one thing, it's quite amazing, to me anyway, that most students, for example, somehow make a distinction between "grades" and "being written up in *Artforum*", or between "grades" and "having a one-person show in Köln". I mean, I can't see much difference—really. In the end, they're all substitute gratifications. It comes down to students speaking the language of artworld success and never viewing the indoctrination process as anything other than "natural". As a matter of fact, I'd bet that many students feel self-righteous about escaping the oppressiveness of schools and making it in the art world. What's even more important, perhaps, is that the work, the actual work of these students-trying-to-become-artists is likewise the result of co-optation. How could it be anything else under the circumstances? "Art world success" is hardly what you'd call a "neutral" notion. And I don't think I have to rehash all the tacit alliances existing between modernism and American imperialism in general or between modernism and capitalism. I mean, formalistic, abstract paintings are without a doubt, safe decorations for American embassies, ITT offices, Chase Manhattan banks and so on.

Stafford— *So you're not really saying that students, and subsequently artists, never fulfill inner needs, but that those inner "needs" are very specifically, that is, institutionally defined.*

Heller— Right, right, I didn't mean to be misleading there. I think what we're dealing with is a "false subjectivity"—which is to say that to one degree or another we've *all* internalized values which reflect institutional self-interest and self-perpetuation—rather than some notion of "authentic subjectivity" (whatever that may mean). Naturally, there's a very good *reason* for this internalization, insofar as our financial security—which comes down in the end to a chance to eat and survive—is to a great extent, often, in the hands of these institutions. And this is where the situation really becomes absurd. After all, institutions are made up of people, and presumably the reason for having social institutions is so they can serve *us;* instead we end up serving *them.* Sometimes I get the feeling that even if the Modern sold all its artworks, say, it would in some way remain as an institution—perpetuating its board of directors as an ideological body. Worse than that is that most of us have become *comfortable* with this situation: anyone challenging art objects or questioning the market system, or exposing the cold war-armed neutrality of most art critical language, *armed* neutrality—is perceived as rocking the boat.

Stafford— *What you seem to be saying is that we're all, or that most of us anyway, relate to our world more or less as it is given to us. That means, I guess, we relate to each other in about the same way and . . .*

Heller— That's a good point. The way we communicate with each other is just incredibly bound up in the prevailing authority structure. That really hit me when I was in grad school. In

my last year I was given a course to teach as part of my fellowship requirement. I thought it would be a good chance to open things up at the school. Unfortunately it turned out to be pretty bad. I went in there with some idea of breaking down the student/teacher gap, trying to show them that my problems and theirs overlapped a lot. Basically I tried to undermine my authority. Maybe I threw too much on them or expected too much, I don't know; in any case I only ended up undermining my credibility. It was a classic failure to communicate. When I didn't undermine my authority (as teacher for example), I ended up reinstituting the standard type teacher/student thing, you know, an extreme passivity on their part. What was really screwed up about the whole thing was that they really preferred to have a guest speaker take up the whole time—with a little lecture or something—rather than talk among themselves. I didn't expect the former and the latter kind of sociality just isn't encouraged. But shit, it's not only them. I think a lot of the problems came up because of my inability to relativise the course to the students. My ability to act, or my *in*ability to act, was really depressing. It was a pretty painful way of learning, for all of us I suppose.

Stafford— I've noticed that it seems as though the further up the educational ladder you go, the more rigid the students become.

Heller— That's true most of the time; I mean the desparate attempt to refine a "personal" style isn't much more than another form of psychological ossification in that it almost becomes an end in itself. And it's interesting that a personal style is paradoxically represented by the art world as an *ex*pression of individuality rather than a *re*pression of individuality, in the long run, anyway. But that reminds me of another situation which connects up with our earlier discussion about grades as well as with this thing about authoritarian communication. In graduate school, according to the grade sheet, I was a good student; according to the department that was controversial at best. I think it was sometime in the second semester of my first year that I was approached by one of my teachers. He told me, in so many words, that I would get an A for the course, but "please don't show up any more in class." He clearly implied that he didn't want what he called "different" work "disrupting" the class. If I wanted to do plaster casting that was fine, then I'd be welcome to attend—otherwise forget it. In the second semester of the second year, the first professor I approached with my idea for that course happened to mention in passing that I didn't have to do "all that", and that if I never even showed up for the class he'd be happy to handle it himself and of course there wouldn't be any problem with me getting my A. Damn, there are more examples. But this type of behavior was topped off when it came time for the one-person show. Now you'd expect that anyone who has received all A's in school wouldn't or couldn't have any problem getting practically a unanimous "yes" vote for the graduation show. You know, approval of the work for the show essentially amounts to graduating—if you don't have your show, you don't graduate, right. I passed the committee by one vote—if one faculty member had changed his mind—I wouldn't have graduated—very strange. When you get right down to it, teachers are willing to play the grade game too, in their case sacrificing one aspect of their own bureaucratic authority—in order to maintain the more important authority of teaching an entrenched ideology. The trouble is a lot of people might not see it this way; they might think these teachers, at least the two who asked me not to appear, were doing me a favor and/or were far-out teachers who really understood how "arbitrary" grades were. I suspect it's not uncommon for people to concentrate more on symbol targets, like grades or the Pentagon or a First National City Bank, while ignoring the real problems of bureaucracy and institutionalization.

Stafford— . . . this amounts to the perpetuation of a system . . .

Heller— . . . I don't know if I'd use the word system, necessarily.

Stafford— What I mean is there seems to be a tendency towards increased limitation as you move up the ladder of institutional success: you mentioned teachers and curricula being limited and I mentioned students being limited. It seems to me that this gets back to your notion of schools reproducing the means of production of the rest of the artworld—at least if I understood your argument, and I think I do. So what I'd like to do is have you talk about that some more and have you talk about the notion of students, artists and teachers as "workers" which you mentioned yesterday.

Heller— Well, speaking of that phrase "reproducing the means of production" . . . I'm not sure I like it, in the way I used it. I mean, schools came off as somehow *separate* from the rest of the art world; and what I'm trying to say is that *all* art institutions, seek to reproduce, that is perpetuate, themselves as institutions. Reproducing the means of production often comes down to not much less than reproducing the structure of authority which gives "production" meaning in the first place. In addition, this means reproducing the "skills" necessary for maintaining these institutions—so that artists have to be produced and teachers and administrators, and students, and so on. That's where the notion of "workers" comes in, because in a sense the labor of students, artists and teachers is only a commodity. It's something to be traded for institutional security, that is, financial security. I mean, if you're dealing in institutionalized success or institutionalized ideologies, in international shows or formalism, you aren't doing much more than "putting in your time." Questions like "how was your season this year" (financial success) are hardly uncommon among artists. But I brought up the notion of "workers" also because I'm interested in the possibility of self-mediation, in undermining my own and others' institutionalization, and there's a history of that in workers' movements. So in some sense I'm using it metaphorically, to suggest some historical connections. Of course, you don't have to recognize the circumstances for what they are for them to have an effect on you. Look, if someone were to talk to you about factory workers as examples of alienated labor you wouldn't give them much of an argument, right?

Stafford— Probably not.

Heller— But when you say that an art student or an artist does alienated labor, the most common reaction—especially among those in the artworld might be something like "How can you say that? Art is one of the few places left where a person can really express themselves, you know, artistic freedom. Just look at all the different things people do."—that kind of crap.

Stafford— That sounds like a fairly standard reply . . .

Heller— But what *are* the possibilities? Do the conditions exist in which a student, for example, can make any 'authentic' choices? It doesn't seem like it, at least not if all the alternatives are institutionally co-opted. We're only left in reified social relations of production, which constitute our activities as alienated activites, serving the purposes of institutional production. Does that make sense? I don't know. It seems like you try to be aware of the 'authority'—you have a strange look on your face—you know I'm not saying that all authority is bad. But part of the problem is constituting a viable or workable construction for authority.

Stafford— It seems to me the problem is that if you try to break down 'institutional' authority you run the risk of countering it with an alternative that might very well end up as an institutionalization itself. How does one as an authority, in a position of authority, maintain credibility without becoming oppressive? The notion of undermining your own authority has a lot to do with being self-conscious that in certain situations the aspects of authority aren't separable or separate *from that situation, they're part of the problem.*

Heller— Yes, but it's not only a question of what you're doing and how you see yourself doing it, but also how other people see you doing it—how they relate to you, that is, how you're recieved. What you represent might be as important as what you're presenting.

Stafford—Well, local issues, and I would take 'authority' to be a local issue in the sense that we're dealing with specific situations and people as well as behaviors, well local issues aren't generalizeable beyond a certain point. Questions come up like—"How does this affect my work in that I am a 'New York' artist?" So I believe it's necessary to undermine certain aspects *of your authority if you can, without losing credibility. So your goal as a 'teacher' wouldn't be to convert students to your way of thinking, but to have them develop their own.*

Heller— Yes, but it's not like falling off a cliff, *you know, it's much more like trying to help them to try* to have their own way of thinking: anyway, we *do* seem to be paralyzed in the face of authoritarian communication. You're supposing they'd react positively to potential self-mediation. But when I had that class to teach in graduate school, the prospect of an "unstable" situation made them very uncomfortable, as I said. And then there was my own inability to do something about this situation. Also I'm not talking about only undermining teacher/student communication. I was in a couple

of classes, where the teacher didn't come over as an authority at all, at least not intentionally. But the upshot of that was that students were "freer" to discuss which part of the entrenched ideology they sided with. There were a lot of arguments, for example, between the New Realists and the Conceptualists. In the end the major difference between this kind of class and a more authoritarian one is that you generally talked about more *recent* art history, in fact there were some field trips to the galleries in Soho, and we weren't being lectured to. Of course this was a step in the right direction, but hardly a large one; and even this didn't happen very much.

Stafford— In a funny way, that relates to the fact that in art schools there isn't much dialogue about work. . . . I mean there's very little dialogue about work in progress or about work which has already been done. I suppose that's expected and perhaps even necessary given the competitive atmosphere. It's important though, in that it reflects several problems. There aren't just teacher/student problems, there are student/student problems as well. It seems to me this lack of dialogue among students *insures isolating them from one another. It certainly prevents any notion of groups (collectivization instead of unionization) from arising. In an odd way, the bureaucratic structure of classes* forces *students to see each other at least occasionally, instead of holing up in their studios all the time. It seems like there were a number of students whose work I only saw in crit sessions, and they mine—I mean that was really the only time we could discuss it. It was as if it was too difficult to get together other than on these occasions.*

Heller— Are you talking about students organizing themselves, like in groups? Groups can be taken in several ways, you know? I mean, you don't autornatically improve your educational situation just hy forming a group. I guess you realized that when you mentioned collectivization instead of unionization . . . .

Stafford— And I don't mean the sense of group in which you have an exclusive membership either, where it's tightly knit. It has to do more, for me, with sociality, interaction, context—that's how I'm referring to it actually. But getting back to your discussion about students as laborers and the production relationship, and maybe I'm just putting it all in my own words . . . but this guy Slater talks about individualism a lot. He points out that the trend in the West has been away from a relatedness between people and an organic connection between nature and environment and against seeing yourself as part of a larger society or societal networks. The emphasis has been or rather is on individuality and narcissism, that is, seeing yourself as different and unconnected and individual from everyone else. Technology has accentuated it, especially the division of labor. And I guess this is where his notion of individualism fits in with MacPherson's "possessive individualism". That is, in a capitalist market, the only resource most people have to sell is their labor. Consequently we all begin to treat our bodies as commodities, something to produce labor, which allows us to eat. Our body, and our thought, becomes an object—even to ourselves. But at the same time we feel we own our bodies—we might not own much else, but at least that. The trouble is, this leads to a premium on owning things, because it's seen to increase individual power. It also means, in effect, that we're always mediating our perceptions of ourselves on the basis of specific market requirements. Basically the collectivity of people in the feudal economic structure was replaced by individuals relating to each other as separate, competing *units when capitalism arose.*

Heller— . . . students not talking to each other . . . they *are* competing for entrance into the same market. I guess it also explains why most artists' unions, now, are devoted to economic issues. That is artists band together to increase their financial security—they rarely question the nature of that security. It's kind of like manipulating the bureaucracy (grades) to get your degree, ignoring how much that degree itself constitutes a kind of institutionalization. I mean, after all, a degree is hardly the road to "freedom", is it? Not if you accept . . .

Stafford— Yeah . . . The market divides people up, as competing units, and people begin to feel that happiness merely means manipulating the system in order to get a bigger *slice of the pie. Isn't that what bourgeois notions of power are all about? You know, except for unions—and as you said, they aren't real contradictions—we have a cult of individualism today approaching the absurd. The 'requirement' that students develop a "unique" style only perpetuates them and their labor as commodities (of course, there are other factors). So, the more all of us feel we have to be unique, the more removed we become from each other and the more dissatisfied we become. Don't misunderstand me, I am not looking for the end of individualism, that seems a bit ridiculous and I admit what I've said is a bit simplified and certainly partial, but I think the whole notion of "possessive individualism" helps explain how art institutions prevent collective action for social . . .*

Heller— What about people who read Marx late at night, alone. Even separate people can form a loose union. It can come out "in work".

Stafford— Without some sort of explicit *sociality, I doubt it. I mean, even a "Marxist" working alone in the artworld, generally ends up being institutionalized—look at Daniel Buren. Part of the reason for a notion of non-institutionalized* sociality *is that you begin to develop a sympathetic, non-alienated sense of* audience. *In other words, you can begin to talk to each other not through institutionalized channels like galleries and media—which tend to make you a producer, while requiring, in a sense, that your audience be a consumer—but* directly. *In a way,* everyone *can become a producer of sorts, in a way,* everyone *can contribute. I mean, this isn't saying anything more than what you were trying to do with your class in graduate school. The problem with operating alone is that almost inevitably your audience ends up being your institutions, and not much else. You can take the idea of developing a notion of group praxis as meaning you're trying to develop a cultural "pocket" of sorts, where you might be able to, in part,* get around *institutionalization. In a way, it comes down to us having to* teach each other *how to behave differently towards* each other. *Anything else would just be the imposition of a set of values, perhaps those of one or two people, on the rest of us. In otherwords, we would have a standard teaching (lecture) situation, a situation many Marxists are prone to themselves—by the way. In any case, there probably aren't many art students or artists or teachers who do read Marx late at night, or any other time for that matter.*

Heller— Well, actually the Art Workers Coalition cooperated for something other than financial reasons.

Stafford— Yeah, but you know what the problem there was: they never addressed each others' work—sure they went on about capitalism and the Vietnam war but never saw the connections (at least publicly) between those events and their formalistic work. Like most artists, they were assuming that the production of art was exclusively in the hands of the artist: "If I say it's art, it's art". But as we said before, the productive process is spread out, throughout the institutional system.

Heller— Well, when I taught that course in grad school, I came up against what you could call a 'distrust' of critical theories. It was a problem. The way I set up the course was quite different from other courses in the department. I mean, there was a lot of reading from other fields, and it was set up for the most part as a discussion group—where participation (dialogue) and thinking, as opposed to what's defined as "doing", were very important . . .

Stafford— Are you saying that talking or dialogue isn't doing?

Heller— No, you misunderstood. What I meant is that "doing" something in an art classroom gen-



erally means you'll stretch your canvas and you'll prime it or you'll do some figure drawings in that class or something like that. So I'm not negating thinking-as-"doing" but supporting a different notion than the common idea of "doing" in an art classroom.

Stafford– Alright . . .

Heller– . . . there's a distrust of critical theories in art schools. I was prepared for some of that. But it was very different being in the position of "authority". I guess I realized a bit better to what extent both students and faculty aren't supposed to make connections which might allow them to better understand things like the context of art. There's no distrust of history, say, but few people follow through on the social context of that history–

Stafford– Like what the cotton growers' interests are, or the multi million dollar art business–even just in raw materials alone every year. And don't forget the "greatest investment opportunity of your lifetime". I think the kind of connections you're talking about might be something like the relationship between these and art schools' stake in the status quo.

Heller– Right, conditions like that. In general there's a lot of value put on "no causality". Like what's right there in front of you, but separated from the rest of your life. You know, situations where people can't talk about human relationships in the process of production–in other words, can't develop a language for talking about it. It's hard to communicate about the material conditions of society–the meaning of our production becomes repressed. And in the process, a notion of "authentic" production becomes an even more repressed ideal.

Stafford– I think that a belief in "expertise" becomes a replacement for a critical theory– and that's a learned response. I mean, you can relate it to the acquisition of those "skills" we talked about. You go into a sculpture class, for example, and have someone for a teacher who probably shows somewhere or has shown somewhere, and for many students that is the mark of "making it" and I guess in some sense they can distinguish the degree to which you are an "expert" by the gallery you show with–you know, you're in a higher bracket with Castelli than you are with Benedek (who?). So as a student you start off your relationship in a sense looking to that person, for example, in a certain way. And, yes it is certainly true that many students reject this notion of "expert"–in relation to say the instructor for the course, they even kick them out of their cubicle. A total rejection! Then they go ahead and make Robert Rymans or Mangold's and so on. I mean, in a way you either "learn" to "believe" or you fail–in any case acceptance isn't accidental.

Heller– What's the alternative?

Stafford– Well, dropping out of school is one . . .

Heller– But that doesn't necessarily do much to deal with the problems of institutionalization and authority (history). You see, I don't only mean the alternatives that exist, but the ones that *don't* exist. Part of institutional "opacity" is the very fact that we just don't have the "tools" to sort much out–

Stafford– So we're in an "institutionalization" of power relations. Now, in their present construction, then, educational institutions–as one more "institutionalization" of power relations–coerce people by blocking what amounts to almost all forms of self-comprehension (consciousness?) . . .

Heller– You could say that. But, what about the idea of it being a student/student problem?

Stafford– I think It's been implied in the last twenty minutes or so. I was in a photography class once, where I convinced the teacher to let me do something with film instead of photographs. Now, I admit that I didn't know exactly what I was doing. I mean I had an idea for what I wanted to do physically and the work turned out fine, that is, technically okay. But I made a bad mistake. I presented it as not really "knowing" what I'd done.

I couldn't mount any kind of defense for my work, in terms of modernist/formalist criteria. In fact it was a Baldessari/Morris-type thing, though I didn't know it at the time; I mean at least I wasn't self-consciously aware of any influence. But I made it worse by not admitting from the beginning that I just couldn't formalize what I was doing–it was just "highly intuitive". What I'm saying is that if I was pinned down, which I ultimately was, I'd have to say that I just wasn't sure of what I was doing.

I was subjected to one of the most devastating attacks by other students I can remember. I mean, there was this incredible bandwagon kind of effect–like one or two people started, and when I didn't repond in the way I guess they expected it really turned into a mob. The group pressure got to be incredible, though one or two people actually talked about the work. After a while it was so bad I think the professor was embarrassed for letting it go on. In fact I'm pretty sure he was, because about a week later he apologized for letting it get so out of hand. I just couldn't understand why people reacted so strongly to someone admitting that they didn't know exactly what they were doing.

Heller– You said one or two people concentrated on the work. Didn't the others?

Stafford– No, they didn't really deal with the work at all. They concentrated on me instead. It was as if I just had a lot of gall presenting something to them which I wasn't sure of. I still wonder how they would've reacted if they would've seen it in a different context, say in a gallery, without the artist present. I suspect they would have accepted it from someone who had some "authority" in their eyes. At least the emphasis of their questioning might have changed. At the time I guess I thought school was at least one place where you didn't have to know exactly what you were doing.

Heller– Well, there's an ingrained positivism in the art world, especially in our language.

Stafford– Sure, it's as if uncertainty is ruled out from the beginning. You can be pretty indefinite about what you actually do, but you have to be very positive *about what you say about what you do. There's a certain kind of market positivism, that is, in a sense, if you're indeterminate about it, it doesn't get marketed. Besides, any attempt to question the basic assumptions of what you're doing, the* context *of your actions, is met with a lot of resistance–and, as we've been saying, not only from other people, but from yourself as well. That's what I meant by saying we needed a non-alienated notion of groups. People can begin to* support *each others' risks, instead of resisting them and or* blaming *the person taking the risks for, perhaps, upsetting the apple cart.*

Heller– So, whole aggregates of social and economic norms are removed from questioning in the art world at large . . .

Stafford– Almost by definition, we're in a situation where there can't be any natural production of art. It's not much more than commodity production. And right now, the move is towards the "skills" of the artist being "learned" more and more in the schools, and less "on the spot"–"in the garret", or in the loft–away from the institution . . .

Heller– "Away" meaning what: outside production? away from formalism? How much is that a possibility? You seem to be reverting back to positivist distinctions. I do take your point though about the tyranny of schools when it comes to the question of where education goes on. But what do you mean by "natural" production of art?

Stafford– Well, I think it should be thought of as something we're approaching in steps. It's like actions without objectives,–and it doesn't matter whether those objectives are right or wrong, or mythical or demythologized or naive or critical, it isn't praxis, *though it might be orientation in the world. Right, and not being praxis, it's action that's ignorant of its own process and aim. You know, take the interrelation of the awareness of aim and process as the basis for planning action, that implies methods, objectives and value options, Christ, it's not like we don't know we're subjected, directed, and affected . . .*

It seems pretty obvious, I mean, if we're going to have a self-mediating human teleology, where we're continuously transforming ourselves, then it doesn't seem like there could be any way of predetermining the forms and modalities, sort of a special form of "I can't tell you what'll get it for you, but I can tell you something". That's just not another form of laisse-faire either.

Heller– It's never fully realized.

Stafford– I think "realized" assumes a lot, at least now anyway. It might be a bit gratuitous to say it's confusing to know where to begin, to start, you know, in terms of thinking about self-mediation. But it is anyway . . .

Heller– Well I can't answer the question of whether or not we can really have an "authentic culture" much less tell you what it would mean to have one.

Stafford– You don't mean something like we can just go out and get an "authentic culture".

Heller– All I'm saying's that the crucial question–the crucial thing about having an "authentic culture"–is the emphasis on *we*, which is what *you yourself have stressed.*

New York, New York

OPTIMISTIC HANDBOOK

LYNN LEMASTER

The dictionary follows the form of Katz's and Fodor's semantic theory, but it is important not to be overinvolved with the ins and outs of that theory in this fragment. Current linguistic theory, on a simplistic level, isn't all that adequate to deal with fairly complex sentences, conceptions, etc. (anyway it doesn't claim to), and even less with how we understand them.

My purposes here in constructing the dictionary fragments are pragmatic and heuristic rather than linguistic ... how it draws a map. I am taking ideology to be accessible in the interface of "range of severally expressible ideas" and "resources of expression."

It could serve as a way of getting at an evaluation procedure ("simplicity measure") for trying to sort-out a notion of learning in relation to a pragmatic approach to a possibility of ideology. It could be about interpretations of semantic information and/or the semantic information generated.

I am not going to bother with the formulation of a formalized pragmatic system, but rather to get a better view of a relation between the speaker of a text and the hearer of that text. The speaker here is a complicated function of groups of persons (and their histories) and of languages, the set of groups to which the person producing the sentences of the text belongs, the set of groups that are his reference groups, i.e. the groups whose norms are considered by the speaker as his own (regardless of any "knowledge"of those) and the functions this individual performs. Or, put another way—possibly more relevant in this context—the task which the individual and both his membership and reference groups are engaged in are involved. The functions that are the speaker and the addressee should be interdependent and dependent upon "communication" relations. This no doubt seems almost trivially obvious. However, there could be some sort of paired correspondence between the descriptions of these functions and a description of how we could "see" ideology in the text.

You have to start with a set of reference points. These could be a number of things, but the specificity isn't all that easy to construct. You could regard the lexis as a (somewhat artificial) reference point. You could also cite moments of time, whose lexis it is, names of persons or locations in space, etc. They would be subsets of the set of reference points and they are needed to define a "task" concept. An agent in this case simply performs a task, performs a transformation in space and time. You also would have to introduce structured sets of agents (membership groups and reference groups and their interaction), and can say that a speaker is a function of the place of the agent in the global and local transformation process.

Although this doesn't solve any problems it is a way of emphasizing an ideological context-dependent language (in which contexts are used but not necessarily explicitly expressed). The dictionary could be seen as a sort of pragmatic metalanguage (showing features upon which the meaning of statements depends for one speaker).

(Don't anyone get over enthusiastic and start looking for the "ideology" in the lexis without a long list of instruments for the task. The relationship you have to your ideological language (or just plain language) may be expressed as a "knowledge" relationship, but not necessarily dependent on any *conscious* awareness. If you assumed awareness as a condition, you would also have to postulate a perfect or almost perfect correlation between grammatical and psychological complexity).

The last has opened up the semantic aspect in a way that would undoubtedly seem odd to a lot of linguistic philosophers. I'm not interested in satisfying linguistic philosophers. It just seems to fit with our way of going on in a context which is generalized as ideological. It is of course a propositional-attitude-view-of-the-world (but that shouldn't sound that strange to someone with a conventional view of art and artists).

If you want to consider a notion of belief or knowledge, Hintikka's model of the attribution of knowledge or belief to a person involves a division of all the possible worlds into two classes: into those possible worlds which are incompatible with it. So, it's fairly obvious that a notion of understanding here would have to be that understanding a sentence is being able to divide all possible worlds into two classes: those in which the sentence would be true and those in which it would be false. You understand what a sentence says insofar as you know what to expect of the world in case the sentence is true. That seems to fit better with an intuitive idea of competence or understanding, i.e. being able to consider implications, new uses, references, meanings for a set of statements (a theory) rather than just being able to articulate that set.

The "understanding bit" might work (or provide an alternative at least to a Wittgensteinian notion). But you have to be careful of the possible/actual worlds locution—the somehow unhappy distinctions made about the world that happens to be actual or the world that happens to be realized. It comes out that there is only one possible world, that is an actual one. I'm afraid that just seems psychologically and ideologically naive—also linguistically naive (e.g. if you consider ambiguity). Hintikka makes the distinction between what someone believes and the ontological correlates of those beliefs—and he's talking about correlates. It seems pretty ludicrous to admit modal logics at the outset and then fail to take the constitutive and psychological consequences (and perhaps sociological consequences) of modal logic. Modal logics are the underpinnings of ideology; it just seems that basic.

Whatever comes up out of the dictionary would, of course, have some reverberations about one's ideas about depth (the syntax). But you can't make too many assumptions about the depth of it because it's involved in describing the depth (to some extent). (You could see it as a sort of picture theory of the depth structure it represented.)

But it's not as straight and narrow (and as "linguistic") as that. It appears that inasmuch as the dictionary is constructed from some (not all) sentences of one pamphlet by Paul Cardan, this would cast aside historical connections with other articles and materials. What has to be dealt with then is the sheets of paper which, in a sense, no longer refer back to the ideology of Paul Cardan or the ideological models to which they might be appropriate. It becomes what is constructible into an ideology from the sentences—a sort of "what are the conditions of ideology?" (a field of study).

However, I think you have to treat it as more than an arbitrary selection out of Marxism. You no doubt have to admit that it is that—that there are social, cultural, historical or whatever parameters on encountering this kind of material (etc.). Presumably, there are ways of tracing the kind of decisions made, the kind of discoveries that might occur in (my) compiling (of) the dictionary. If that is about trying to show something, then what it shows is not entirely about reflecting what I know of that set, what I know as an "academic," or in a field-of-study sense of the situation. It has to reflect something else. (I'm trying to reflect something else.) If it doesn't then it doesn't have anything to do with ideology. It would just be to do with positivistic history (dialectic). The point is simply that ideology is about people being in a culture. Inasmuch as you can be "together" with the pieces of paper (and their various antecedent pieces of history) then that's how it can be about ideology.

That means the "methodology" involved is trying to prevent (myself or anyone else from) even considering things like "a field of study that would allow you to have the same accessibility to information or area that Paul Cardan had." The problem is really one of the interface or intersubjectivity between Cardan and myself/someone else, and how I/you might differ from Paul Cardan, given pragmatic considerations which build up into the semantics of, or the meaning

of, that which is extracted.

This should show something fairly real/natural about ideology as distinct from something contrived. That's what the problem is. And the confusion that appears to be generated with respect to the dictionary is a lot more "profound" than being able to make *ad hoc* methodological decisions. (As for the historicity of the text—inasmuch as the purposes are pragmatic then they are to do with extracting the maximum amount of information as can be extracted, from the set of parameters which one can constitute in relation to Paul Cardan.)

So, what is being looked at is a (my) relationship to the semantics of a particular piece of syntax, rather than the given assumptions of what the semantics, the meaning, the interpretation of a piece of text is. The thing is to get rid of things like the dialectic, the arguments, assumptions, conclusions, etc. in the text per se as far as possible. What then is given is myself (or yourself) as a fundamental point of reference.

There is no reason to expect this lexis to reflect an OED-order reality. Instead, you could argue that the "order" of reality was a very strong assertion about the vast amount of idiom that comes one's way (and passes between you and someone else). Presumably your idioms (idiolect) are not entirely based on environmental features. There are conceptual features of your discourse which determine structure, the idiomatic parts of one's speech, i.e. "the bizarre" with respect to the set of functions which are not the set of functions associated with a group you might belong to. If you see the dictionary as a "first person" dictionary in this sense you could ask "what is a second person dictionary?" or "what is the possibility of a second person dictionary?" in relation to the first person.

You can get a lot of long strings, and presumably a series of molecularly ordered first person dictionaries (that's what you would end up with, even in one pathway). The fact that it's molecularly ordered makes for there being something rather odd about it. It's unlikely, for instance, to be caught by set theory, because the universal quantificatory part is just going to be all over the place. It (the quantifier) wouldn't really have a place in the points of reference. The points of reference are more like the concatenation "and the next point is, and the next point is" and so on. And the "and the nexts" are both a natural feature and an unnatural one. The unnatural "and the nexts" are going back, overlapping. The thing is it's more like an experience than like a formality of set theory.

I can say a bit more about the methodology here, i.e. in the talk about experience. It is very much an anti-categorization stance. Categories are indeed generated in the strings, but you come across your categories as parts of your experience as distinct from *a priori* strictures on your experience. It is very odd to think of, for example, the experience of waiting to come across a category, a sort of wandering on and knowing that not so much if you wander along for long enough, but quite simply that there is in something like a system sufficient to generate that which will function as a virtual category for a certain region of that experience. In other words, a certain sort of set of inter-world transformations, as opposed to intra-world transformations.

With this in mind, you could see a critique of the thing as a sort of questionnaire—to find out what "resources of expression" you have in common with somebody else. You would have to think about certain aspects of a piece of syntax, given the typology of whatever the context, semantic markers are. Given someone else's reading of the syntax, you could find out what was in common between his reading of it and your reading of it. Again, semantic markers (or whatever) is a reflection of the method, so how generalized are you or how ungeneralized or how generalized can you get? There is a point here about the actual profundity of the order of the semantic markers. It is quite simply a sort of sociological set of markers. You could speculate about what the order amounts to. I think that is pretty profound.

It would be really unfortunate to get the idea that this has anything to do with sewing up the world neatly. For a start, I can't even consider anything like providing a "complete" dictionary of any kind (and I don't mean the time problems involved). Aside from which the thing is just too massive to catch hold of. You just have to think of some of the general possibilities inherent in

the fragment and what the upshots are. The fact that it generates confusion and so-bit-it-is-out-of-this-world-ness is probably more about ideology than (e.g.) Marxist pamphlets. Some artists should scrutinize their educations—you can't do art, Katz and Fodor and Marxism simultaneously.



1. We should start by examining what has happened to the most concrete part of Marxist theory, namely its *economic* analysis of capitalism.
2. Far from being a contingent, accidental or empirical application of Marxist theory to a particular historical phenomenon, this *economic* analysis is the place where the whole substance of the theory is concentrated.
3. We know that for Marx capitalist *economy* was subject to insoluble *contradictions* which manifested themselves in both periodic crises of over-production and in long-term tendencies whose unfolding would increasingly shake the system to its very foundations.
4. It forces us, however. to reconsider Marx's *economic* theory in order to see if the *contradiction* between the theory and the facts is merely apparent and temporary.
5. It "neglects" the effect of the gradual self-organization of the capitalist *class*, precisely with the aim of dominating the "spontaneous" tendencies of the *economy*.
6. These shortcomings stem from the theory's fundamental premise, namely that in a capitalist *economy*, men (proletarians or capitalists) are actually and completely transformed into things (i.e. *"reified"*) and that they are submitted to the action of *economic* laws that in no way differ from natural laws, except insofar as they use the *"conscious"* actions of men as the unconscious instruments of their own realization.
7. The fundamental *contradiction* of capitalism lies here and not in the quasi-mechanical incompatibilities that the *economic* gravitation of human molecules in the system is claimed to give rise to.
8. Firstly one can no longer maintain the central importance given by Marx (and the whole Marxist movement) to the *economy* as such.
9. The word *economy* is used here in the relatively precise sense given to it by the very contents of "Capital", i.e. the whole system of abstract and quantifiable relations, which starting from a given type of appropriation of productive resources (whether this be legally guaranteed as property, or derives simply from a "de facto" power of disposal) determines the creation, the exchange and the distribution of values.
10. These *economic* relations cannot be constructed into an autonomous system, whose functioning would be governed by its own laws, independently of other social relations.
11. Such a construction is impossible in the case of capitalism, and since it is precisely under capitalism that the *economy* tends to acquire the greatest "autonomy" as a sphere of social activity, one suspects that it would he even less possible to do so for previous societies.
12. Even under capitalism the *economy* remains fundamentally an abstraction: society is never transformed into a series of *economic* relations to the point where all other social relations could be considered as secondary.
13. Making of the "development of the productive forces" the motive force of history implicitly presupposed a constant pattern of fundamental human motivations: roughly speaking the *economic* motivation.
14. One cannot make any generalizations about *"economy* determining ideology" or about "ideology" determing *economy"* (or even about *"economy* and ideology mutually determining one another") for the very good reason that both *economy* and ideology (considered as separate areas that might or might not act on one another) are themselves products of a given phase (and a fairly recent one at that) of historical development.
15. One of the major obstacles which the penetration of capital met, and still meets, in the "backward" countries is precisely the lack of any capitalist type of *economic* motivation and mentality.
16. It is wrong to claim that the technico-*economic* categories have always been the determinant ones, for during long periods of history they neither existed as materialized categories of social life nor as poles of values.
17. In a sense, of course, technique and *economy* "have always been there," sinee every society has to produce in order to survive and has to evolve a social organization of this production.
18. Can one pretend that the way *economic* factors integrate with other social relations (for example with authority relations or with the relations of allegiance within feudal society) have no influence either on the nature of the *economic* relations of society in question or on the way these relations act upon one another?
19. For example there is no doubt that once capitalism is constituted the distribution of productive resources between the different social

strata and among the capitalists themselves is essentially the outcome of the free play of the *economy*.
20. At another level we might accept the idea that under "laissez-faire" capitalism the state apparatus (and political relations) can be envisaged as a *"superstructure"* depending on the *economy* but having no influence over it.
21. Such an affirmation would be meaningless however in the case of a feudal (or an 'asiatic') *economy*.
22. Can one pretend that the meanings, motivations and values created by each culture have no function or effect other than that of camouflaging an *economistic* psychology, which somehow always existed?
23. All this is equivalent to the invention of another subconscious beneath the subconscious, which unlike the first subconscious would be both "objective" (since totally independent of the past history of the individual and his actions) and "rational" (since constantly geared towards definable and even quantifiable objectives—namely *economic* objectives.)
24. The elaboration of a whole '*economic*' psychoanalysis' would be required in order to reveal the 'real'—if hidden—*economic* meaning of human action.
25. In such a system '*economistic* surges' would replace the pulses of the libido.
26. To be sure, hidden *economic* meanings can often be discovered in actions which on the surface don't appear to have any.
27. But this doesn't imply that these *economic* meanings are the only ones or even the primary ones.
28. It certainly does not mean that their content is always and everywhere the maximisation of '*economic* satisfaction' in the Western capitalist sense.
29. Whether '*economic* surges' (one might say the 'pleasure principle' diverted to the ends of consumption and appropriation) take this or that form, whether they choose this or that objective, whether they maintain themselves in this or that pattern of behavior, will depend on a totality of inter-related factors.
30. It will depend in particular on the relations between the '*economic* drive' and the sexual drive (and in particular on the manner in which the latter 'specifies' itself in a given society).
31. Nothing except the postulate that the real nature of man is to be a productive-*economic* animal.
32. It is but one link in the chain of causal relations unambiguously determined at any given moment by the state of the technico-*economic infrastructure.*
33. A *class* is needed to keep a given socio-*economic* system working according to its own laws.
34. This would be tantamount to admitting that the history has not been exclusively determinated by the remorseless functioning of predetermined *economic* laws but that the actions of social groups and *classes* have been able to modify the laws themselves by changing the conditions under which they operate.
35. This last example clearly shows that *economic* determinism and *class* struggle propose two mutually incompatible explanations.
36. Is it the development of *technology* and the effects of *economic* laws that govern the system?
37. More sophisticated marxists, referring if necessary to other texts of Marx, will refuse this unilateral view and will assert that the *class* struggle plays an important role in the history of the system, that it can modify the functioning of the *economy*, and that one should not forget that this struggle can only take place within a given framework which determines its limits and gives it its direction.
38. The *economic* laws formulated by Marx are simply meaningless outside the *class* struggle.
39. Between the capitalism of 'Capital' (where '*economic* laws' lead to a stagnation of wages, to increasing unemployment, to more and more violent crises and finally to a virtual impossihility of the system to function) and real modern capitalism (where wages increase in the long run parallel with production and where the expansion of the system continues without encountering any *economically* insoluble problem) there is not only the difference between the real and the imaginary.
40. Marx for example is a great *economist* (even when he is wrong) whereas Francois Perroux is

but a windbag (even when he is not wrong).
41. It also leads to the no less paradoxical attempt to reduce the life of men as they themselves genuinely lived it (whether *consciously* or unconsciously) to a mere illusion—an illusion in relation to the 'real' *(economic)* forces which determined it.
42. But historical materialism implies at the same time that these 'other needs' have always, in all places and at all times, been predominantly *economic* needs.



1. But *it* is another thing to reduce production, work, and human activities mediated by instruments and objects to the level of 'productive forces' i.e. in the end to the level of *technology.*
2. And it would be just as wrong to grant to *technology* an evolution which 'in the last analysis' would be autonomous.
3. One cannot evolve a system of social mechanics based on an eternal, and eternally constant opposition between a *technology* (or productive forces) endowed with an autonomous evolution and the remaining mass of social relations and human life (the *'superstructure'*) to which would just as arbitrarily be attributed both passivity and an inbuilt inertia.
4. In fact there is neither autonomy of *technology* nor any ingrained tendency of *technology* in the direction of such an autonomous development.

5. During 99.5% of its development (that is to say during the whole of its evolution except for the last 500 years) known or presumed history was based on what appears to us now to have been *technological* stagnation.
6. Similarly one cannot divorce the enormous *technological* development of modern times from radical changes in these attitudes, however gradually these may have appeared.
7. To convert scientific knowledge primarily into a means of *technological* development and to vest it with predominantly instrumental characteristics also corresponds to a new attitude.
8. It is only with the flowering of bourgeois society that one begins to witness what appears to be a sort of autonomous evolution of *technology.*
9. This *technological* evolution is a product of the philosophic and scientific development launched or accelerated by the Renaissance (whose deep links with the whole of bourgeois culture and society are undeniable).
10. Finally in the present stage of capitalism, *technological* research is planned, directed and explicitly orientated towards the objectives of the dominant strata of society.
11. Does it really make sense to speak of an 'autonomous' evolution of *technology* when the U.S. Government decides to spend a thousand million dollars on rocket fuel research—and only one million dollars on research into the causes of cancer?
12. During past periods of history, when men so to speak accidentally came across some new method or invention, and when the basis of production (as well as of war and of other social activities) was characterised by *technological* scarcity, the idea of a relative autonomy of technique might have appeared to have some meaning—although even then it would have been false to claim that this technique was a 'determinant', in any exclusive sense, of the structure and evolution of society.
13. This is proved by the immense variety of cultures, both archaic and historical (Asiatic, for instance) built on the same *technological* bases.
14. In contemporary societies, on the other hand, the continual expansion of the range of what is *technologically* possible, and the permanent influence and action of society in relation to its methods of work, of communication, of war, etc., definitively refutes any idea of the 'autonomy' of the technical factor.
15. The 'Sermon on the Mount' and the 'Communist Manifesto' belong just as much to historical practice as any *technological* invention.
16. What is more idealist than isolating a single abstract factor (the evolution of *technology*)—which is moreover of the order of an idea—and building a whole theoretical edifice on this basis?
17. But instead of being religious, philosophical or political ideas, the ideas are *technological.*
18. *Technological* ideas remain then a kind of prime mover.
19. We either remain just there—and the whole allegedly 'scientific' edifice of *historical materialism* is seen to base all history on a mystery: the mystery of the autonomous and inexplicable evolution of a particular category of ideas (*technological* ideas).
20. Or we replunge *technology* into the bath of total social reality.
21. Either Engles was making a purely verbal concession in which case we are left with a factor *(technological* ideas) which determines history without being determined by it.
22. The British motor car industry operates on the same *'technological'* basis as the French motor industry.
23. In fact to say that men have always sought the greatest possible development of the productive forces and the only obstacle encountered in this endeavour was the state of *technology*—or to claim that societies have always 'objectively' been dominated by this tendency and shaped according to it—are impermissible extrapolations.
24. Is it the development of *technology* and the effects of *economic* laws that govern the system?
25. The system is continuously propelled as the result of the autonomous progression of *technology.*



1. They are as conditioned by the *infrastructure* as the *infrastructures* are conditioned by them (if the term 'to condition' can be used to describe the mode of coexistence of various diverse aspects of social activity).
2. Engels' attempt to escape this dilemma by explaining that although *superstructures* may act on *infrastructures*, the latter remain determinant 'in the last analysis' hardly makes sense.
3. The really idealistic character of the *'materialist conception of history'* appears at an even more fundamental level when one considers another aspect of the categories *'infrastructure'* and *'superstructure'* as used by Marx.
4. In Marx's vision not only has the *infrastructure* a determining weight but it alone has weight, for it alone is at the origin of the movement of history.
5. Unlike everything else, the *infrastructure* embodies truth.
6. But for marxists this ambiguity, this deformed relationship to historical reality would apparently cease to exist when we start dealing with the *infrastructure*.
7. It is but one link in the chain of causal relations unambiguously determined at any given moment by the state of the technico-*economic infrastructure*.



1. The great forces of production—that shock factor in historical development—were choked in those *obsolete institutions* of the *superstructure* (private property and the national State) in which they found themselves locked by all preceding development.
2. One cannot evolve a system of social mechanics based on eternal, and eternally constant opposition between *technology* (or productive forces) endowed with an autonomous evolution and the remaining mass of social relations and human life (the *'superstructure'*) to which would just as arbitrarily be attributed both passivity and an inbuilt inertia.
3. *Superstructures* have never enjoyed the privilege of being passive.
4. These *superstructures* are only a web of social relations.
5. What Marx called the *superstructure* has no more been a passive and delayed reflection of an otherwise undefinable social 'materiality' than human perception and knowledge have been hazy and imprecise 'reflections' of an external world 'in itself' perfectly formed, col-

ored and endowed with odor.

6. Engels' attempt to escape this dilemma by explaining that although *superstructures* may act on *infrastructures*, the latter remain determinant 'in the last analysis' hardly makes sense.

7. The really idealistic character of the *'materialist conception of history'* appears at an even more fundamental level when one considers another aspect of the categories *infrastructure* and *superstructure* as used by Marx.

8. *Superstructures* are always ambiguous: they both express and hide the 'real situation.'

9. At another level we might accept the idea that under "laissez-faire' capitalism, the State apparatus (and political relations) can be envisaged as a *'superstructure'* depending on the *economy* but having no influence over it.



1. These shortcomings stem from the theory's fundamental premise, namely that in a capitalistist *economy*, men (proletarians or capitalists) are actually and completely transformed into things (i.e. *"reified"*) and that they are submitted to the action of economic laws that in no way differ from natural laws, except insofar as they use the *'conscious'* actions of men as the unconscious instruments of their own realisation.

2. *Reification*, although a fundamental tendency of capitalism, can never completely fulfill itself.

3. The struggle of people against *reification* is, just as much as the tendency to *reification*, an essential condition for the functioning of capitalism.

4. The system can only function if its fundamental tendency, which is indeed the tendency to *reification*, is not achieved.

5. Secondly, if *reification* as a category needs to be re-examined the whole philosophy of history which underlies the analysis of "Capital" must also be reconsidered.

Horley, Oxfordshire

LOOKING BACK, GOING ON

TERRY ATKINSON

I INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Basically the development of the notion of 'fixed-grammar' is a result of questioning that notion of grammar holding that the significant grammatical structure of sentences is found in their surface form. 'Fixed-grammar' is (seen as) an attempt to explain what happens when language is treated as if it is a stimulus/response-bound system. How might we expand this point? We are saying that insofar as grammar provides a sound-meaning correlation for an infinite number of sentences thus providing an infinite set of structural descriptions, and each contains a surface-structure that determines phonetic form and a deep structure that determines semantic content, then is it possible, firstly, for this phonetic form to be controlled (by whatever systems of control in a given society that we wish to examine), and if it is, then can this control (conditioning) of an evaluated 'correct' phonetic form itself become a factor affecting the deep structure which determines the semantic content? Might it, for example, atrophy the workings of the deeper semantic level in the sense of inhibiting the creative aspect of language-use? Such investigations may help us to understand, e.g., the relation between a particular condition of the language-use of a given society and the slogans it accepts or rejects. We are talking about the possibilities of a language-use approaching the condition of automatonism.

The apparent standardized behaviour of vast modern societies in comparatively recent times, say the last hundred years, seems to warrant at least asking some of the questions above. So, to reiterate the second sentence of the previous paragraph, 'fixed-grammar' is a model attempting to explain not only what happens to the language, but to all those elements of experience that our language-use affects when the language is used as if the significance of the grammatical structure of that language is to be wholly discovered in the surface form of its sentences.

II

If one is to say that the First World War generated an institutionalized bedlam insofar as it was a cataclysmic head-on clash of (apparently) opposing fixed-grammars, then what is meant by fixed-grammars? First, grammar here is characterized as knowledge of language in the sense that a person who has acquired knowledge of language has internalized a system of rules that relate sound and meaning in a particular way. Thus we could then say that any linguist attempting to trace out this grammar is attempting to advance an hypothesis concerning this internalized system. There has been a school of thought, centering upon the area of stimulus-response psychology, that has treated as a serious object of inquiry, the (seeming) assumption that language is merely a 'habit structure' in the sense of being a network of associative connections, this then allows the phenomena of language to be described as simply a matter of 'knowing how', a skill expressible in terms of a system of dispositions to respond. According to this hypothesis knowledge of language *must* develop slowly through repetition and training, thus generating the further thesis that the apparent complexity of language results from the proliferation of very simple elements rather than from some not easily (if at all) discernible deeper principles of mental

organization. By 'deeper' and 'indiscernible' we suggest systems that are inaccessible to introspection just as are the mechanisms of respiration and digestion. Given that whole modern societies may have based their propaganda and educational philosophies on such assumptions (and a number of these societies may pre-date stimulus-response psychology, at least in its comparatively 'sophisticated' modern forms) in the sense that such assumptions by virtue of being 'accepted' in a largely unselfconscious way were a priori factors governing any debate on the character of language, then one would expect to see in their ideological/educational-inculcation programmes a heavy emphasis on repetition as a methodological principle furnishing an (assumed) logical succession of stages showing how the world was not puzzling. The vast majority of education in Victorian and Edwardian Britain was of this kind. And the variations in 'quality' of education (e.g. public school, church school, etc.) only serve to illustrate how in-phase the various components of the educational system were with each other. The education of pre-1914 Britain ensured the cross-class response to Kitchener's call insofar as its components were in-phase with each other.

The capability of a society to ensure that the knowledge of language (the internalization of the rules of language) is not itself made an object of inquiry in that society is a measure of the uniformity and standardization of the members-of-the-society's picture of the world. More succinctly, we might say that it is a measure of how effective the society (institutionalization) is in interning its members within the confines of its initial internalization condition. But the picture of the world set out by this measure of control is finally arbitrated by the empirical consequences of the picture. As long as the empirical consequences remain in-phase with the picture, that is, well-aligned with the expectations engendered by the grammar in the users of the grammar, then it seems that the slogans of the society will tend to be regarded as effective, and the language-use will be ritualistic in the sense of having rigidly organized patterns serving mainly as mnemonic aids to stabilize and entrench established ideological positions. In other words, language will be primarily used as a conservative instrumentality. But should the empirical consequences of the world-picture become radically out-of-phase with that picture then the language-use will tend to push-out for new ideological patterns, that is, the language will be used more for purposes of ideological revision. How well-entrenched a given habituation of language-use is may be measured by how long it will endure a severe dislocation of it from its empirical consequences.[1] All native speakers of a language have acquired a grammar on the basis of very restricted and degenerate evidence. That is, in internalizing the system of rules (in acquiring the knowledge) of our native language, the evidence for using the rules is picked up very unselfconsciously. It is a matter of simple logic that self-consciousness about what happens when we use language can only take place after we have acquired language, that is, acquired knowledge of the language. An interesting question about the relation between human psychology, language and learning, is to ask whether it is possible for a person to become inquisitive about language-acquisition whilst that person is acquiring it? That is, is it logically possible to externalize the internalization whilst the internalization is happening? By 'fixed-grammar' I mean the condition where the internalization does not become an object of inquiry. In this sense language is treated as an obvious element of the world, explainable where an explanation may be required, by recourse to the device of positing an occult property. To state that 'x is essential and inherent to Y' endows Y with an occult property, and this general assumption tells us nothing insofar as occult properties are treated as obvious elements of the world in the sense that their explanation requires only the statutory 'it is simply there' or 'it simply is the case.' For example there was a widespread approach to 'explaining' human intelligence in Victorian Britain, which began by postulating, on *a priori* grounds, certain specific mechanisms that it claimed must be those underlying the acquisition of knowledge and belief.[2] Whenever this kind of stage is reached it becomes inconceivable that one might have to postulate revised or entirely new principles of functioning and organization outside the framework of what is the conventional 'common sense'.

In the terminology of perhaps the best known school of thought in modern linguistics 'knowledge of language' is often called 'linguistic competence'—and it is often suggested that the degree of linguis-

tic competence can be measured by observing the mastery of grammatical processes. These processes can be summarized as follows: there seem to be some general properties of grammars; a number of very simple rules expressing a few rudimentary grammatical functions can, by assigning to these rules a recursive property, generate an infinite class of deep structures. Through iteration grammatical transformations will form a surface structure which may be remote from the underlying deep structure. So how are these general properties of grammars functioning inside a fixed-grammar? It will be useful here to preface the answer to this question with some general remarks concerning the differences between a society whose culture is transmitted orally and a society whose culture is transmitted also through writing. It will be worth keeping in mind a distinction derived from traditional Cartesian observations on the character of language-use, namely, that between 'appropriateness of behaviour to situations' and 'control of behaviour by stimuli'.[3] By 'fixed-grammar' one is suggesting that the bearer of such a grammar tends to have his world-picture organized according to the latter, 'control of behaviour to stimuli'. In part the language-use of all of us tends to work like this, and especially where the language-use of a given society is primarily used as a mnemonic aid in the sense of aiding the memories of the members in respect of entrenching the established ideological picture. In such situations the processes of cultural transmission have an homeostatic function. But the relation of difference in cultural transmission between an oral and literate society is a complex one. It seems that as long as the legendary and doctrinal aspects of the culture are mediated orally they are kept in relative (to a literate culture) harmony with each other and with the current needs (themselves partially governed by the phenomena of oral transmission) of the given society in two ways. Through the unself-conscious operations of memory, and through the adjustment of the reciter's terms and attitudes to those of the audience/situation before him. Oral transmission is a significant factor in the ideological homogeneity of many oral societies. In literate societies, as in oral societies, the phenomenology of interlocking conversations takes place, but it is no longer the society's only means of dialogue; and insofar as writing provides an alternative source for the transmission of cultural orientations it (apparently) tends to favour awareness of inconsistencies in those orientations. An important aspect of this is the notion that the cultural inheritance is made up of basically two different kinds of material; on the one hand, fiction, error, and superstition, on the other, elements of truth which can provide a basis for some more reliable and coherent explanation of gods, the human past, the physical world, etc. It seems then that writing establishes a different kind of relation between a word and its referent than that obtaining between words and their referents in oral transmission. The relation in literate transmission becomes more general and more abstract, and less closely connected with the particularities of place and time.[4]

It is only in the days of the first widespread alphabetic cultures that the idea of an immutable and impersonal mode of discourse appears to have arisen. And the notion of objective reality seems inextricably linked with the idea of formal logic (formalization) which is dependent upon literate transmission.[5] But, although the idea of the intellectual and to some extent political universalism is historically linked with the growth of literate cultures, it brings with it other features which have quite different implications, and it is these other features, these other intrinsic effects, of comparatively widespread literacy that should be noted in respect of the notion of 'fixed-grammar'. From the earliest times that the main elements of a cultural tradition were written down it engendered an awareness of two things, the past as different from the present and the inherent inconsistencies in the picture of life as it was inherited from the cultural tradition in its codified recorded form. These two effects of widespread alphabetic cultures have continued and magnified ever since, and a rapid quantitative and qualitative increase was achieved at the inception of printing techniques. As printing technology advanced the inconsistency of the totality of written expression became compounded by another, perhaps even more striking problem, the enormous bulk and vast historical depth of the totality of written expression. Both of these have seemed increasingly impenetrable obstacles for those seeking to

reconstruct society on a more unified and disciplined model. Thus literate society, simply by having no device of structural amnesia in the way an oral society does, places severe limits on the cultural participation of any one individual. In one way the vista of endless choices and discoveries offered by so extensive a past can be viewed as a great source of stimulation and interest, but the social effects of such an orientation generate such a prolifically volatile and complex situation inevitably fostering the alienation[6] that has seemingly characterized so many writers and philosophers in The West over the last century and a half. In practice the literate individual has so large a field of personal selection from the total cultural repertoire that the odds are heavily against him experiencing the cultural tradition as any sort of patterned whole. For the notion of 'fixed-grammar' this is critical, for in the relation between the fact that our knowledge of language is an internalized system of rules and the vast historical depth that literate transmission has provided us with lie all the possibilities of semantic manipulation of one group by another, the former usually the larger group, and such manipulation usually carried out unselfconsciously. In front of this vast historical depth a fatigue threshold is reached comparatively quickly and institutionalized means of standardizing the interpretations of the past are engendered to avoid the possibility of anomie. Western literate societies are characterized by proliferating layers of cultural tradition, which incessantly expose their members to a more and more tortuous and opaque version of a kind of culture-conflict. This same phenomena when projected onto an oral society often produced total anomie. In literate societies theoretical sophistication may be the very stuff of alienation, both for the 'understanders' and the 'non-understanders' (which will include the 'misunderstanders').

Another important consequence of alphabetic writing relates to social stratification. In the proto-literate cultures with their relatively difficult non-alphabetic systems of writing, there existed a strong barrier between the writers and the non-writers; but although the 'democratic' scripts made it possible to break down this particular barrier, widespread literacy itself led to a vast proliferation of more or less tangible distinctions based on what people had read. Achievement in handling the tools of reading and writing became one of the most important axes of social differentiation in modern societies. And this differentiation extends on to more minute differences between professional literate specializations so that members of the same socio-economic groups may hold little intellectual ground in common.

There seem then to be factors in the very nature of literate methods which make them ill-suited to give a continuity between even intra-social groups, and even more so between individuals, and yet the instrumentality of literacy remains unequivocally the most powerful ideological tool we have. It is a powerful tool whether used for purposes of ideological entrenchment or ideological revision. But the psychological fatigue that the consequences of literacy engenders has seemed to pose a paradox in relation to the observation that although alphabetic writing, printing, and (relatively) universal free education have combined to make the literate culture freely available to all, on a scale never previously approached, the literate mode of transmission is such that it does not impose itself as forcefully as is the case with purely oral transmission.[7] In a literate society quite apart from the scale and complexity of the 'high' literate tradition, the fact that reading and writing are solitary activities means that insofar as the dominant cultural tradition is a literate one, it is, compared to oral ones, relatively easy to avoid.[8] And, even when the literate culture is not avoided, its effects may be relatively (to an oral culture) shallow. Abstractness and categorizations of knowledge do not correspond very directly with the fluxlike input/output of common experience and immediate personal context; and the compartmentalization of knowledge similarly restricts the kinds of connections which the individual can establish and ratify within the natural and social world where it seems that habituation toward ideological stabilization becomes a near-reflex. In this kind of climate one can often see a nostalgic yearning for unanalytic spontaneity and for the 'simple cohesive life'.[9] Writing literally objectifies and reifies words and in so doing makes them and their meaning available for much more pro-

longed and intensive scrutiny than in oral cultures. In this sense it makes the word a physical object of contemplation, apparently inviting solitary study and encouraging private thoughts. From this act has come the main framework allowing the individual to hold out a notion of objectivity by which he can objectify his experience thereby giving him some check upon the transmutations of his memory under the influence of subsequent events, and this in itself ensures a partial insulation from the assimilative process of oral transmission.

Bearing in mind then the foregoing remarks on literate and oral transmission of culture, we can return to the question, 'How do the general properties of grammar function in a fixed-grammar?' Thus taking the following definition of language: language is that which is described by a particular grammar as all the sentences it can generate: then by fixed-grammar the suggestion is of a state where socio-psychological factors (and the tradition of language-use will play a major part in the formation of such factors) produce a condition (a (linguistic) climate in respect of the notions learning/understanding/knowledge) where the generative capability of the language is impeded. The 'idea' of this control of language is anyway, in the long-term view, intrinsically weak insofar as it ignores the fact that neither the active nor passive vocabulary of a native speaker is neither fixed nor static for even short periods of time. In one sense language-users subscribing to a fixed-grammar condition have an idealized model of what language is insofar as they treat language as inherently an ideology-stabilizing device, when in fact the creative aspect of language-use will always tend to produce ideas of revision, no matter how small the amount of change and how long it takes for an accumulation of small changes to become significant. Subscribers to a fixed-grammar are involved in a contradictory relation with this subscription insofar as they are language-users and as such will be subject to at least a minimum amount of creative use of language. In fixed-grammar a 'brake' is put on the role of the language-use in its ideologically revisory function. But it is *only* a 'brake', it cannot be a termination insofar as (as is suggested above) the creative aspect of language-use is intrinsic to the condition of language-use.

Language-use that predominantly reifies extant semantic patterns, developing standardized responses in the sense of control of behaviour by stimuli, may be characterized as having an asymptotic function insofar as it approaches the state of rendering the language-user (cultural participator) an automaton. So describing an asymptotic function as a line which continually approaches a given curve, but does not meet it within a finite distance, then we can say that insofar as the language can be treated as a purely conditioning instrumentality then the 'line' of this language-use approaches the 'curve' of automatonism according to the effectiveness of the language-use in governing a user's knowledge of the language to the extent of only the ability to take dictation.

Language used in this direction expressly contradicts the old Cartesian premise that language is available for the free expression of thought in the sense that this premise holds that at least the creative aspect of language-use is undetermined by fixed association of utterances

or physiological states. We can hold with this premise so long as we do not claim an absolute irreducible distinction between 'body' and 'mind', for to do so would be dogmatic in the face of the apparent mysteriousness of the creative aspect of language-use. Thus, when the tendency of (a given) language-use is heavily weighted toward entrenchment of the world-picture constructed by that language-use, then that language-use might be questioned as characteristically human language-use, insofar as it approaches what can be termed the purely functional and stimulus-bound animal communication systems.[10] Thus the individual, group, or society which is fixed-grammar-bound will be limited in the development of the creative aspect of its language-use, and should ever a society break the asymptotic function where the 'line' of direction of the language-use as a conditioning instrumentality breaks into the 'curve' of automatonism then the aspect of creative language-use would, one imagines, suffer the most severe process of atrophy.[11] But the existentially-credible fixed-grammar bound entity (individual, group, society) will find great difficulty in generating new expressions of thought (its active vocabulary), and probably even more difficulty in understanding and taking seriously new expressions of thought if and when they do take place (its passive vocabulary). A society which explicitly held that language-use is within the bounds of mechanical explanation is the fixed-grammar adherent *par excellence*. Such a society would hold language-use to be nothing more than control of behaviour by stimuli. Its means of cultural-transmission would be training in the sense of being totally committed towards a uniform, standard, and *predictable* cultural participator.

NOTES.

1. When one is talking of the notion of 'dislocation' one is not talking about the effects of such a dislocation upon the language-user, but the fact of an empirical event not turning out in the way that the world-picture (of the language-user), as constructed according to the conventions of the language-use, predicted. The events on the first day of the battle of the Somme as experienced by the vast majority of the British infantry are a particularly clear and tragic case of this. Some of the testimonies furnished in note 4 of appendix A (following) give examples of both the quality of the effects of the dislocation of that particular event, and also the time taken for the effects to form.

2. The writings of Salisbury, Balfour and Galton, for instance, furnish good examples of this.

3. J.J. Katz in his book 'Linguistic Philosophy' (pp. 90-91) says "It is, in fact, just this freedom from stimulus control that makes natural languages suitable for expressing the products of creative thought. No doubt there are cases where a speaker's utterance is under the control of such stimuli, together with the speaker's recent history of deprivation, punishment, and reward, provide some probability that he will utter a certain sentence, for example, the case of the man whose arm is being twisted by a bully who tells him he must say "uncle" before he will release him. But of course such cases, which are the only ones that fit the stimulus-response theory, are extremely rare and atypical." This seems to me to be an unduly optimistic conclusion. The New Army of Britain elicited 'voluntarily' at the call of Kitchener in 1914 was, perhaps arguably, under the control of local stimuli and this army consisted of 500,000 men. (See appendix A following). It is certainly true that "natural languages are in general free from the control of external stimuli in the speech situation" if we are able to define external stimuli as excluding other speech events, and also if we are talking about (a natural) language-use as if the creative aspect of language-use is irresistible in the sense of being immune to impediment. But can we?

4. There may be a little irony in respect of this general point concerning the current studies in Pragmatics. These can be seen as an explicit and high-powered attempt to deal with the particularities of place and time using some of the most advanced logical apparatus, which itself can be seen as one of the most sophisticated products of literate transmission.

5. In fifth century Greece it seems that the fact of alphabetic reading and writing was a considerable factor in the development of political democracy. Apparently a majority of free citizens were capable of reading the laws and taking an active part in elections and legislations. In this wide sense it is possible to say that both democracy and the notion of an objective knowledge is linked with widespread literacy.

6. Nietzche, for example, described literate man as a 'wandering encyclopaedia', obsessed with the past and totally unable to live in the present.

7. Margaret Mead has suggested that modern education, as distinct from primitive education which promotes parent-child continuity, tends to produce discontinuities insofar as it turns the child of the illiterate into a literate individual. This is O.K. as a generalization concerning the literacy barrier condition, but in many of its aspects modern education creates a continuity through the standardization and uniformity of its product—the cultural participator—this may be, according to the view one takes of modern education, due to its shortcomings as much as anything it has as a positive increment.

8. Particularly after a basic level of literacy has been acquired, which in itself constitutes a significant part of the 'ticket' allowing access to a whole range of what we might call sub-cultural activities the participation in which involves ritualized behavior patterns and, often, whose main form of cultural transmission is oral.

9. The homogeneity of oral culture has become over the past two centuries an object of nostalgic yearning in a number of intellectual movements in the West. The Rousseauesque picture of 'The Noble Savage' turned upon a self-consciousness that admired the apparently simple cohesive life comprising an unanalytical spontaneity and an absorbed and uncritical participation in which the contradictions between history and legend

were not seen as contradictions or were not felt as anything particularly interesting if they were seen. Logically, such an admiration is paradoxical insofar as the 'admiration' implies a self-consciousness on the part of the admirer of the unself-consciousness of the way of life he is admiring. This idea when transmitted through the literate forms of modern societies, where literacy can be used as a means of standardizing the responses of the receivers can produce the most frustrating situation for a teacher wishing to push the self-consciousness of his pupils to a further point. I speak from experience, the art schools in Britain were rife with this kind of problem during the late sixties. The whole range of pedagogic practises centering upon the old adage 'Don't talk artist, make art' (Don't talk painter, paint' etc.) were uncritical adaptations of this, by then, well established notion of admiring unalytical spontaneity and an absorbed and uncritical participation. A lot of the 'formalist' painting one sees at both the 'professional' level and in art schools seems to have this kind of history-stacking and historical self-delusion behind it.
(For some earlier commentary on some of these problems see 'Art Teaching', Terry Arkinson and Michael Baldwin, Art-Language, Vol. I, No. 4, Nov. 1971.)

10. Chomsky's classic commentary on Skinner's book 'Verbal Behaviour' is a convincing text against the theory of stimulus-response as explaining the underlying semantic reality of language. (cf. 'A review of B.F. Skinner's "Verbal Behaviour"', The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, No. A-34.)

11. The character of 'Big Brother' invented by George Orwell in his book '1984' seems untypical of the way large modern bureaucratic structures generally control people, insofar as it is implied that 'Big Brother' is cynical in the sense he believed in nothing, not even the apocalyptic Newspeak. Big Brother just did it, as a kind of automatonism. The characteristic feature of bureaucratic degeneration as we know it seems to be 'noise on the message' engendered by the large number of message-passing units whose very profusion assure their increasing proliferation. This seems to produce a fatigue in the receivers of the message, in whose number are the increasing army of message-passers, which seems to act as a 'control' in the sense of making them skeptical or cynical about what can be done. Great numbers of these 'receivers' could not be labelled as having 'conditioned responses' in the sense of being uncritical, but rather, a sense of self-criticism is presupposed in their fatalism in seeing themselves as powerless, as caught up in a kind of mechanistic inevitability. People at what we might call the top-end of the bureaucratic structures are often evangelical in their belief in what they are doing. The last thing one could call many of these is cynical. By a curious irony these are the very people that we might describe as 'conditioned'.

Appendix

THE NEW ARMY — 1914

Can we imagine a 'simple' linguistic knowledge in respect of consideration being given to only relations of meanings among words? We can, but the operation of embedding would simply be laying one word against another, and therein one suspects would be the start of phrase structure. This latter is merely an hypothesis, one is not suggesting that this is how we come to phrase structure operations; the evidence, such as it is, according to empiricism, that ostension is the start of language acquisition is not at all convincing. The operation of phrase-structuring may already be 'there' according to given innate principles—insofar as the evidence mounted for the empiricist thesis is not convincing, the tentative models of the 'innate principles' theoreticians offer at least as rich a theory. There are two points worth remembering here: one, that embedding seems to be a universal characteristic of language-use, and two, that semantic representation involves relations among phrases. So, by 'fixed grammar—' one is not positing anything strange about the minimal conditions of language, but rather that there may be a more or less rigid (intuitive) control of sentence length and phrase complexity. Due to the structural amnesia inherent in a culture which relies upon only oral transmission as a check upon its members' memory, things such as sentence length and phrase complexity will not be controversial issues. It seems that for a sophisticated study of language the given students have to be literate. It also seems, for example, that just the phenomenology of formalization would be hard to carry in the 'mind' without recourse to a literate transmission. But literacy has not automatically meant elimination of amnesia. On the contrary! Literate transmission also has its amnestic tendencies, and they are very strong insofar as the tendency of literate culture to gather puzzles and proliferate problems runs in contradictory direction to an apparently well-entrenched tendency in human psychology which takes the form of a metaphysical yearning to treat the world as simpler than much of our experience tells us it is. When confronted by anything puzzling, tortuous, opaque, etc. this kind of attitude will often place it as a 'mystery' and thereby cease to wonder at its mysteriousness. The purveyors of mystery (and they are clearly discernible from mystics) are often the people suffering from the most acute form of recoil from proliferation of access to, and proliferation of material of, the historical depth and cultural layering that literate transmission provides. Cultures preying (and the 'preying' here may be done in what we may term a 'partially' conscious way) on these factors will be the characteristic cultures of fixed-grammar, and they will admit of language only a quality space of known character. And contrary to a conventional opinion, the conventions of poetic use of language may themselves constitute a bulwark of this kind of linguistic determinism, acting against the development of the resources of expression of the language. Kipling is a good example of this. The Victorians did not claim that they knew a lot about language-acquisition, but this lack of knowledge was not treated as something that affected their ideological determinism. For the institutionalized purveyors of Victorian culture, the fact that language-acquisition was mysterious (that is, in the cases where this fact even occurred to them) had absolutely no bearing on their ideological world-picture. Such factors were so 'obvious' and assigned to the realm of the *a priori*, that most useful of shelves for objects which require dust over them, that it could be separated off from the world of linguistic performance. Arthur Balfour, British Prime Minister 1902-1905, wrote two long philosophic tracts the first (in 1879) titled *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, the second (in 1895) titled *The Foundations of Belief*, both displaying some sophistication. His first book asserted some doubt about material reality and reaffirmed the right to spiritual faith, but such sentiments did not stop Balfour making decisive encounters upon Ireland and in the realm of education in Britain. On the contrary, throughout his political career his own particular form of spiritual faith in the superiority of the English gentleman and English learning allowed him to make a considerable impact upon the 'doubtful' realm of material reality, often, to people receiving this impact, a very uncomfortable one, leaving them in very little doubt as to the authenticity of material

reality. Balfour was a paragon of Victorian idealist production, steeped in what he saw as the superiority of the breeding of his class, sufficient, apparently, in terms of the action of his life to override the theoretical sophistication he was capable of contemplating in the making of his philosophic tracts. The language of the controllers of Victorian language, the grammar-fixers, was a language admitting only one quality space.

All out models for trying to explain how a language-use can be developed which apparently works against the better interests of a great majority of the people who are actually using it, must be treated as being tentative. This admitted, perhaps we can suggest the following. A device that may be crucial in developing the resources of expression in a given language may be that of self-embedding. Self-embedding offers a complexity, and truistically, complexity is certainly required for expressing some of our ideas. There is something very misleading about the old adage that good ideas are simple ideas. If, somehow, a control is placed by the institutions of a given society upon, for example, a characteristic device of language-use such as self-embedding in respect of the language-users in that society, then here is a considerable weapon in the armoury for producing a standardized 'consciousness'. A very interesting way to look at the cultural melange from which the 1914-18 War emerged might be to look at the language-use of the societies involved through the data of current investigations into language. The slogan of Kitchener's recruiting poster "Your Country Needs You" may offer some information concerning the manipulation of language-use into stimulus-response patterns, at least if one is to take seriously the response that particular slogan elicited. Within that slogan, there could be no possibility of doubt, no possibility of a transformational rule applied to it which might convert to even a suggestion of doubt, such as the transformation 'I Believe Your Country Needs You'—the rule which would subjectivize the slogan thereby suggesting the possibility of personal opinion as distinct from 'natural law'. The law-likeness of "Your Country Needs You", where Kitchener himself was assigned the role of Moses come down from the Mountain with the Tablets, characterizes the core (or should it be corps) of Victorian fixed-grammar, what we might call the classic form of British Imperial fixed-grammar. Today's historio-sociological explanations of the period never seem to much more than mention in passing the language-use of the period, most of the psychological cause-and-effect observations seem to have some credibility as far as they go but I haven't seen one attempt to look seriously at the language-use of the time in the light of the data and models currently available in linguistics. I am not in a position to undertake such an inquiry in the present context insofar as both the space and time in terms of the deadline date for the publication of this magazine do not allow such an undertaking. But it seems to me that such a suggestion would be a worthwhile task for future articles. Bearing in mind then the work of modern linguistics, consider some of the sociological and psychological detail of the response to Kitchener's call. The response was cross-class as was mentioned in part I. Alan Clark in his book *The Donkeys* (which was a derisive term invented by the German High Command condensely describing the apparently leaden learning capabilities of the British generals in respect of the conduct of battles by the British in 1916 after the debacles of 1915) ascribes the seeming inability to learn, manifest in their conduct of battles 1915-16, by the British High Command on the Western Front, to what he calls the "ordered childhoods of Victorian Britain." And Clark throws a wider net than this for his model, he also uses it as an explanation for the doggedness and the dourness of the British infantryman in the face of unequivocal widespread bureaucratic bungling throughout the chain of command upon whose efficiency both his day-to-day well-being and his life depended. Now Clark's model has a certain explanatory power in respect of the upper and middle classes who generally controlled the language-use of the society, but it does not tell us in any way how these 'ordered childhoods' came to be so ordered. It is at this point that we are forced to look at the character of the cultural transmission, and in looking at this, then language and language-use is clearly going to play a critical part. Sociologically, we can follow Clark's suggestion that clearly the 'order' was more widespread than simply to the subscribers of the sentiment of "Floreat Etona" which gives a fairly accurate reflection of the British aristocratic somnabulence in being lulled into a consciousness (if that is the right word) of unassailable peerlessness. The in-phaseness of the fixed-grammar turned upon the fact that the boutgeois Briton and the labouring classes had the corresponding grammatical position (component) which slotted into the working process of the whole linguistic 'machine'. When the concept of national pride was called upon and the slogans came rolling out of the (apparent) language control-centres their ability to control was affirmed. Their propaganda worked, cross-class, and without any significant differential. Consider the social configuration of the various classes in respect of Kitchener's scheme in 1914. Kitchener decided he would build a new army in 1914 as he anticipated (rightly) that the war would be a long one and its requirement in men would far exceed the strength of the British Expeditionary Force then fighting in Belgium and France. From their own testimony we can see that generally men from the middle classes had an explicitly intense pride in Britain and things British, and (like many elitist sensibilities before and since) a correspondingly intense dislike of upstarts, which is how they saw Germany. This class was not the tip of the elite, not actually the elite at all but the bedrock upon which the elite rested, the imitators of, and aspirers to, the values embodied in the elite itself. In this class, with its models of admiration of, and aspiration to, the aristocratic echelons of Victorian Britain, was the reservoir from which many of the new manufacturing barons came. Joseph Chamberlain from Birmingham, one of the emergent industrial meccas of Victorian Britain, is the paradigm case of the then rudimentary process of a transfer of power. In this admitation of elitism we can observe the surface of what Chamberlain himself described as "thinking imperially". But the most remarkable response perhaps to Kitchener's call was that of the labouring classes, remarkable in the sense that this was the class who clearly had least to gain from supporting Kitchener's Moses-like stance. We know that what we might call the conservative British workman was often a rabid King & Country addict, but by 1914 large numbers of the working classes in the industrial areas were trade unionists and conscious of the massive social injustices of the status quo. And yet come the war and Kitchener's call, the whole structure of international socialism was evaporated as the surface language it obviously was. Kier Hardie's political and ethical heart was broken, he had taken the surface to be the depth, and in an age of great sentimentality, the sentimentality of rank-and-file socialism was defeated at its first real national conflict with the sentimentality of patriotism. The labouring classes were enveloped in an environment of constant poverty, being placed there according to the structural imperatives of the capitalist sensibility. And perhaps the most contradictory logic in the whole situation, was that it was *only* from this class that the quantity of private soldiers could come, it was the only class capable of futnishing the quantitative requirements of Kitchener's scheme—and the class did so, with lightning momentum, 'voluntarily', to the tune of 500,000 men by the end of September, 1914. If then the age was a very sentimental one, then the labouring classes were the most avid receptors of this sentimentality sent out by the transmitters of imperialist sloganization. Looking for details of and the reasons why

this apparently perverse in-phaseness took place then the phenomenology of the workings of the language in its deep-structures seems the obvious place to look. At this kind of level we may be able to see the more profound reasons why Kier Hardie's sentiment that 'No British working man would ever plunge a bayonet into his German brother' turned out to be simply a breaking of wind. We know that the labouring classes were as patriotic as events required and we can pile up the sociological facts, but why do these sociological facts fit together? What is the framework that set them out in such patterns? We can continue to lay out the sociological details. The first large-scale action that the New Army divisions took part in in great strength was the first day of the Battle of The Somme on July 1st, 1916. And the areas where many of these battalions were recruited from were the industrial areas of the North, North Midlands, and London itself in England, of South Wales, and of Lowland Scotland (Glasgow and Edinburgh). Areas in which pre-war there had been fierce industrial unrest. The actual configuration in respect of geographical source of the New Army battalions in action on that first day were as follows: Yorkshire 29; Lancashire 22; Ireland 20 (majority Ulster); Tyneside 17; Midlands 14; London 13. And using the same geographical framework the casualties were, at a conservative estimate, distributed as follows: Yorkshire 9000; Ulster and Ireland 6000; Lancashire 6000; Tyneside and the North East 5500; London 5500; Scotland 3500.[1] And these latter geographical details bring out another example of the particular mechanisms used to elicit the massive response to Kitchener. In his idea for a new army Kitchener chose to use the county regiment system as his recruiting framework. Now in choosing this system, Kitchener had alighted upon, whether fortuitously or not, a formidable strata of linguistic homogeneity. Local chauvinism was, and I guess still is, one of the most virulent of hand-me-down stimulus-response patterns. This was the point where idiom and dialect became a means of identification deployed in the use of striving for competitive superiority. In respect of the New Army the fever of patriotism on the national level was reinforced by the micro-nationalism intrinsic to the county regiment system. From the north country emerged the concept of the "Pals" battalions, the name itself embodying the idea of solidarity and commonality of background and environment. Many of these battalions were known by their town name.[2] The town of Barnsley in the heart of the South Yorkshire mining area, then, by today's standards, a comparatively small town, raised two battalions in a few weeks, and a considerable number of these men were, pre-1914, hardening their political consciousness by the emergent weapon of the strike.[3] Often in communities like this where the sentiment of local comradeship and solidarity was intrinsic to the everyday working routine of their lives, it was precisely this sentiment that ensured a kind of 'falling domino' response to the call of Kitchener, one joined, or a group joined, and this set off a whole chain of response. Another ironic point, a number of communities throughout the country were peculiarly vulnerable to the 'package tour' dressing given to the sentiment of adventure in the army. This was literally the linguistic icing on the grammatical cake. Jobs which were sheer drudgery were now shamelessly admitted to be what they were (by authorities, who, before the war had expressed sentiments of the jobs not being at all bad, etc.) simply to entice men into the army. Depending upon what arm you served in and where you were posted, life in the army could be more humane and more interesting than your job in civilian life. Farm labouring communities, mill workers, and workers in many heavy industries were strongly susceptible to this. But if you were two minutes over the top with the 11th Suffolks (The Cambridge Battalion) opposite La Boiselle or with the 13th York & Lancasters (1st Barnsley Pals) opposite Serre on July 1st, 1916, then the drudgery of a Suffolk farm or the backbreak toil on the low seam at Barnsley Main must have seemed attractive. It was at points such as this that the empirical consequences of the 'package-tour' fixed-grammar began to dislocate from it.[4]

Leamington Spa, Warwickshire.

NOTES.

1. These figures are taken from Martin Middlebrook's book "The First Day On The Somme" (pp. 79 and 269 respectively). For a picture of both the battle on the first day and for background detail of the battalions in action this is an outstanding book. Published in 1971 by The Penguin Press, London.

2. For example: from Manchester, the 16th Manchesters (1st Manchester Pals), 17th Manchesters (2nd Manchester Pals), 18th Manchesters (3rd Manchester Pals), 19th Manchesters (4th Manchesters Pals), 20th Manchesters (5th Manchester Pals), 21st Manchesters (6th Manchester Pals), 22nd Manchesters (7th Manchester Pals), From Liverpool, the 17th King's (1st Liverpool Pals), 18th King's (2nd Liverpool Pals), 19th King's (3rd Liverpool Pals), 20th King's (4th Liverpool Pals). From Salford, the 15th Lancashire Fusilieres (1st Salford Pals), 16th Lancashire Fusilieres (2nd Salford Pals), 17th Lancashire Fusilieres (3rd Salford Pals). From Belfast, the 8th Royal Irish Rifles (East Belfast), 9th Royal Irish Rifles (West Belfast), 10th Royal Irish Rifles (South Belfast), 15th Royal Irish Rifles (North Belfast), 14th North Irish Rifles (Belfast Young Citizens). From the counties of Ireland, 11th Royal Irish Rifles (South Antrim), 12th Royal Irish Rifles (Central Antrim), 13th Royal Irish Rifles (1st Co. Down), 16th Royal Irish Rifles (2nd Co. Down), 9th Royal Inniskilling Fusilieres (Co. Tyrone), 10th Royal Inniskilling Fusilieres (Co. Berry), 11th Royal Inniskilling Fusilieres (Donegal and Fermanagh) (all after partition from Ulster), and from the Republic, the 9th Royal Irish Fusilieres (Armagh, Monaghan and Cavan Volunteers). From Grimsby and surrounding area, the 10th Lincolns (The Grimsby Chums). From Tyneside and the North-East, the 20th Northumberland Fusiliers (1st Tyneside Scottish), 21st Northumberland Fusiliers (2nd Tyneside Scottish), 22nd Northumberland Fusiliers (3rd Tyneside Scottish), 23rd Northumberland Fusiliers (4th Tyneside Scottish), 24th Northumberland Fusiliers (1st Tyneside Irish), 25th Northumberland Fusiliers (2nd Tyneside Irish), 26th Northumberland Fusiliers (3rd Tyneside Irish), 27th Northumberland Fusiliers (4th Tyneside Irish), 17th Northumberland Fusiliers (Newcastle Railway Pals), 18th Durham Light Infantry (Durham Pals). From Edinburgh, 16th Royal Scots (1st Edinburgh City), 16th Royal Scots (2nd Edinburgh City). From Oldham, the 24th Manchesters (Oldham Pals). From Accrington, Burnley and Blackburn, the 11th East Lancs (Accrington Pals). From Yorkshire, the 10th East Yorks (Hull Commercials), 11th East Yorks (Hull Tradesmen), 12th East Yorks (Hull Sportsmen), 13th East Yorks (T'Others), 15th West Yorks (Leeds Pals), 16th West Yorks (1st Bradford Pals), 18th West Yorks (2nd Bradford Pals), 12th York & Lancaster (Sheffield City Batallion), 13th York & Lancaster (1st Barnsley Pals), 14th York & Lancaster (2nd Barnsley Pals), 12th King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (Halifax Pals). From Glasgow, the 15th Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Boys' Brigade), 17th Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Commercials). A batallion was officially constituted as 36 officers and 1,000 men, usually they were under strength. Thus the above mentioned batallions would constitute nearly 60,000 men largely organized according to their respective local dialectal and idiomatic commonality. This was language at the service of fixed-grammar, of "thinking imperially".

3. Ironically, at the time of writing (Feb. '75) the Mineworkers Union (of Britain) has just turned down an offer of a 22% pay increase from the National Coal Board, and describes this offer as derisive. They are asking for 40%. The whole ar-

rangement may be rehearsed to some extent, but the miners' aggressive growth of consciousness post-1914-18 war, culminating (through the strike of 1926, the slump of the Thirties, the resistance to cut-backs in the fifties and sixties in the face of what was then regarded as the fuel of the future, oil) in the confrontation of the past few years may, allowing the fixed grammar of much Marxist doctrine, help vindicate the broken sentiments of those infantrymen who came back to 'a land fit for heroes' (what a slogan!). and avenge the bones of many of their predecessors now lying in the cemetries of The Somme and Passchendaele. Grabbing a bigger slice of the cake may not give us a new bakery, but it certainly alters the workings of the old one.

4. We can take a number of testimonies which explicitly show the process of dislocation starting. All are from Middlebrook's book dealing with the first day on the Somme.

"It was pure bloody murder. Douglas Haig should have been hung, drawn and quartered for what he did on the Somme. The cream of British manhood was shattered in less than six hours." (Pte. P. Smith, 1st Border)

"I might add that five minutes after the attack started, if the British public could have seen the wounded struggling to get out of the line, the war would have possibly been stopped by public opinion." (Pte. J.F. Pout, 55th Field Ambulance.)

"I cursed, and still do, the generals who caused us to suffer such torture, living in filth, eating filth, and then death or injury just to boost their ego." (Pte. W.N. Haigh, 1/5th York & Lancaster.)

"From that moment all my religion died. All my teaching and beliefs in God had left me, never to return." (Pte. C. Bartram, 94th Trench Mortar Battery.)

"I made up my mind that, if ever I got out of it alive, there wasn't enough gold in the Bank of England to get me back again." (L/Cpl. J.A. Henderson, Belfast Young Citizens.)

More nostalgically:

"The memories of those heart-breaking days will last forever. The name Serre and the date July 1st is engraved deep in our hearts, along with the faces of our 'Pals', a grand crowd of chaps. We were two years in the making and ten minutes in the destroying." (Pte. A.V. Pearson, Leeds Pals.)

"So ends the Golden Age." written in the History of the 9th York & Lancaster Regiment, which lost 423 men on July 1, 1916.

"We were able to see our comrades move forward in an attempt to cross No Man's Land, only to be mown down like meadow grass. I felt sick at the sight of this carnage and remember weeping. We did actually see a flag signalling near the village of Serre, but this lasted only a few seconds and the signals were unintelligible." (L/Cpl. H. Bury, Accrington Pals.)

"My strongest recollection: all those grand looking cavalry men, ready mounted to follow the breakthrough. What a hope!" (Pte. E.T. Radband, 1/5th West Yorks.)

And in hindsight:

"One universal question which I have never seen answered: two or three million pounds a day for the 1914-18 war, yet no monies were forthcoming to put industry on its feet on our return from the war. Many's the time I've gone to bed, after a day of 'tramp, tramp' looking for work, on a cup of cocoa and a pennyworth of chips between us; I would lay puzzling why, why, after all we had gone through in the service of our country, we have to suffer such poverty, willing to work at anything but no work to be had. I had only two Christmases at work between 1919 and 1939." (Pte. C.A. Turner, 97th Brigade Machine Gun Company.)

"When I was out of work, I had to go before a Means Test Panel. There was a very fat lady on the Panel, cuddling a Pekinese on her lap. She said, 'We've all got to pull our belts in a hole or two these days'. I was fed up and told her, 'your words belie your appearance. That bloody dog's had more to eat today than I've had.' There was a lot of argument and it ended in a row. My chair went over; papers and ink-wells went flying and the dog was yapping and squealing. I was charged with common assault and got three months in Wormwood Scrubs." (Pte. G. Kidd, 9th Devons.)

The traditional hostility of the Miners Union soon surfaced after the war, when conditions in the mines showed little sign of improvement. Some of the miners who had been captured by the Germans whilst serving in the army, were put to work in German mines. "It was 1945 before our pits became as safe and efficient as the German pits were in 1918." (Pte. T. Easton, 2nd Tyneside Scottish.)

"Of course, I have been angry and bitter concerning the betrayal of promises made to the men of the 1914-18 War, 'A land fit for heroes'. etc. Many of my miner friends suffered long periods of unemployment and poverty. The greatest of all indignities was to watch their children having to line up at soup kitchens." (L/Cp. W.J. Evans, 8th King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.)

And a further dislocation of the language-use from its empirical consequences was to be found in the plight of many war-disabled, who were viciously left to eke out an existence on pittances of pensions, and, obviously, would have considerable difficulty getting work.

"Although I have survived to the ripe old age of seventy-five, I look back, not with pride, but with disgust at the treatment meted out to the disabled ex-servicemen of my generation." (Pte. F.P. Weston, 7th Buffs.)

"More than anything I hated to see war-crippled men standing in the gutter selling matches. We had been promised a land fit for heroes; it took a hero to live in it. I'd never fight for my country again." (Pte. F.W.A. Turner, 11th Sherwood Foresters.)

And in the following testimony is perhaps enshrined the whole question as to the ethical influence of language upon experience.

"July 1, 1916 was the most interesting day of my life." (Lieut. P. Howe, M.C., 10th West Yorks.)

Lieut. Howe's battalion, the 10th West Yorks had the highest casualities of any battalion in action on July 1st, 710 out of a battalion strength of 1,036. After his initial attack with the 10th West Yorks, Lieut. Howe went over the top again with the 7th East Yorks after being placed in a position of more or less being unable to refuse by the invitation of the Lieut.-Colonel of the 7th East Yorks, who apparently regarded him as an experieneed veteran after his luck in surviving the morning attack with the 10th East Yorks. At 2.33 in the afternoon the 7th East Yorks went over the top, at 2.36 they were ordered back as it was apparently hopeless to continue. They had lost 123 men in three minutes, killed or wounded. After surviving the second attack, Howe on his way back to report to brigade headquarters met the Lieut.-Colonel of the 7th Green Howards, who, after already once having attacked and losing more heavily than the 7th East Yorks, were about to go in a second time. Inevitably by now it seems, Lieut. Howe received the statutory invitation. At this point, Lieut. Howe explained the situation, pointing to his wounded hand, his grazed face, and his exhausted men. He was excused. In the light of such a day, the employment of the adjective "interesting" seems itself an interesting term to use to describe sueh a day. (See Middlebrook's book, pp. 205-07.)



PERIMETERS OF PROTEST

Review of a panel discussion at Artists Space, 155 Wooster Street, New York City, February 18, 1975. The eight panelists were: Carl Baldwin (moderator), Carl Andre, Rudolf Baranik, Mel Edwards, Hans Haacke, Nancy Spero and May Stevens. Linda Nochlin was supposed to attend but she apparently had the flu—too bad.

I. Perimeters of Protest had a few problems. The title itself gives us some idea: it was all about the form and style of protest rather than what it is, that is *the content, the practice,* what we might aetually protest about. It was taken for granted that protest is something to be vaguely desired. None of the panel discussion was *socially specific.*

This ennui of metaphorical-generality was initially the result of the *lack of practice* of an art-historian, Carl Baldwin (though nobody else fared much better). The problem of "politics" existing as an alienated subjeet-matter was typified by Baldwin's introductory ramble. Here he did an impression of an art-historian. Why are art-historians so often boring? Is it because they oeeupy a grey middle-land, a half-way house of "information"-without ideology or practice? Baldwin acted as if his own academic-historical search-for-niches was unproblematically "natural". And from the reaetion of the audience, only his art-historical chums really followed him.

Baldwin mentioned as part of the history of "protest art" (sic) Daumier, *The Raft of the Medusa,* and *Guernica.* But the latter, it seems, is only "political" in that it is "about" politics—a response after the faet, not a praxiological response leading up to it. He didn't mention Dada. Surely Dada and Surrealism both had political dimensions which, despite them being almost totally coopted by alienating art-institutions, were "political" in ways which *Guernica* was not. The latter *illustrates* a political subjeet, it doesn't *internalize* the problem, it *alienates* it. This might give us some idea of the difference between political radicalism and a wet-sock notion like "protest art".

One point Baldwin may have been trying to make (it wasn't clear) was: you had to have the social conditions in order for protest to be effective. Delacroix's *Liberty Guiding the People* was effective in part since it embodied a sense of class conflict. The working people of Paris dominate the picture. It told the bourgeoisie something they didn't want to hear. At that time however the Parisian workers *did* go to the Salon, not only the bourgeoisie. They saw the painting as a symbol of working class Paris. Similarly, Courbet conjured up images which undermined the bourgeois sense of what was art. He addressed himself to another public, the public that each year crammed the Salon Carré on their day off.

Consider this in the light of Walter Benjamin's suggestion that for protest to be effective it ought to make co-workers not only out of our fellow producers, but also make co-workers out of the consumers, out of readers and spectators. Thus it is a function of such "protest" to *make use of conditions* where you ean make eo-workers out of your fellow producers and consumers. Now consider how so-called fine-art might do this today? Look at the *material conditions.* Look at the audience for fine-art today. Perhaps Lissitzky had such an audienee once, but *Guernica* didn't. It's rather a symbol-after-the-fact, a classical painting, hardly a tough paradigm of protest.

One member of the audience who sounded as if he was going to say something more interesting than he did, made a point about Hans Haaeke's work being "too soon" --that is, out-of-phase vis à vis the public context today. The thing about Haacke's "Guggenheim Trustees" publication (listing the corporation and business connections of those trustees) is that—and Carl Andre made this same point—it tells us what we already know. Now, if we know the same people buy museums and control culture also control corporations and rule the rest of the USA, what real purpose is Haacke's piece supposed to serve? Moreover, who is the information aimed at? It isn't the working people or the

"minorities" of New York City since they don't often get uptown to the Stephenotty Gallery. So one assumes it must be the privileged members of the New York art-community? Haacke said he didn't see his work as protest art and pointed out that protest art belongs in the streets in the form of posters anyway. (It's normally assumed that Haacke's work has political *content*. It doesn't. It has political *subject-matter*. The content isn't really all that controversial. Here again politics isn't internalized, it's *illustrated*. This isn't merely caused by bad strategy, it's a reflection of the way all art is muzzled today.)

In his introductory ramble Baldwin seemed to be saying something like we lack access to the kind of audience present 120 years ago in revolutionary France. The Lower East Side Puerto Ricans just don't visit the MOMA on Sundays, they watch TV. It might follow, if one wanted the effect of (e.g.) Courbet (in certain instances) that one ought to use mass-media? But even this presupposes the so-called masses are going to be responsive to such appeal. TV is potentially popular media but unfortunately it's controlled by corporations. It is, in the USA anyway, a function of Capitalism. TV as a medium is, unlike books and magazines and newspapers, just like Video. It is externally paced, rather than read at a pace chosen by the reader. It would seem to be that this has all sorts of implications with respect to learning. It also poses questions as to what kind of cultural power one wants?

But all this is a bit of an academic point it seems. If we are going to begin to talk coherently rather than in an idealistic and utopian way about "protest", we have to look at what specific possibilities are open to us, given who we are. That is, we must try and make it socially specific. There has to be not only a functionality between one's work and specific injustices but a functionality between those injustices and our ability to deal with them. Instead, in the panel discussion, attention is drawn away from this and onto the cult of historical autonomy: Goya-Daumier-Delacroix-and-oh-really-Picasso. These historical niches veetor "protest" as if it's part of the stylistic continuum of art-history.

II. Generally people were loathe to mention the obvious. It was Carl Andre who pointed the finger at Capitalism. Andre quoting guru Cage on "there's just the right amount of suffering in the world" reminded us that yes-indeedee Andre does have a slogan fit for every occasion. But, also, it rightly reminded us that there's something obscene, something scandalous, about the artist protesting suffering in far-flung parts of the globe. We can call this mindless-Thirdworldism, something which is not of course, by any means, restricted to artists. A lot of people prefer to see politics taking place in South America, China or Africa—or even, particularly in the Sixties, Vietnam. In fact the further away and more exotic the better since it is then easier to stick with indignance but hard (though far from impossible) to make it socially specific and hence begin to internalize or include *yourself* as part of the problem.

This panel was our first encounter with the label "protest art". Nancy Spero even spoke of herself as a protest artist. If there's one way imperialist art-promotion will ruthlessly subsume—i.e., render harmless what we do—it's by packaging yourself as a protest artist. Even better media-fodder is to package yourself as a *woman* protest artist. Her work's likely to function harmlessly despite her intentions (since there is in this society some lacunae between intention and function). This was aptly illustrated by May Stevens. One of her prints protesting Capitalism (or something or other) had been bought by the United States Information Service. All of which points to conventional medium, painting, sculpture, prints, as perfectly *useless*. And they are not useless because they are old-fashioned or other glib stylistic criteria, but because they are at present strategically a waste of time, though this may not always be so. These media perpetuate rather than confront the massive institutionalization of art recognized everywhere today. May Stevens seemed surprised that her print was bought by the USIS. If she was surprised, the question is why was she surprised?

Given the moneyed dynamics of the art-world today, the idea of painting and sculpture as a means of protest is just not very serious.

It's depressing to see people take their work for granted, as if the work itself didn't already embody some of this society's political relations. Except perhaps for Haacke and one is never sure of Andre, the others didn't seem to understand many of their problems resulted from their work itself and the paradigmatic weight given to the cult of individual art-personalities.

Amongst the audience there was one guy who was just itching to ask Andre and Haacke why, if in fact they wanted to protest the kind of institutionalization that we are stuck with, do they show at the John Weber Gallery? One gets the feeling Andre has been asked this time and time again and he's done a lot of rehearsing the answer. Actually his answer was a bit pat but of course valid. He said one can't proceed to live today as if the revolution had already occurred. But, even given this, one can still do a bit where one can and so one can further ask (and this is important) *is Carl Andre doing his bit, is he doing enough?* Andre has, it mustn't be overlooked, been pointing for the last ten years to many of the problems that now seem just basic. At the same time, he's sustained his sculpture. While some of his remarks on the panel were by far the most pointed, on other levels it's very difficult to understand him. For instance, at the panel he gave the distinct impression that he was born laying little zinc squares "naturally"—so to speak—on art-gallery floors. The I-can't-help-what-I-do syndrome results from an awful neglect of materialism.

It was to be expected that half the evening be taken up by fat-heads who think art is a bit of nature. One panelist (Rudolf Baranik apparently?) insisted that the artist's muses might be "a dealer named Leo, a critic named Lawrence, an editor named John, and a curator named Bill". Or, the artist, this same person continued, might instead have Marx, Lenin or Che in mind. *But*, he continued, when the artist really gets down to work, these muses all vanish. He seemed to be making a psychological point about the nature of work into, apparently, a plea for final political innocence. It hardly seems the effect of losing oneself in one's work is just limited to art. It also seems true of other non-alienating work—building a table for instance. But Baranik seemed to imply that the mode of production was immune from influence, was autonomous and, going by the applause, many others present agreed. Art is thus supposed to be innately innocent. This is just wishful art-school "sensitivity" and an incredibly simple form of essentialism. It finally amounts to further evidence of the way the Modernist ill-educated continue to go about their thinking.

There was a lot of oohing and aahing about the relation between art and life. This kind of flabby grammatical habitualization prolongs petrified modernism and prevents us from dealing with the problem as a question of ideology/content. Naturally the former has a bit of injected content, just so as we don't all become too ashamed of ourselves (Mel Edwards, a black artist, seemed to imply artists cloistered in SoHo don't know what problems are anyway).

So, there was no dearth of platitudes. We might ask, who was to blame for them. It's a bit gross just to blame the panelists or even the audience. It might be closer if we consider the sea of generalities as a function of the organization of the panel, that is, the concept of the panel itself. If we have eight persons all intent on "protest" meaning something distinctly different, then public noise pushes out private message. The liberal ethic of homogenization is at the base of the problem: let's-not-deal-with-one-person-but-let's-get-a-survey-of-the-whole-spectrum. This is more than merely a problem of organization. The structural-methodological base restrains and distorts ideological-moral practice. So finally, "perimeters of protest" alienated practice in favour of *kunstwelt* media-life.

So, "perimeters of protest" had a few problems. Harold Rosenberg, sitting just behind us throughout, has been going on about a lot of these problems for a long long time. But during the panel he dozed off—it didn't even keep him awake.

MEL RAMSDEN

THINKING ABOUT TIM CLARK AND LINDA NOCHLIN

It shouldn't be exotic to look to a pre-Modern era to try and catch glimpses of a different relation to art production—perhaps a more integrated, less alienated activity? The rise of Modern Art coincides with the rise of modern capitalism and, while their histories are far from independent, dependent relations are far from clear. Most attempts to elucidate those relations come over as superficial sloganizing or just plain nutty. The period in France, in particular from 1848 to 1871, has left its stamp on us in one way or another. But it's a confusing period. Realizing today how Modern Art has shaped our language and cultural world, realizing how we have been recruited as puppets for its cause celebre, then anyone trying to deconstruct this ideology should look at that period for many of the sources of today's empty-headed practice. It marked the beginning of the specialization which 'stops ordinary people doing it.'

1848-51 was the time of the Second Republic in France, a time of great hope, a time when (in Clarke's mind) Courbet "for a moment. . .almost achieved the impossible," because "if any artist came close to creating the conditions for a revolutionary art, it was Courbet in 1851." The other end of the period is 1871 and the Paris Commune. This was a time when, as the Metropolitan Museum's recent show 'The Impressionist Epoch' seemed to be trying to tell us, it was already 'too late' for those who had commenced along the pathway of Modern Art, a time when a political art had already become impossible for the Impressionists in a way that it apparently hadn't, earlier, for Courbet, Daumier, and others.

This epoch saw the rise of what Courbet called "the lazy goal of l'art pour l'art" and what Baudelaire mocked (once) as the "puerile utopia of l'art pour l'art." Initially, l'art pour l'art was a protest against the vulgar utilitarianism of the day, the taste of the emerging middle-class, and a drive to create something independent and elite from that. In their disgust with contemporary reality, the artists began producing for a nonexistent audience, essentially production for production's sake. This was a far cry from the political intention that is so often associated with Realism in art. However, "the idea that only an elect—an anti-Philistine elect known as the avant-garde—self-chosen and self-perpetuating—could respond to the work of art on the basis of its *art* qualities alone, is a *social* response, not merely an aesthetic one, to the tremendous social and institutional pressures on the production and consumption of art that went along with the more general upheavals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words, the creation of the avant-garde was the mirror image, the precise response *to* the emergence of the mass Philistine audience."

Oddly (perhaps?), one of the strongest defenses of l'art pour l'art came from an expatriated American. Whistler, in his 'Ten O'Clock Lecture' (1885) asserted the artist has no relation whatsoever to the time in which he lives; the for-art's-sake artist that Whistler proclaimed led two lives, one in the real world and the other in the 'world of art.' How entrenched this has become!

At the time this represented an upheaval in the system of values—the replacing of 'humanist' values by autonomous and formally-stressed values. This is well-caught in the derision of the critic who exclaimed, of Manet's *Chez le Pere Lathuille*, that he couldn't be expected to accept that the gentleman's tie was as important as the complexion of the lady's face. To paint the tie *as important as* the face was to ignore the *content* (in a social sense). Consider this as a sort of cultural counterpart of the Copernican Revolution when the Earth was no longer posited as the center of the universe. Here the tie is as important as the face—is man then to be no more important than the clothes he wears? —how can the painter assume such an *impersonal* relation to the people he is painting?—how can he treat them as 'objects' rather than 'subjects'? This small incident catches some of the early impetus of modern *formalism*, where the artist no longer reflects a personal compassion for the social reality of his subjects but transfers that compassion to the 'art' of his picture. *It is the beginnings of the autonomy of the work of art*—and the psychological alienation of the artist's product from himself. "For Manet and the avant-garde, as opposed to the men of 1848, the relation of the artist to society was a phenomenological rather than a social fact. . . (Manet's works) seem more like embodiments of. . . a dandyish coolness toward immediate experience, mitigated either by art or by irony, or by his own inimitable combination of both." Irony and art become a rejection of and defense against the real world. . .the subject of their alienation. But, unlike other situations, they more or less fixed on and preferred alienation from their social reality, and their work celebrated it!

The impersonalism and exclusivism of the artist's relation to his work meant that art no longer had any external (social, etc.) impulse to change, the dynamic was *internalized* and further distanced the artist from his true social situation. Thus were the conditions for the artifice of the 'avant-garde.' "For implicit—and perhaps even central—to our understanding of avant-gardism is the concept of alienation—psychic, social, ontological. . ." When we speak of the alienation we feel toward our art production and cultural life today, this is I believe (at least part of) what we are talking about. The formalist ethos, the treating of form as though it were the essential thing, is dependent on the autonomy of the product, the work of art, and becomes the very basis of its economic 'life' independent of the producer.

Consider Marxist Fischer: "any ruling class which feels threatened tries to hide the *content* of its class domination and to present its struggle to save an outdated *form* of society as a struggle for something 'eternal,' unassailable, and common to all human values. Hence the defenders of the bourgeois world do not speak today of its capitalist content but of its democratic form. . ." *(The Necessity of Art, 1959).* Marxist or not, the problem remains. In attempting to develop a political consciousness in art-practice, all the resources of expression given us are an expression through a social form *contradictory* to such a consciousness, and it is finally *this form which is the public content of the work. That* is the heritage of Modern Art. . .no matter what up-to-date or radically-opposing subject matter is interposed.

Clarke's books, suggestive of new modes of interpreting 19th c. art, scrutinize the relation between art and politics at a particular (and crucial) moment of history. His discussion of the split between public art and private innovation is something we can easily identify with, it's embodied in today's institutionalized divorce of an artist's political commitments from his artistic expression, and the widely held belief that an artist need only create 'new' art to have constituted an act of political radicalism. Clarke writes, "art's effectiveness, in political terms, is limited to the realm of ideology. This is a real limitation, though occasionally the nature of politics means it is not a crippling one. In other words, the political struggle *is* always, partly, a struggle of ideologies; and at times the clash of ideologies takes on a peculiar importance; it is the form of politics, for a moment. In certain circumstances, works of art can attack, dislocate, even subvert an ideology. And sometimes, rarely, that dislocation has some political significance."

The question Clarke is finally grappling with is: "how could there be an effective political art? Is not the whole thing . . . incompatible with the basic conditions of artistic production in the nineteenth century—easel painting, privacy, isolation, the art market, the ideology of individualism? Could there be any such thing as revolutionary art until the means existed . . . to change those basic conditions . . .?" He argues that the problem, then and perhaps also now, is how to use the conditions of artistic production without becoming defined by them. But our problem today is not just that the conditions of our production have defined us, the very concepts of ourselves as 'artists', but that also the private dimensions of our lives have been eroded away or likewise become defined by our production. It's no longer anywhere near enough to invent a means of distribution to bypass the art market, the problem is now spectacularly larger.

Anyway, it would seem right now that nineteenth century art-historians are in a fortunate position, if they can take advantage of it fully, of steeping themselves in the period of revolutionary change from pre-capitalist to an ultimately avant-gardized, commoditized, capitalized Modern Art tradition. The concept of such a tumultuous change seems beyond the grasp of most twentieth century historians, particularly those who have promoted the avant-garde via their own self-serving 'theories' of 'historical necessity'. But such a change is what many today are self-consciously striving for—however platitudinous that sounds. So why does the work of Nochlin and Clarke on 1830–80 interest us? Because there might be a kind of convergence between those who are looking at Modern Art's beginnings and those who are hoping for its end.

IAN BURN

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A FORUM ON ARTFORUM

The meeting between the Editors of *Artforum* and the artist' community, sponsored by Artists Space on October 15th, 1974, was quite revealing; many aspects, including the very notion of such a meeting itself, pose interesting questions. However, I wish to concentrate on one aspect: the Editors, through their unassailable indifference, brought to the proceedings an air charged with intimidation. They were unbelievably arrogant in the self-sufficieney of their opinions (passive observations), led off by John Coplans' statement that '*Artforum* goes where the action is.'

As long as critics deal with the form and rating of art, they are in a protected position. Critics maintain authority because they are not made answerable for their practice but rather are allowed to deal in opinions, all of which are adaptable (critics often survive the fall of art movements). During the course of the meeting you almost found yourself agreeing with the critics' opinions, as they had the rhetorical force of their authoritarian language behind them; any challenge was weak for its lack of such language and was therefore easily dispensed with. However, the artists complied with their own role marvelously, asking, for the most part, such penetrating questions as 'how are artists selected for review' and 'why don't West-Coast artists get equal space'—to which the Editors replied with enthusiastic superiority. Neither the artists nor the Editors seemed concerned with their actual praetice, but rather were interested in the demarcation of the authority within which they worked. Criticism (and this applies to both critics and artists) deals in opinion, which due to its arbitrary character, presents the *illusion* of freedom through its 'unpredictability.' This unpredictability is, however, little more than the application of fixed economic or social pressures, for which the critic serves as mediator.

In a world where the predominant order is that of authority, we now, forced by our inability to be authors of our own acts, seek security in the hope of gaining a greater collective share of the wealth and power of that system. As artists, we are forced to submit to the politics of the 'market place,' bargaining for a position within the bureaucratic structure of the contemporary art world. *It is not by accident* that the artmagazines, especially *Artforum*, have now developed an increasing interest in the politics of art. It was through the pages of this magazine that we recently witnessed the most 'sophisticated' use of philosophical terminology in the most authoritarian way (Pincus-Witten *et al.*); it is, therefore, *consistent* that it develop the language of institutionalized art 'politics.'

The articles in the February issue of *Artforum* on the breakdown of the Pasadena Museum, MOMA unionization, and various articles on MOMA's policies, never question the social roles of these institutions, or the nature or their authority, let alone, as noted above, any critical analysis of the magazines' *own* investments. They discuss, essentially, these institutions' adjustment (or failure to adjust) to the latest heights of economic monopoly. In John Coplans' article on Pasadena, he does not even mention the possibility that the Norton Simon kind of takeover might be rooted in the very nature and purpose of these institutions themselves—his indignation is over the loss of power to his 'class' of bureaucrats. Coplans criticizes Norton Simon for not having the 'ethic of public charity' of the old style capitalists such as the Rockefellers. He neglects to mention that the nature of capitalism has changed since then, and that this also might have something to do with the Pasadena situation. In Lawrence Alloway's article on MOMA unionization, there is never the consideration of the political ends unionization will achieve (if any), except to mention it should change something (left unspecified). Does unionization in this liberal sense achieve anything more than the fact that more people will be making one and the same decision?

But we cannot just blame patrons, curators, critics, etc.—artists are equally complicit. For any one or all of these groups to gain a greater share of the bureaucratic power would not alter its basic ideological form. Even when we are able to describe the general ideological structures that have put us in this position, we have no subjective basis for understanding them. Our experience, framed in the language of 'objective' rationalism and liberal 'reform,' reinforees that *language*, not our experience. The 'objective' status of art finally reduces itself to the proposition 'anything can be art.' Our language then becomes vacuous, as it can arbitrarily nominate any set of formal terms to justify a given situation. Thus the real justification of present art is elearly seen as its authoritarian but arbitrarily administered language. It is for this reason we are faced with the wholly unprecedented complicity of artists in maintaining this status quo.

Paradoxically, the meaninglessness of methodology has forced the very issue of 'politics' (which has been fervently denied by liberal ideology). The dilemma which then occurs is that we are now forced to deal with a politics (talk concerning the market), but havc internalized the notion that any political content in art is impossible. The only thing we have left to talk about cannot be a part of our art. Realizing the politics of the market place to be absurd, we are unable, however, to formulate a radical political content into our activity and work. We are now blatantly confronted with our own impotence, our activity suspended in a dilemma which negates action.

As our individuality, or what illusion of it remains, is further subsumed under monopoly capitalism, we are faced with forming collective enterprizes and unions in order simply to survive. Thus collectivization, at this point, is not motivated so much by 'good intentions' as it is by a desperate attempt to survive in the face of a collapsing monolith of our own construction. Talking must form a beginning, but we lack the necessary authority over our own language. The concept of an 'artworld' is ludicrous; yet the problem is contained in that very term we use. We unwittingly identify ourselves, not as artists in a larger community, but as members of a separate and self-sufficient 'world.' We talk about the 'problems of the artworld,' but are unable to integrate them (except by dubious analogy) into a larger world. If we assume the supposed freedom of the individual, then by extension we must assume the freedom of the artworld. A 'free community' in an authoritarian world. Angels in hell, no wonder we have nothing to say! But we like it, don't we; there are few such privileged sanctuaries where we can live out our fantasies of being radical heretics, and be paid to meditate for hours reciting the names of saints and geniuses who suffered for our privilege. However, the bottom's falling out, and the growing awareness of our dependency on that larger world is actually making some of us *think*.

It is a sad commentary on our 'freedom' that the awareness of our compromise is forced on us by the impending collapse of the market system which supports it. We never questioned that position during the hysteria of the Sixtics, when commodity values overwhelmed ideological possibilities (who needs to argue on a fat stomach). But now hysteria has calmed, we have to face the fact that we too exist in the world of everyday life, and that we must make clear our commitment to it. In spite of our (deserved) cynicism, that means being 'political.'

We must pay, however, for our indulgence, and the price is being caught in the dilemma of not knowing what to *do*. Our talk begins by being all over the place.

Talking infers the interaction between people, as opposed to meditation, which is a solitary (if not anti-social) activity. Meditation mystifies in that it presupposes the individual to have innate qualities that will allow him to comprehend the world; and this mystification forms the basis of our rationalization of our present art-activity. The 'great' artists and thinkers are always pictured alone, their ideas coming through a kind of revelation, usually triggered by one of those fortuitous accidents of fate or nature. By talking, we might be able to avoid the inevitable result of isolation that leads to over-formalization and abstraction; through the modifications of interaction we might be able to define a practice which has a social commitment. Thus we would be able to test our practice in a social context, rather than in the private domain of 'mystic revelation.'

It has been argued that art can serve no radical political purpose; that it is the aesthetic of decorative amorality. We have authoritative art historians who can fanatically trace a whole history of pigmented forms, ignoring any content as either socially quaint or philosophically irrelevant—art historians who preserve their academic 'freedom' by declaring the content of art to be harmless, at most an interesting record of social customs of a given time. We have been so brainwashed with the idea that our art cannot have content, it seems impossible to visualize any that could. God forbid that we go back to representation, after all those precious years of struggle to get away from it. What would we represent, anyway: the heroic worker, the fat capitalist, or our own backyard?

Even if you could develop an art object (be it a painting, film, poster, etc.) that, hypothetically, had a radical content and form (!), would not this object become another commodity just in its necessity to reach a public? In fact, this hypothetical case still preserves the autonomy of art, acting as a separated entity. It assumes that the artist is *giving* something to society, rather than *practicing within it*. It is in this *separateness* that even 'radical content' is consumed. The artist is oppressed by his specialized 'professionalism,' which alienates him from his own work, as well as other people. It is only through an *integration of activity and self on all levels* that any radical theory can develop (in art or anywhere else). In this sense, any idea of community cannot be a community of specialists, e.g., an art community. Soho, which constitutes an unprecedented ghetto of artists, and would *seem* to function as a community, consists of the most socially alienated group of individuals one could ever hope to meet. We have become so accustomed to our fragmented life of selling ourselves and our work, teaching (the perpetuation of our producer-consumer existence), and a relatively affluent lifestyle, that the idea of throwing it all in is, to say the least, a bit disconcerting.

The problem of a community that is defined by a profession is that such a community develops its own language and becomes insular (much like national communities). They may be sufficient for those within it, but would fail to contribute outside their boundaries, ultimately replacing the alienated *individual* with the alienated *community*. You may be able to define a community by common professional interests, but the cohesion of the group eventually becomes elitist/dogmatic (patriotic?) in its failure to integrate with the larger world.

Despite the above reservations, a community still seems the only means by which we can overcome the extreme isolation of our vacant subjectivity, and begin to deal with the larger world. Such communities, based initially on professional groupings, could form the basis for the de-structuring of the present artworld; its institutions and authorities. More importantly, it can develop a dialogue in which we could begin to formulate a practice; and it is through *practice* that we are able to come to terms with the actuality of our experience. However, a community and its practice need also develop towards integration with other communities and individuals, giving up the sanctities of its specialization and language, eventually to form the basis for the definition of a radical community on which a broad revolution could be built.

KARL BEVERIDGE

BUYING CULTURAL DEPENDENCY: A NOTE ON THE CRAZED THINKING BEHIND SEVERAL AUSTRALIAN COLLECTIONS

Pure Art is no longer a black rectangle or an unpainted canvas. It is art sold for a price so huge it strikes one blind and thus makes the painting itself invisible. (Harold Rosenberg)

A writer on art, Terry Smith, is currently being sued by Max Hutchinson of the Max Hutchinson Gallery and Sculpture Now, Inc. (in New York) and Gallery A (in Sydney, Australia).[1] In a fairly genteel review of the Australian National Gallery's two million dollar Pollock purchase, Terry Smith wrote:

> "Rumors fly about in New York: that the agent for the sale, Max Hutchinson, whose gallery in the SoHo area of Manhattan has hardly been a raging success, either artificially boosted the price so as to increase his commission or incompetently negotiated a price inflated by at least a half million. That the director of the National Gallery, Jim Mollison, did not consult his advisors Waldo Rasmussen and John Stringer of the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art. That Ms. Heller is deeply unhappy about her husband's selling the painting and wants it back. That someone is now crazy enough to want to pay *three million* for the painting." (*Nation Review*, 1/18/74)

In my view this is pretty tame stuff. In Australia, the purchase caused a furor from a number of interests, questions were raised in Parliament, artists were outraged. That is, there were a lot harsher things said.[2] So why is Terry Smith being sued?

I think the answer to this can be found by recognizing the opposed cultural interests represented by each party. On the one hand, you have someone who profits from culture having become a function of economic caprice and, on the other, someone who (on several occasions) has strongly assailed such debasement of art and who is now faced with a lawsuit aimed at intimidating him and pushing him 'out of business'.

Terry Smith assailed 'internationalism' in art in an article published in *Artforum* (Sept. '74). Anyone who wants to know his position can read this article, no need to go into it here. However, his central point is that regional, local, and individual diversity is being systematically eroded by a concept of culture which is allied with market power. Such power—via media, education, etc.—causes culture to be viewed as something *external* to what people do, something alien and outside of personal intention, something which has become the dominion of 'experts' and entrepreneurs . . . like Max Hutchinson.

According to Terry,[3] "provincialism is not merely a submissiveness to the power exerted by a geographically distant metropolitan art world. Rather, it is all that follows from seeing one's options as an artist, critic, curator, dealer, audience, etc., within a framework whose two *inclusive* poles are joining in with the metropolitan center's criteria for 'significant art' on the one hand, and burying oneself in peculiar localisms or idiosyncracies on the other. In practice, compromise is the result in nearly every case."[4] That is to say, cultural dependency insinuates itself and determines all the permissable options, even the reactive ones. Your *actions*, no matter what your intentions, become a function of that dependency. Thus New York modernism serves as the coin of the realm.

But this is also a time when the New York tradition is faltering, when the economic impulse has extinguished every prospect for a real practice, even at the privileged pinnacle of this cultural hierarchy. You can't hope to sustain non-economic values if the cultural privilege-system is governed by a Detroit-style art market.[5]

Despite the producers' realization of this impasse in their cultural lives, the New York Bubble hasn't burst yet—the marketeers and entrepreneurs are continuing business-as-usual. It's characteristic of these persons to want to prolong modernism's aesthetic half-life. But, in so doing, they *have to* disregard the specific character and subjectivity of any one particular place and promote a notion of 'universality' which implies an end-to-diversity and a deathly conformity to New York dominated

values. This they *have to* do in order to *make money* . . . because this is the market where the capital is concentrated. Thus the marketeers and all, through the very nature of their business, have a vested interest in seeing as many places as possible fall into dependency within this marketing empire.

The U.S. art market has spectacularly inflated prices *literally* beyond sense (—the Pollock: $6,000 in 1954; $32,000 in 1956; $2,000,000 in 1973). By inflating the prices of its own art, it has by 'historical-necessity' inflated the prices for all prior Modern Art. That's fine for the money-grubbers—but these inflated interests have *devalued all current art production*. For example, how can any Australian artist even hope to 'match' a two million dollar painting? Because this is the situation which has been set up . . . if you pay that much for a painting, you *can't* separate it from the price. Thus making a painting 'as good as' Pollock means now making a two million dollar painting. The *money* and nothing else becomes the psychological criterion for 'matching', the producing artist is *downgraded* and even further imprisoned in a dependent provincial role. It also insinuates itself throughout culturally-educated values, becoming the psychological ball-buster in every institutional context of learning.

If it was, say, a Rembrandt, not a Pollock, would it make a difference? In some ways, yes. Time-wise, the Pollock is *competing against* a local history of art, and devalues it, by having become so excessively valued *in the context of the local history*. There are a number of ways that, for New World countries, pre-Modern art doesn't raise questions of competing histories, of selling out your own history to a more capitalized imperialistic history, and so on. It's no less problematic, it just raises different questions.

Moreover, the current policies are seemingly irreversable now. The Australian Government isn't likely to sell its collection, is it? Because showcases like the National Gallery are the status symbols of 'emerging' nations—and a two million dollar painting is a bigger status symbol than a one million dollar painting. God help us!

So the ramifications for current art production are dire. But what exactly are the criteria for 'internationalized art'? There's a remark from old cold-war warrior Daniel Bell which throws some light on this: "One of the reasons why men can go to the moon but not create more habitable cities, is that plotting a trajectory into space is solely a technical problem, but planning a city means being subjected to the crossfire of conflicting interests and diverse values of different groups of men. . ."[6] In similar terms, the high art of today has been transformed by the culturecrats, the whole media-world of 'international' middle-men, into a specialized and technical problem, one able to be ruled over by 'experts', divorced from the frailties and uncertainties of socially specific contexts.

Now obviously, in any literate culture, some formalization is necessary. But recently such formalization has acquired the bureaucratic spirit: that is, it defines itself as *logically separate*[7] from the "crossfire of conflicting interests and diverse values of different groups of men". Such an alien and 'logically' separate realm is staffed by an army of middle-men, all of whose livelyhoods depend on market imperialism. One of them is Max Hutchinson.

It ought to be apparent that Terry Smith's views stand antithetical to Hutchinson's interests. The latter received a $100,000 commission from the Pollock sale (from the Australian Government, the buyer, not from the seller) and, if you include for example the shows in Sydney of his New York stable of artists, it can be seen he has a considerable investment in perpetuating the steady state of cultural dependency of the Australian art community.

What's to be done then? Dependency is the criterial condition of the 'international culture'. It's the conceptual framework of corporate uniformity. Anyone who travels about the international art world knows there is an astonishing homogeneity amongst museum taste-makers—no matter where one goes. The Australian taste-makers are no exception. This is characteristic of all bureaucratized cultures, where 'taste' becomes authoritarian and institutionalized. Another characteristic of bureaucratic behavior is secrecy, and this too is mirrored in the apparent difficulty for anyone to find out exactly what the Australian National Gallery has purchased. Is this merely to do with the assumption of inviolability of all artocrats, a way of perpetuating themselves by restricting information which might make them open to criticism? Is this so different to Hutchinson assuming the inviolability of his marketing practices? Doesn't it also reflect a condition pervasive throughout contemporary art—the difficulty, especially for a bureaucratic mentality, of articulating any sort of coherent defense of purchasing policies, or the prices paid, or the 'grading system' in general? Doesn't the difficulty lie in the fact that the absurd superstructure of contemporary art is simply a function of market collusion? But who is prepared to admit that publicly?

There are basically two collections in Australia with enough funding to purchase in 'the international market'. One is the, still under construction, Australian National Gallery (where the Director, Jim Mollison, is a former employee of Max Hutchinson). The other is Sydney University's Power Gallery of Contemporary Art, potentially the largest collection of third-rate art in the world.[8]

But what sort of culture does the National Gallery purchasing reflect? With its two million Pollock and (almost) one million de Kooning, of course it reflects the culture of privilege-wealth-glamour . . . and ultimately irrelevance. It reflects a culture that has been so transformed that it has lost its ability to *mean* anything, since meaning too has fallen into the dominion of the culturecrats. This kind of culture is an ideological desert, especially considering the way it's supposed to function with respect to art production in Australia. It is an ideological desert because the dumbfounding inflationary prices force any non-alienating art production into the devalued position of dependency and oblivion. It is an ideological desert because the concept of buying 'masterpieces', tokens of a culture whose spirit exists elsewhere, whose context and complex intentionality is elusive, is a gross insult to our potentiality for learning → culture.[9]

In short, it reflects all of the things I think tough contemporary art ought to be assailing.

I am an Australian and I'm galled by the poverty of the thinking behind this sort of purchasing. But what makes the National Gallery's policy of so much concern is that *the Director is literally purchasing culture en bloc*. Culture, if it's achieved at all, is earned (won), not granted or bought . . . cultural freedom is the precondition for acquiring the maturity for such freedom, not a gift to be granted when such maturity is achieved (Kant,—nearly). The Australian policies serve ends opposite to those they are intended to be serving.

The policies have ramifications not only for local art production[10] but also as a reinforcement of the dynamics of the market-place. If you invest two million in one painting, you are making an institutional commitment to see that painting's exchange value doesn't drop. Thus you are forced into protecting not just an individual work of art but the whole imperialistic market dynamic that creates that price. This means you have locked yourself into American cultural-economic interests.[11] You are not only locked in, you are locked in *as a consumer*, not a producer. It seems however these kinds of connections are never made.[12]

The savants of art are all too willing (if unwitting) servants of the market, and seem pretty determined to try and make all of us equally servile. Unless we can get more self-consciousness into *our* functions, and *their* functions, it's likely they will succeed to a greater extent than they already have.

Finally, in what seemed an incidental and merely personal lawsuit there are signs of the growing schism in cultural attitudes. Hopefully, this schism will become more contentious and the issues more explicit and hotly debated. I also hope it means the war against art-imperialism will now be fought far more out in the open.[13]

IAN BURN

NOTES & REFERENCES

*While this note reflects a personal vexation on these matters, some of the issues were clarified in conversation with Nigel Lendon.

1. Of course, technically, the newspaper is being sued.

2. For example, "Last year the Australian Government bought 'Blue Poles' . . . by Jackson Pollock. Don't think the $US2 million our Government paid for it was the market price. No, by astuteness and cunning, they managed to snap up 'Blue Poles' for eight hundred thousand dollars *more* than the market price. At least two people deserve a large part of the credit for securing this anti-bargain. One is Mr. James Mollison, the Director . . . Another is Mr. Max Hutchinson . . . Before Mr. Mollison was appointed to the Canberra Gallery . . . he worked for Gallery A. Mr. Hutchinson, the founder of Gallery A, was his boss." Brian Medlin, 'Cultural Imperialism', *Broadsheet*, Contemporary Art Society (South Australia), Sept 1974. Also, it was recently revealed to a Parliamentary Committee that, during 1972-73, 63% of the National Gallery's purchases were through Max Hutchinson's galleries.

3. I don't want anyone to think,this note has anything to do with spurious 'objectiviry', Terry is a friend of mine and I feel a

tremendous solidarity with what he is doing. But at the same time I don't wish to paint him as any sort of white knight—he's made his share of mistakes too.

4. *Artforum*, December 1974.

5. Even Robert Hughes (*Time*, March 10, 1975) has commented that "the stupendous hyping of art as a blue-chip investment . . . has made it impossible for most people under 35 to have an aesthetic experience without considering the price of the works they are looking at."

6. *Art International*, December 1974.

7. cf. Mel Ramsden, 'On Practice', this issue.

8. It appears, not incidently, that the buyer for the Power Gallery, Elwyn Lynn, doesn't like Terry Smith either. He particularly doesn't like Terry's take on the provincialist problem. In reply to 'The Provincialist Problem' (ibid) in the Letters to *Artforum* (Dec 74), Lynn allegedly defends himself against charges of being a "formalist"; however the bulk of the letter comprises an obsequious dose of self-promotion.

9. It is an ideological desert also because the Director behaves like an ideological empty-head. For example, he said in an interview (*National Times*, Oct 1, 1973) that he buys works because he "likes them"! Does this mean he "likes" to buy two million dollar Pollocks in the same way he "likes" to buy chocolate chip icecream? The ascription of conventional cultural preferences to organically 'natural' likes and dislikes is typical of the inhabitants of the wastelands.

10. Actually Mollison has put together a reasonable collection of Australian art. But who can see anything after being blinded by two million and one million dollar sugarplums.

11. The investment in the Pollock, while some see it as daring ("A courageous buy," said Mr. Ben Heller), is actually full-blooded *conservative*, a massive investment in the perpetuation of the status quo.

12. Even when Mollison admitted to the newspapers, after the Pollock purchase, that "(t)here have been times when $50 millions of art offers have poured onto my desk in a single day," he apparently didn't make any connections.

13. My intention is *not* to promote nationalism. Internationalism is just a market expedient and only that, so by attacking this it doesn't follow I'm defending nationalism—in fact an apt definition of provincial thinking is someone who is able to think *only* within these two alternatives.

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